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Abstract 
 
This project focuses on American art and fiction in the long nineties (1989-2001). 
Specifically, it explores the critical strategies that artists working in this decade employ in 
their efforts to challenge aspects of the political philosophy of neoliberalism, in the wake of 
the declining power of postmodern aesthetics. My approach to this topic is structured 
around a series of readings of genres. This structure imitates Hal Foster’s recent work Bad 
New Days, in which Foster engages with four ‘terms’, noting that ‘some are closer to 
strategies, others to predicaments.’ As for Foster, each genre I engage with contains 
elements of both strategy and predicament: they generate new ideas about remaking the 
word – strategies that might be considered post-postmodern – as well as manifesting 
intractable political and aesthetic situations beyond which the artists working in this period 
struggle to move. Each genre ultimately represents one specific critical approach to 
neoliberalism in the 1990s, from the withdrawal central to the slacker narrative to the 
mediation by which suburban fiction engages with financialisation, to the abject art that 
forces a confrontation with the outer limits of what fiction can represent and accomplish.  
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Introduction 
 
 
What is the Matrix? 
 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between art and neoliberalism in the American 
1990s. I am interested not only in texts that comment on or make visible the conditions of 
life in the United States under nineties-era neoliberalism, but also in how artists including 
novelists, filmmakers, and visual artists respond to and challenge the phenomenon of 
neoliberalism as it manifests both as economic policy and—as becomes increasingly 
apparent over the course of the decade—as an organising principle of everyday life. My 
specific period of interest is what Phillip E. Wegner, in one of the few existing studies to 
focus wholly on the period of the 1990s, refers to as 'the long nineties.'1 This 12-year 
decade is bookended by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the destruction of 
the Twin Towers on September 11th, 2001. My focus will largely be directed towards 
experimental, outsider texts that have received less critical exposure than canonical works 
from this period, but that nevertheless do vital and often innovative work in approaching 
the problem of neoliberalism. For the purposes of this introduction, however, I want to 
consider a rather more prominent text for what it has to tell us about the condition of the 
United States at the end of the twentieth century.  
 
Released in 1999, The Wachowski Sisters' The Matrix edges into the history books as one of 
the most successful films of the decade.2 A true cult phenomenon, The Matrix expertly 
blends cutting-edge digitally enhanced action, pop-philosophical depth, and high concept 
science fiction into a cinematic spectacle that manages to be both exhilarating and 
esoteric. And while the digital landscapes and iconic 'bullet-time' sequences represent the 
culmination of almost a century of filmmaking technology, The Matrix is, also, firmly a 
                                                          
1 Other studies of the 1990s include: Samuel Cohen, After the End of History: American Fiction in the 
1990s; Adam Kelly, American Fiction in Transition: Observer-Hero Narrative, the 1990s, and 
Postmodernism; Gil Troy, The Age of Clinton: America in the 1990s; and the edited collection 
American Fiction of the 1990s: Reflections of History and Culture.  
2 The Matrix was the highest grossing R-rated film in the U.S. in 1999 (see 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=matrix.htm). It also topped the newly created DVD 
sales charts for both 1999 and 2000, practically single-handedly propelling this emergent technology 
into the public’s homes (see Clover, 49).   
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product of its specific historical moment. Despite its creators wryly describing the film as 
being nothing more than a tale of ‘robots vs kung-fu' (qtd. in Clover, 8), The Matrix has 
spawned an entire industry of critics, academics, and amateur analysts devoted to 
unravelling the mystery at the heart of the film: 'what is the Matrix?' One way to approach 
this question is to consider just how The Matrix is attuned to the specific historical 
conditions from which it emerges. Such a consideration, in return, can lead us to a deeper 
understanding of the specific issues and anxieties with which the film is engaging. 
 
The Matrix tells the story of Thomas Anderson, aka Neo, as he is awoken to the realisation 
that the entire human world and the existence which he believes to be real is in fact a 
computer simulation called the Matrix, generated explicitly for the purpose of containing 
and pacifying the human population. The illusion of the Matrix is revealed, in the course of 
the film, to conceal humanity's real existence as a captive source of energy for a dominant 
society of machines. At the beginning of the film only a small society of rebels have 
escaped from the vast 'fields' in which humans are held and harvested, and their 
awakening allows them to re-enter the Matrix as beings of superhuman potential, able to 
bend and break the rules of what they now understand to be a computer program in order 
to perform feats of spectacular strength and athleticism as they battle rogue programs 
called 'agents' operating at the behest of the machines. 
 
As a narrative of awakening, The Matrix represents one of a number of entries into a 
subgenre which Joshua Clover has termed 'edge of the construct' narratives, wherein, as 
Clover describes, the hero of the film 'sees the simulation as nothing more (and nothing 
less) than what it is, recognises the limited apparatus of what he once thought was infinite 
reality' (Clover, 8). In his study of The Matrix for the British Film Institute, Clover notes the 
ubiquity of these narratives at the end of the twentieth century. From John Murdoch in 
Dark City to Truman Burbank in The Truman Show (both 1998), the late 1990s saw a host of 
cinematic characters transcend, or at least awaken to, the artificial bounds of their 
existence. But what prompted this trope to enjoy such extraordinary popularity at precisely 
this moment, as the twentieth century came to a close? 
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With its postmodern philosophising and invocation of Benjaminian reproduction and 
Baudrillardian simulacra,3 The Matrix obscures a much simpler allegorical undercurrent. 
Synopsising the film, Clover observes that 'a ruling class has achieved dominant power. 
There is a dominated class. The master class does not rule simply for the pleasures of 
power [...] it requires something of them for its own sustenance' (57). The meaning here is, 
of course, quite explicit, and barely even qualifies as allegory. Read in this way, The Matrix 
is very simply 'a plain-spoken Marxist description of capitalism and its human conditions' 
(ibid.).4 But even more than this, The Matrix is a description of capitalism in 1999: of the 
neoliberal incarnation of capitalism particular to this period. As Clover notes, in 1999 the 
absolute crisis Marx foretold—in which plunging rates of profit would provoke competitive 
struggle, bankruptcies, and eventually class uprising—had, in fact, still not occurred. And so 
the question at the heart of The Matrix becomes 'what is the thing that stops the 
oppressed class [...] rising up?' (59)–a question the film phrases as: "what is the Matrix?" 
 
 
What is neoliberalism? 
 
 
Before attempting to answer that question, we must consider the precise conditions of 
capitalism at the end of the twentieth century; of what has come to be known as neoliberal 
capitalism, or neoliberalism. An immediate challenge to the attempt to engage with 
neoliberalism is, as many critics have noted, the inherent slipperiness of the term itself. In 
their overview of existing literary studies that take neoliberalism as their subject, Quinn 
Slobodian and Leigh Claire La Berge remark upon the fluidity of the term as it has been 
used in recent critical efforts. They note how ‘neoliberalism’ alternately defines a period 
from the 1970s to the present marked by the deregulation of finance in the global north 
and a concurrent shift of industry to the global south; a ‘doctrine of governance’ that 
mandates competitive individualism over redistribution and social justice; a ‘movement of 
intellectuals’ associated with F. A. Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society; and an ‘order of normative 
reason,’ quoting Wendy Brown, that has amplified and extended features of capitalism into 
the arena of everyday life (La Berge and Slobodian, 603). The authors conclude that such 
                                                          
3 In one famous scene, the camera lingers on the cover of a hollowed-out book just long enough to 
reveal its title: Simulacra and Simulation. 
4 As Clover wryly notes, ‘Matrix, Marxist; what’s a letter between friends?’ (57).  
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referential flexibility is not inherently a problem, cautioning rather that those of us aspiring 
to critique neoliberalism remain sufficiently attendant to the dangers of flattening the 
‘family of neoliberalisms,’ quoting Dieter Plehwe, into a single, homogenous, and broadly 
meaningless phenomenon (612). Too often, they note, the term neoliberalism ‘sutures 
together left-inflected investigations of all aspects of culture,' (603) without sufficient 
precision.5  
 
While this thesis is less interested in the neoliberals behind neoliberalism, it will at various 
times refer to neoliberalism both as a doctrine of governance and as an ‘order of normative 
reason,’ as well as seeking to nuance the typical 1970s-to-present periodisation of 
neoliberalism that, perhaps unhelpfully, now encompasses a half-century of history.6 One 
of the recurring questions that arises when discussing artistic responses to neoliberalism 
regards on which of these levels it is more efficacious to engage with the term: as a political 
doctrine or as an organising principle of everyday life. Slobodian and La Berge note that the 
two most important figures, in the context of literary studies, to have produced texts on 
neoliberalism are David Harvey and Michel Foucault. ‘Put broadly,’ they explain, ‘Harvey is 
used to periodise; Foucault, to conceptualise.’ We could also argue that Harvey provides an 
intellectual foundation for those analysing neoliberalism as a political doctrine. His work is 
also frequently to be found cited by those critics whose intellectual affinities are broadly 
associated with neo-Marxist and world systems critical theory, and whose interests focus 
less on neoliberal politics than on the systemic, globalised capitalist system that is 
understood to determine these politics. Meanwhile, Foucault’s work is conversely drawn 
upon by critics interested in analysing neoliberalism as it manifests in everyday life, and 
                                                          
5 Will Davies, on the other hand, argues that this difficulty is an inherent, integral aspect of 
neoliberalism. The reason ‘neoliberalism’ appears to defy easy definition, he suggests, is not due to 
critical imprecision but because the term ‘refers to a necessarily interdisciplinary, colonising process. 
[…] It remains endlessly incomplete, pushing the boundaries of economic rationality into more and 
more new territories’ (Davies, ‘The Difficulty of Neoliberalism’).  
6 As Will Davies notes in another of his articles on neoliberalism, contemporary post-2008 
neoliberalism ‘is manifestly different from the neoliberalism that rose to power in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and different again from that which held sway from the 1990s, in the long boom 
preceding 2008. […] there is […] something problematic about ascribing governmental interventions 
in 2016 to the same overarching rationality or teleology as those of 2001 or 1985’ (Davies, ‘New 
Neoliberalism,’ 123). As I shall explain later, I follow Davies’ in his attempts to periodise within 
neoliberalism—work that is critically important but, with the exception of Davies’ efforts, has gone 
largely neglected to date.   
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who fall broadly into a post-Marxist camp and whose interests lie more in subjective 
experience than in systemic inequalities.7  
 
Beginning with Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism, we find in the opening pages one 
of the most succinct definitions of neoliberalism as political doctrine. ‘Neoliberalism,’ 
Harvey writes,  
is […] a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade. (2) 
Following this definition, Harvey identifies the lynchpins of neoliberal thought as the 
trifecta of deregulation, privatisation, and the sanctity of the free market. All of these ideas 
can be seen at work in the proto-neoliberal experiment carried out in Augusto Pinochet’s 
Chile by the so-called ‘Chicago Boys,’ a group of economists influenced by the teachings of 
Milton Friedman, himself influenced by his participation in the Mont Pelerin Society 
(Harvey, 19-20). This intellectual genealogy resulted in the Chilean economists of Chicago 
returning to their country in 1975 to ruthlessly restructure the economy according to the 
principles of neoliberalism. They did so by reversing nationalisations, opening natural 
resources up to private and unregulated exploitation, privatising social security, and 
encouraging foreign direct investment and free trade (Harvey, 8). Their activities 
precipitated an immediate, if short-lived, revival of the Chilean economy that nevertheless 
provided tangible evidence to support the theories of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, who would bring neoliberalism to the UK and US respectively in the 1980s. As 
Harvey observes, ‘a brutal experiment carried out in the periphery became a model for the 
formulation of policies in the centre’ (9).8  
 
But while the forceful restructuring of the Chilean economy from the top down provided 
the results Reagan was looking for, it did not suggest a suitable means of implementation, 
                                                          
7 The opposition between neo- and post-Marxist thinking is explored in much greater detail in the 
final chapter of this thesis, which focuses on the dialectical writing of American author Don DeLillo. 
8 The brutality of this experiment is not to be understated. The neoliberalisation of Chile is the first 
example of what Naomi Klein, after Friedman himself, calls the ‘shock doctrine’: the rapid and 
wholesale transformation of an economy according to neoliberal principals, the speed and scale of 
which is designed to place a public in a state of ‘shock’ that, according to the theory, helps facilitate 
the transition. In the case of Chile and of other economies that form the case studies in Klein’s Shock 
Doctrine, this economic violence is accompanied by the physical violence of imprisonment and 
torture meted out against those perceived as obstacles to the transformation process.   
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nor does it account for the manner in which, by some accounts, neoliberalism morphed 
from a policy to a logic or ‘order of reason.’ To account for how Western capitalist 
countries like the US became ‘neoliberalised’ through a process of democratically achieved 
consent, Harvey turns to what will become a regular—if not unproblematic—narrative for 
this thesis. Consent, Harvey argues, is grounded in what Gramsci calls ‘common sense,’ or 
commonly held beliefs. These beliefs can be influenced by powerful tools of ideological 
dissemination,9 but are rooted in the fundamental, everyday experiences and values of the 
mass population. In the 1970s, the preservation of individual freedom was widely held as 
sacrosanct, crossing political boundaries and transcending traditional divides. This desire 
for personal freedoms was demonstrated with particular vigour in the political upheavals of 
the 1960s, and Harvey notes the way in which the demands made by countercultural 
figures for freedom from ‘parental, educational, corporate, bureaucratic, and state 
constraints’ proved complementary to the neoliberal project to privatise and deregulate 
(41). Furthermore, neoliberal rhetoric proved particularly adept at exploiting and 
fomenting the tensions between collective action and individual autonomy, values which 
had always been at odds with one another. By promoting certain approaches to identity 
politics and multiculturalism, neoliberalism could co-opt these values from collective leftist 
organisations ranged, as Harvey describes, ‘in pursuit of social justice through the conquest 
of state power’ (41). And by mobilising the ideals of individual freedom against regulatory 
and interventionist state policies, capitalist class interests could protect their hegemonic 
position.10 To carry out this neoliberalisation, these capitalist interests constructed a 
‘market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism’ 
                                                          
9 In Gramsci’s theory, ideology is disseminated through a process of hegemony wherein a dominant 
group’s values are promoted by ‘intellectuals’ who hold authority in civil society. This is in contrast 
to ‘political society’ which enforces ideological values through coercive disciplinary systems. These 
distinctions are roughly analogous to Louis Althusser’s ‘Ideological State Apparatuses,’ a category 
that encompasses the media, corporations, and the universities, schools, and churches that 
constitute civil society, and ‘Repressive State Apparatuses,’ which, like Gramsci’s political society, 
operates according to principals of coercion rather than persuasion. See Gramsci, Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks, 145.     
10 Following on from the previous footnote, I use the term hegemony here and elsewhere in this 
introduction as Gramsci defines it: as the ostensibly peaceful (as opposed to coercive) domination of 
an ideological system of governance over civil society. In this sense we can understand Western 
neoliberalism to be hegemonic, while the state-enforced Chilean proto-neoliberalism to which I 
previously referred is more accurately an example of what Gramsci would call “direct domination,” 
enforced, as it was, by repressive rather than ideological apparatuses. For more on this distinction 
see Gramsci, 145. 
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(42).11 As such, as Harvey finds, this proved quite compatible with the emerging intellectual 
and cultural dominant of the time: postmodernism.  
  
We will return to explore further postmodernism’s curious intersection with neoliberalism 
later in this introduction. For now, it is enough to record that the same counterculture from 
which postmodernism emanated also oriented American ‘common sense’ around the 
absolute sanctity of personal freedom: a belief that proved highly conducive to the 
implementation of neoliberalism. What did this implementation look like at the level of 
daily life? As Harvey explains, neoliberalism entailed not just the creative destruction of 
institutional frameworks and powers, but also of ‘divisions of labour, social relations […] 
ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the 
heart,’ (3) all in the name of positioning market exchange as an ethic in itself, and in 
bringing all human action into this domain. It is here that it proves useful to move to 
Foucault’s account of neoliberalism in order to better conceptualise what Harvey has 
usefully periodised and politicised.  
 
Here, also, the limitations of Harvey’s account become apparent. While Harvey’s work has 
undoubtedly proven a useful foundation for scholars working on neoliberalism, his 
definition of the term as representing a laissez-faire economic policy has little to distinguish 
it from more traditional forms of liberalism. Since Harvey’s initial work, however, others 
have attempted to better define the specific values of neoliberalism, often by drawing 
Harvey’s more traditionally Marxist work into alignment with the work of Foucault—much 
as Etienne Balibar describes the process of ‘articulation’ by which contemporary scholars 
often borrow and combine ideas from both Marx and Foucault and combine them in order 
to think through a problem (see Keucheyan). Will Davies, for example, notes that Foucault 
was ‘one of the first to notice’ that neoliberal intellectuals were engaged in ‘a remaking of 
human subjectivity around the ideal of enterprise,’ which involved harnessing ‘the virtue of 
markets[:] their competitive quality’ as a normative procedure for determining value and 
                                                          
11 While the brunt of the neoliberalisation of the US was carried out through this appeal to freedom, 
this is not the whole story. Quinn Slobodian’s account of the formation of ‘meta-economic’ global 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation corrects a 
prevalent narrative of neoliberalism that leans too heavily on the importance of self-regulating 
markets and shrunken states. For Slobodian, conversely, a national free market economy was only 
made possible under neoliberalism by the creation of international institutions capable of 
‘safeguarding capitalism at the scale of the entire world’ (Slobodian, 2). In other words, 
neoliberalism didn’t do away with intervention or concern itself entirely with individualism, rather it 
simply moved power from one institution (the state) to another (the global institution).   
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knowledge (Davies, ‘New Neoliberalism,’ 127). Here Davies adds a fourth, vital term to 
Harvey’s definition: competition. A further distinction between liberalism and 
neoliberalism, and another addendum to Harvey’s definition, comes in the form of 
financialisation. A term broadly used to capture the turn from the accrual of profits through 
trade and commodity production to the generation of profits through the expectation of 
future interest or capital gains, financialisation indexes a shift in the US economy from the 
desire for immediate returns to the assumption of future returns. To see just how the 
neoliberal project sought to develop and extend competitiveness, and how the practices of 
investment were extrapolated into daily life, we can look to Foucault’s pioneering work on 
biopolitics.   
 
In The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, Foucault sets out his 
theory of ‘neo-liberalism’ as distinct from German ‘ordo-liberalism.’ Key to Foucault’s 
narrative is the theory of ‘human capital,’ a term initially popularised by Gary Becker, 
another of Milton Friedman’s students—and later his colleague—at Chicago. In The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Foucault explains human capital as representative of a distinct process: ‘the 
extension of economic analysis into previously unexplored domains and […] the possibility 
of giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be 
non-economic’ (219). These twin processes entail what can broadly be thought of as the 
economisation of everyday life, in which economic rationality dictates ‘the strategic 
programming of individuals’ activity’ (222). This leads, for Foucault, to the situation in 
which an individual’s labouring ability becomes conflated with their selfhood, so that ‘the 
worker appears a sort of enterprise for himself […] and entrepreneur of himself […] his own 
capital, […] his own producer, [and] the source of his earnings’ (225-226). As such, pursuits 
that would previously be considered either peripheral to, or entirely distinct from, the basic 
process of labour exchange become subject to economic rationalisation: education, 
pastimes, diet and exercise, and even social and romantic relationships become 
investments designed ultimately to enhance one’s potential as an enterprise, and to 
maximise future successes.12  
  
                                                          
12 Despite the apparent proximity of these ideas to certain Marxist theories, it is worth noting, as 
Etienne Balibar has done in his extensive work on Foucault and Marx, that Foucault’s position in 
relation to Marx has always been uneasy. As Balibar observes, Foucault’s ‘materialism of the body’ 
and his focus on governmentality and disciplinary techniques may borrow occasionally from the 
Marxist phrasebook, but his focus is distinct from the economics-oriented preoccupations of Marx 
(Balibar).  
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Foucault’s account has received considerable attention and modification since the 1980s. 
Perhaps one of the most convincing and widely cited accounts of neoliberalism, deriving 
from Foucault, is found in Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth 
Revolution. To the standard left criticisms of neoliberalism—intensified inequality, crass 
commodification, enhanced corporate influence over policy, economic instability—she 
adds another: the transformation of market-based behaviour into a ‘normative order of 
reason.’ Updating Foucault via the work of Michel Feher,13 Brown narrates the evolution of 
human capital from an analogue of productive capital to one of financial capital. From 
Foucault’s initial vision of the worker as a producer (in which, like the synecdoche of the 
worker as hand, the profit-earning potential of the worker comes to encompass them 
entirely) Brown tracks the evolution of homo economicus into the more nuanced notion of 
the subject’s investments (in education, relationships, etc.) as speculative contributions to 
an ongoing process of self-appreciation that provides no immediate tangible rewards but 
enhances one’s stock value on the human market, in a process roughly analogous to that 
occurring in the newly financialised economy. Concurring with both Harvey and Foucault, 
Brown ultimately concludes that this specific form of economisation leads to the situation 
by which ‘neoliberalism governs as sophisticated common sense […] a reality principle’ 
(35). As such, the economic principles which it preaches come to structure the everyday 
lives of those living in neoliberal America, while more insidiously, this process is 
simultaneously disguised as natural or common-sensical: an invisible transformation that 
Brown terms the ‘stealth revolution.’ 
 
 
Why the 1990s? 
 
 
In the 1990s of The Matrix, Brown’s stealth revolution was in full swing, something the 
Wachowski Sisters’ film exhibits an acute awareness of. As a mediation between material 
reality and social consciousness that offers itself as ‘real’ or as common sense, the Matrix in 
which Neo and his compatriots are at first trapped and from which they are later liberated 
is in fact a representation of a ‘reality principle.’ Beyond the ‘reality principle’ there are 
many terms for the system of control The Matrix allegorises: broadly speaking, the Matrix 
can be read as a representation of Althusserian ideology, Foucauldian discourse, Lacanian 
                                                          
13 Most notably Feher’s article ‘Self-Appreciation; or, The Aspirations of Human Capital.’  
17 
 
symbolic order, or Ranciere’s distribution of the sensible; all of which describe variations on 
an ideologically informed, ordered version of reality designed to obscure the real 
conditions of human existence and to enforce certain behaviours, principles, and logics as 
natural. In the 1990s the economisation of everyday life had rendered the policies of 
neoliberalism into a system of ethics capable of governing human social behaviour, and The 
Matrix responds with anxiety concerning this state of affairs, in which a political ideology 
had come to dictate the terms of everyday existence.14  
 
But why does The Matrix emerge at this particular moment, at the end of the 1990s? To 
read the accounts of Harvey, Brown, and others is to follow a narrative that sees 
neoliberalism calcifying into common sense from the late 1970s onwards. And yet the 
‘edge of the construct’ genre emerges almost in its entirety in the last couple of years of 
the twentieth century. It is my contention that the 1990s can be understood as a period of 
‘high neoliberalism’—of neoliberalism’s hegemonic phase. In his vital work to periodise 
within neoliberalism, Will Davies similarly terms this period ‘normative neoliberalism’: the 
period from 1989-2008 in which ‘the horizons of political hope had been delimited to a 
single political-economic system’ (127). This, in contrast to the earlier period of ‘combative 
neoliberalism,’ in which neoliberalism defined itself in combative opposition to socialism, 
and to the later period of ‘punitive neoliberalism’: of post-2008 austerity capitalism. 
However, where Davies and others present a picture of the 1990s as one of delimited 
horizons, I want to argue that the decade presents moments in which the ‘reality principle’ 
begins to fray. While the stealth of Brown’s ‘stealth revolution’ remains intact during the 
decade and the term neoliberalism remains largely absent from popular discourse, the 
1990s nevertheless sees, in art in particular, an insistent series of efforts to push and probe 
at the ‘reality’ neoliberalism presents. It is these efforts which are the focus of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
14 Clover observes the many instances in which The Matrix discloses an anxiety specifically directed 
at neoliberalism. Protagonist Neo’s daily life as Thomas Anderson is emblematic of the ‘new 
economy’ of the 1990s, a distinctly neoliberal work environment in which those at the ‘wavefront of 
the tech boom […] worked in a cubicle not so different from Thomas Anderson’s, for a company that 
wanted as many […] hours as it could get, and had newer and better ways to get them’ (15).  The 
disciplinary speech Anderson’s boss delivers to him further compounds this ‘no alternative’ 
situation: Clover brands it ‘the soliloquy of middle management. […] It presents an inescapable 
totality […] This Job or Some Other Job, a choice that presumed long ago that life is made totally of 
labour’ (62). The Matrix, as Clover succinctly concludes, is ‘about work’ (71), and about the end of 
the distinction between ‘work and not-work’ at the hands of the new economy (73).   
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In his account of the decade, The Age of Clinton, Gil Troy characterises the 1990s as 
emblematic of Bill Clinton’s flagship policy ‘the Third Way’: for Troy, the 1990s represent a 
synthesis of ‘politics and culture’, of liberal belief in government’s instrumentality in 
fostering social justice and of conservative belief in ‘nurturing families and strong 
communities’, of ‘Reaganite conservatism and Great Society liberalism, the 1950s and the 
1960s, traditional anchors and modern freedoms […] America’s super-ego and America’s id’ 
(3). In his introduction, Troy sets the scene for this paradoxical decade, ranging from 
Clinton’s origins in the hippie movement to his braiding of democratic values with the 
Reaganite legacy of hard neoliberalism into his flagship vision of the Third Way. Continuing 
and modifying Reagan’s neoliberalism proved key to the unification of Republican and 
Democrat ideals that the Third Way was intended to represent. The ‘Democratic twist’ Troy 
credits Clinton with injecting into Reaganite economic policy is one based on expanded 
recognition and rights for minority identity groups: an identity politics, in other words, that 
at times distracted from Clinton’s Republican-appeasing attempts to slim-down the state 
and to use ‘market forces to temper government’ (Troy, 304).15 While Clinton’s policies 
continued to facilitate the ‘stealth revolution’ of neoliberalism, the decade’s rapid social 
and technological change generated what Troy terms the ‘five revolutions’: of race, 
technology, work, society, and sex.16 These cultural, economic, political, and technological 
changes proved so rapid as to render a ‘rich and free’ society of Americans as paradoxically 
more ‘lost and unhappy’ than ever before. Ultimately, Troy characterises the 1990s as a 
period of intense confusion: of a confusing decade governed by a confusing presidency. 
Subverting Clinton’s famous proclamation, Troy observes that the 1990s was not a bridge, 
but a runway into the twenty-first century, moving America forward at terrific speed. 
 
Troy’s account of the 1990s as one of intense confusion and change is perhaps unusual, but 
not unique. In the study from which I borrow the ‘long nineties’ periodisation, Phillip E 
                                                          
15 For a contentious discussion of identity politics’ function as a ‘distraction’ to the inequalities of 
neoliberal capitalism, see Walter Benn Michaels, ‘Against Diversity.’  
16 Respectively: the ‘rainbow revolution’ which saw racial demographics increasingly diversify 
throughout the country; the ‘digital revolution,’ which encompassed the rapid expansion of personal 
computing and witnessed the clash of a utopian belief in ‘hyperlinks subvert[ing] hierarchy’ and an 
anxiety regarding increasing alienation; the ‘information age reset’ that occurred as an older 
manufacturing economy gave way to a new knowledge based economy; the cultural ascendance of 
an ‘I’m-OK-You’re-OK’ attitude that represented an increased tolerance for ‘the alternative’; and 
finally what Troy terms ‘America’s gender bender,’ or, the rise in the prominence of sex as an 
acceptable topic of discussion, of alternative sexual orientations, and—related to the expansion of 
the internet—as viewing material and as increasingly diversified and taboo-breaking in practice. See 
Troy, 7-8.    
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Wegner’s Life Between Two Deaths, 1989-2001: U.S. Culture in the Long Nineties, Wegner 
describes the 1990s as a ‘strange space’ situated between an ending (of the Cold War), and 
a beginning (of the post-9/11 world). Borrowing the Lacanian/ Žižekian notion of the 
parallax, Wegner describes the decade as a ‘non-historical […] empty place’ situated 
between a ‘Real event and its symbolic repetition’ (9). This theory is born out in the lived 
reality of the time, which is characterised above all by a ‘Janus-faced’ experience: 
On the one hand it feels like a moment of “terrifying monsters”, of hauntings by a 
living dead past. Yet it is also experienced as a moment of “sublime beauty”, of 
openness and instability, of experimentation and opportunity, of conflict and 
insecurity — a place, in other words, wherein history might move in a number of 
very different directions. (10) 
In a very tangible sense, this instability is partly rooted in the end of the Cold War, which 
ended also one of the twentieth century’s greatest cultural and political struggles and, on 
the one hand, cleared space for the global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, but on the 
other, also ‘opened up space for new kinds of political and cultural experimentation’ (36) of 
the sort documented in greater detail by Troy.17  
 
But the new global order was a formidable opponent to those wishing to take advantage of 
this new openness. In one of the most compelling accounts of neoliberalism’s hegemony, 
Mark Fisher follows in the more conventional footsteps of Francis Fukuyama as he 
describes the end of the twentieth century as the moment of ‘capitalist realism’: of a 
situation in which ‘not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, it is 
[…] impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2).18 Fisher’s most 
valuable contribution to the discourse is his own personal account of living and working in 
the 1990s, a period in which, as we have already seen, political ideology was present in 
almost every aspect of daily life. Describing working in higher education under Tony Blair’s 
                                                          
17 On its surface, Wegner’s account represents a departure from the traditionally accepted narrative 
of the ‘end of history’ popularised by Francis Fukuyama, whose basic argument describes the end of 
the Cold War as the moment of ‘the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government’ (4). Wegner’s account of the decade as one in which ‘history might move in a 
number of very different directions’ might seem antithetical to Fukuyama’s account, but it is 
important to note that Wegner’s focus is largely on a specific politics of identity and culture, and so 
his account of ‘openness and instability’ should be read in relation to the arena of cultural 
production and to the reorganisation of society and societal hierarchies of identity rather than in 
reference to broader political doctrines.   
18 To illustrate his point, Fisher borrows Jameson’s famous assertion that it’s ‘easier to imagine the 
end of the world than the end of capitalism’ (Fisher, 1). 
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government in the UK, Fisher, in conversation with Jeremy Gilbert, offers the following 
account: 
We didn’t have to believe it, we only had to act as if we believed it. The idea that 
our ‘inner beliefs’ mattered more than what we were publicly professing at work 
was crucial to capitalist realism. We could have left-wing convictions, and a left-
wing self-image, provided these didn’t impinge on work in any significant way! This 
was ideology in the old Althusserian sense - we were required to use a certain 
language and engage in particular ritualised behaviours, but none of this mattered 
because we didn’t ‘really’ believe in any of it. But of course the very privileging of 
‘inner’ subjective states over the public was itself an ideological move. (Fisher and 
Gilbert, 91) 
Fisher’s narrative of his lived experience under neoliberalism affirms the Foucauldian 
theory in which ‘conduct’ is the primary target of governmentality. Building on Foucault’s 
definition of governmentality as the ‘way in which one conducts the conduct of men’ 
(Foucault, 186), Nikolas Rose describes the way in which neoliberalism shapes a ‘meta-
world of images and values [in which] the self is to be reshaped and remodelled so that it 
can succeed in emitting the signs of a skilled performance’ (Rose, 239). This privileging of 
‘authentic’ inner subjective states preserved against an outward-facing performance of 
sometimes antithetical values highlights another facet of neoliberal ideology that proved 
particularly pervasive during the 1990s: the supremacy of individualism. From the 
dismantling of labour unions and other forms of collective action to the increased emphasis 
on the governing of oneself and the reframing of social life as a competitive market, 
neoliberalism encouraged subjects to live according to Margaret Thatcher’s proclamation: 
‘there's no such thing as society[,] there are individual men and women and there are 
families’ (Thatcher). Fisher’s account in Capitalist Realism would appear to present an 
unchallengeable system: a true ‘reality principle’ presenting an absolute version of the real; 
a smooth surface against which critique could make no impression and personal values 
were divorced from public performance. And yet, as is evidenced in The Matrix, the 1990s 
records the moment in which questions of this system were asked with increasing volume 
and urgency.  
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“To show them a world without you”19 
 
 
In David Harvey’s account of neoliberalism’s cultural ascension, Harvey makes a point of 
postmodernism’s crucial facilitating role. Harvey’s account, in which postmodernism and 
neoliberalism flourish and commingle in the aftermath of 1968, can also be found in 
greater detail in Sean McCann and Michael Szalay’s article for The Yale Journal of Criticism, 
‘Do You Believe in Magic? Literary Thinking After the New Left.’ The authors begin by 
reiterating Harvey’s assertion of the fundamental importance of individual freedom as 
underpinning the cross-political acceptance of neoliberalism. ‘It was easy,’ McCann and 
Szalay write, ‘for the New Left to look past its differences with the radical right, in short, 
because the two movements shared a basic antipathy to big government’ (442). The 
authors go on to explore precisely how postmodernism contributed to the leveraging of 
this political position into a cultural dominant. The importance of theory to postmodern 
thought—the emphasis on Foucauldian discourse, Althusserian ideology, and 
poststructuralist concerns with language and meaning—saw the countercultural radicals of 
the 60s and 70s turn toward the notion that political protest should concern itself less with 
directly addressing state actors and fellow citizens than to provide what McCann and 
Szalay, after the counterculture leader Paul Potter, call ‘breakaway experiences’ (444). In 
literature, the authors observe, this results in the ‘fundamental opposition between a 
quotidian realm of banal communication […] and the transcendent force of what [Toni 
Morrison] calls “word magic”’ (447).  At its most extreme, postmodern politics lauded pure, 
experiential force shorn of all meaning, and for those authors McCann and Szalay critique, 
language comes to assume ‘a magical and anti-authoritarian power only to the degree that 
it has nothing to say’ (451).  
 
In what has become a common position adopted by left-leaning critics of contemporary art 
and literature, McCann and Szalay’s response to their posed problem is to call for a 
reinvigoration of meaning, of a political literature that prioritises clarity over contingency 
                                                          
19 The title of this section is taken from the final lines of The Matrix, in which the now free Neo 
addresses the following monologue to the machines:  
I don't know the future. I didn't come here to tell you how this is going to end. I came here 
to tell you how it's going to begin. I'm going to hang up this phone, and then I'm going to 
show these people what you don't want them to see. I'm going to show them a world 
without you. A world without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries. A world 
where anything is possible. Where we go from there is a choice I leave to you. 
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and seeks to make sense of the increasing complexity of neoliberal capitalism. This notion 
is echoed in Franco Berardi’s The Uprising, in which Berardi, working in the arena of poetry, 
describes how the ‘subsumption of language by the semio-capitalist cycle of production’ 
has effectively frozen the ‘affective potencies of language’ (18). When money is divorced 
from a concrete referent, as was the case when the gold standard was ended in the US in 
1971 (meaning that a dollar could no longer be exchanged for its equivalent in gold), so the 
stability of the entire linguistic system of signs and referents is shaken. Just as money 
begets money in an M-M economy, so signs beget signs in a postmodern culture no longer 
concerned with meaning. Concerned less with the escapism of the ‘breakaway experience’ 
than with its individualised focus, Berardi argues for a corrective project in which poetry 
reactivates ‘the emotional body’ and therefore ‘social solidarity’ (20), in a direct challenge 
to the colonisation of actions described above, by Fisher. Fisher himself reaches a similar 
conclusion in Capitalist Realism, when he offers his own strategy to combat the seemingly 
unthinkable totality of neoliberal capitalism. For Fisher, the urgent work is in ‘invoking the 
Real(s) underlying the reality that capitalism presents us,’ the ‘cracks’ in neoliberalism’s 
enforced narrative which highlight discrepancies between what should be and what is—
eco-catastrophe, bureaucracy, mental health crisis—and that illuminate the fundamental 
truth that ‘capitalism is inherently dysfunctional’ (18-19).20 Here, like Wegner, Fisher 
introduces a sense of possibility back into the nihilist narrative of the end of history. As 
Fisher remarks at the conclusion to Capitalist Realism, ‘the tiniest event can tear a hole in 
the grey curtain of […] capitalist realism. From a situation in which nothing can happen, 
suddenly anything is possible again’ (81). 
  
However, as many artists working in the 1990s came to realise, to simply tell the story of 
capitalism’s dysfunction through art or fiction brings with it its own dangers. Jedediah 
Purdy’s 1999 book For Common Things proves a neatly illustrative example of this. In the 
opening to the text, Purdy describes his book as a ‘response to an ironic time’ (2). Clearly 
establishing itself as a rejoinder to postmodern ironic consumerism, Purdy’s book is a 
celebration of sincerity, earnestness, and the curtailing of rampant consumption. But as the 
title of his retrospective analysis of the book’s reception, ‘The Accidental Neoliberal,’ 
                                                          
20 These ideas recall classic analyses of the relationship between aesthetics and politics. In The 
Politics of Aesthetics, Jacques Ranciere notes that the arts’ contribution to emancipatory projects is 
in the ‘parcelling out of the visible and invisible’ (19), while Adorno, in ‘Lyric Poetry and Society’, 
observes that ‘the greatness of works of art lies solely in their power to let those things be heard 
which ideology conceals’ (61).  
23 
 
betrays, Purdy found his rejection of postmodern capitalism far from irreconcilable with 
the ‘neoliberal knot.’ Threaded into this endlessly flexible and accommodating knot, 
Purdy’s ‘substantive and structural politics’ were quickly labelled according to their 
perceived aesthetics and sensibility, the media eye content in tagging Purdy as an 
emergent figure in the ‘new sincerity’ movement and marketing him accordingly (16). In 
this, Purdy resembles perhaps the most iconic figure of wearied resistance to 
commodification: Kurt Cobain. Writing of Cobain, Mark Fisher describes the Nirvana 
frontman as giving voice to ‘the despondency of a generation that had come after history, 
whose every move was anticipated, tracked, bought, and sold before it had even 
happened’ (Fisher, 9). Recognising himself how ‘perfectly [his] anticommodification style 
[lent] itself to a commodification that offered an anticommodification frisson among its 
features,’ Purdy bitterly concludes that neoliberal practice consistently succeeds in 
disabling personal attempts to escape it, to the extent that ‘trying to imagine, in public, a 
way of being that is not neoliberal means, mostly, making ephemera’ (22).  
 
This raises an urgent issue for this thesis and for a broader critical engagement with 
neoliberalism. To clarify this, I want to reconsider the narrative I have presented thus far. 
When we move from the historicised narrative of Harvey to the subject-oriented accounts 
of Foucault, Brown, Fisher, etc., we find the privileged object of study to be the individual 
Western subject’s experience under neoliberalism. These accounts, which are 
understandably Foucauldian but also borrow theoretical terms from Althusser, Lacan, and 
others, are themselves drawing on the same postmodern critical tradition as the artists 
McCann and Szalay critique. And their critical work, concerned as it is with the liberation of 
the individual subject from a neoliberalised ‘reality principle,’ often fails to sufficiently take 
into account other overarching realities of neoliberal capitalism: of systemic inequality, 
class divide, and the industrialisation of the global south. In restricting their account to a 
focus on the subject, such critical accounts in fact contribute to precisely this reality 
principle and to the illusion of the absolute hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. Critiquing 
Brown, Slobodian and La Berge note the tendency of her account to imbue neoliberalism 
with a near-eschatological and omnipresent agency. As critics and artists, how then do we 
talk about neoliberalism in a way that recognises its hegemony but isn’t complicit in 
reinforcing it? As Purdy discovered, to be direct and sincere is to risk either derision or co-
optation and marketisation, but to dispense with meaning, as McCann and Szalay argue, is 
to tacitly condone an individualist and escapist politics.  
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Key to this predicament is the idea of autonomy. What Purdy, Cobain, and others seeking 
to criticise neoliberalism find to their detriment is their relative lack of autonomy from the 
system they are attempting to challenge—their autonomy, in other words, from the 
market. This lack of autonomy is similarly experienced—and even embraced—by the 
postmodern artists critiqued by McCann and Szalay. In his seminal work on the subject of 
postmodernism, Jameson notes that, contrary to the varieties of modernism that were 
united in their ‘hostility to the market,’ postmodernisms ‘all at least share a resonant 
affirmation, when not an outright celebration, of the market as such’ (Jameson 1991, 304). 
It is this embrace of the market and celebration of consumption that unites the various 
postmodernisms present in art, architecture, music and fiction that Jameson discusses. 
More recently, Nicholas Brown has echoed Jameson’s distinction when describing the 
complex mediation between autonomy and heteronomy that defines contemporary 
political art. Discussing post-postmodern art, Brown emphasises the ways in which 
contemporary artists can activate modernist-inspired spaces of restricted production 
within a broader field of heteronomous production.21 Reading such post-postmodern 
fictions, Brown insists upon a hermeneutic project of critique that asks, ‘how and where is 
autonomy asserted, what are the mechanisms that make it possible?’ (Brown). Key to both 
accounts is the assumption that art—as demonstrated by postmodern art—cannot be 
authentically meaningful, and successfully critical, if the primary motivation behind its 
production is to appease or even celebrate the forces of commerce and the market. This, of 
course, raises the question of what autonomy from the market looks like—and what 
exactly ‘the market’ is.  
 
Mark Banks provides a useful definition of autonomy that coincidentally also clarifies what 
exactly we are talking about when we talk about the market:  
In broad terms, autonomy can be defined as the capacity of individuals (but also 
institutions and organizations) to exercise discretion or apply freedom of choice; 
                                                          
21 Brown’s examples of approaches that prove successful in this objective are: the ‘positive 
historicism’ of, for example, Brazilian Tropicália, which uses a pastiche aesthetic to juxtapose 
seemingly disparate musical elements in such a way that meaning is generated; and the 
‘aesthetisation of genre,’ which involves an act of subversion within an established and marketable 
generic frame. Both of these approaches essentially involve the ‘smuggling’ of meaning under the 
cover of an essentially meaningless form, hence Brown’s insistence on a constant hermeneutic 
project of critique. This unfortunately also leads to some moments of apparently subjective 
judgement, as when Brown declares at the end of his article that ‘Terminator II can be a work of art, 
while Avatar is only an art commodity.’ 
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the autonomous subject is one that has the ability to determine the pattern and 
shape of their own lives. Historically, autonomy in cultural production has been 
associated with freedom from the particular demands and constraints of the 
commercial world […] autonomy [is] especially closely linked to the artist; that 
special, self-regulating being and ‘free spirit’ possessed of rare and precious gifts. 
(2-3) 
Banks defines autonomy thus: as a broader attribute of individuals to exercise free will; and 
more specifically, as the capacity of artists to resist capitulating to the demands of 
commerce. In the latter sense, the market at work here is clearly the market as it is 
traditionally understood: as a network connecting producers and purchasers upon which 
commodities are bought and sold. Banks’ former definition, when considered in 
conjunction with the above discussed theories of human capital, suggests the capacity for a 
more urgent form of autonomy: an autonomy from the market of human relations into 
which neoliberalism has arranged human sociality through its drawing into conjunction of 
ethics and economic rationality.  
 
Let’s return to The Matrix, to consider precisely how the film attempts to navigate the 
‘neoliberal knot,’ as Purdy describes it, of being both of and against the system. As a 
narrative of awakening, The Matrix appears to aspire to the condition of an event which, in 
Mark Fisher’s words, can ‘tear a hole in the grey curtain of reaction which has marked the 
horizons of possibility under capitalist realism’ (81). When Neo threatens at the end of the 
film to ‘show these people what you don't want them to see […] show them a world 
without you,’ he is certainly aspiring to tear such a hole in the grey—or green, as the film’s 
distinctive palette casts it—curtain of the Matrix, a curtain we have already established 
bears a striking allegorical relationship to the ‘reality principle’ of capitalist realism. 
However, as figures like Purdy and Cobain discovered, there is an almost indistinguishable 
line between challenging and reinforcing neoliberal norms. Often, this line is erased in the 
process of distributing the artwork seeking to mount a challenge. As fictions that challenge 
the market ethics of neoliberalism are translated into commodities for distribution, their 
impact is frequently undermined. This is precisely the problem Clover finds with The 
Matrix. As he concludes his analysis, he notes that the film encourages us to identify with 
Neo and the other liberated rebels; however, for the duration of the film we the audience 
in fact,  
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resemble the docile labourers, each of us enclosed in our own chair, hooked to the 
popcorn and coke machine, consuming digitised and mediated images that sing to 
us our own autonomy while returning our labour to the economy a few dollars at a 
time. (69) 
Furthermore, the identification encouraged by the film is itself problematic. In Henry 
Giroux and Imre Szeman’s critique of the political limits of the cinema of the 1990s, the 
authors remark that edge of the construct films like The Matrix and The Truman Show 
reinforce ‘neoliberal individualism’ by allowing the viewer to identify with their 
‘exceptional protagonists, those true individuals who are able to separate themselves out 
of the mass fantasy of contemporary consumerism’ (97). This identification is further 
reinforced by the film’s unique cinematic innovations, such as the ‘bullet time’ 
phenomenon. Clover notes that in these sequences, 'all of the power and agency is vested 
in a singular figure,’ with whom we identify (25). In simultaneously making visible the edges 
of the construct, and yet still reinforcing certain neoliberal values, films like The Matrix 
demonstrate that for the audience there is 'no walking out' from our own reality principle, 
but there is at least the possibility of 'recognising that this is not the world as it is' (Clover, 
82).  
 
A central question that this thesis will seek to answer is whether recognition is the limit of 
critique. In other words, can any artists, filmmakers, or authors working in the decade 
advance on the work that The Matrix does? One possible response to this question, which I 
will return to explore in greater detail in later chapters, will revolve around the notion of 
sociality. In his chapter in the edited collection Towards a Theory of the Image, Scott Lash 
describes the subject of sociality as ‘not self-enclosed, but open […] not involved in 
monologic “representation” but dialogical “presentation”, and whose aesthetic sensibility is 
not primarily productionist but receptionist’ (114). Lash’s theory describes a form of art 
that, through its aesthetic and formal strategies, rejects individualism in the form of the 
singular creative ego, encourages dialogic engagement and participation in the artwork’s 
creation or meaning-making, and ‘presents’ the possibility of effecting material change 
rather than simply ‘representing’ the way things are. Along with a reinvigoration of 
meaning, Lash argues for the importance of collectivity and connection—precisely what 
The Matrix, with its focus on the hero-saviour Neo, fails to do. The importance of these 
qualities are echoed repeatedly in the artworks this thesis focuses on, and in the 
movements, like the ‘new sincerity’ movement that has emerged as one of the most 
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coherent variations of post-postmodernism, that aesthetic forms of the 1990s appear to 
foreshadow.  
 
 
Strategies and Predicaments 
 
 
The title of this thesis is borrowed from the introduction to art critic Hal Foster’s essay 
collection Bad New Days. In this introduction, Foster notes that the terms each essay 
focuses on—abject, archival, mimetic, precarious, and post-critical—represent ‘not 
paradigms, but strategies or predicaments.’ He clarifies that each term, which he uses to 
delineate a loosely related movement in post-postmodern art, ‘orient some practices [but] 
do not regulate them, and though some follow others in time, they do not displace, much 
less disprove one another; so, too, no one truth is at issue, only so many questions’ (1). This 
last point is particularly salient. This thesis is similarly organised around a series of terms 
which denote genres, or subgenres, of art and fiction that emerge and loosely cohere 
during the 1990s. Often co-existing, but also contradicting one another, each term includes 
aspects of both strategy (pertaining to the successful critique of neoliberalism) and 
predicament (regarding the negotiation of pitfalls in the process of this critique). These five 
genres—slacker narratives, autofiction novels, suburban fiction, abject art, and dialectical 
writing—each provide uneasy, contingent, sometimes wholly compromised answers to the 
problems presented in this introduction. Nevertheless, each also does valuable work to 
push beyond postmodernism and to flirt with new, post-postmodern forms of political 
writing. In particular, the theoretical awareness those working in these genres inherit from 
the postmodern tradition afford them an awareness of the interrelation between form and 
content, a demonstration of what Jameson calls dialectical thinking, or ‘thought to the 
second power,’ in which ‘both the particular content involved and the style of thinking 
suited to it must be held together in the mind at the same time' (Jameson 1971, 45). As 
such, these artworks broadly demonstrate a theoretical self-consciousness more typically 
associated with postmodernism, but go on to present a post-postmodern sentiment or 
agenda. If this sounds abstract, it will be elaborated and made clearer as I handle specific 
case studies over the following chapters, which will proceed according to the following 
structure.  
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The first chapter of the thesis traces the politics of withdrawal through the subcultural 
figure of the slacker. I begin by historicising the practice of ‘doing nothing’, as it develops 
out of the countercultural moment of the 1960s, then delineate its specifics in the context 
of the 1990s. Significant to the slacker narrative is the figure of the artist and depictions of 
avant-garde artistic practice. I historicise the art of doing nothing, reaching back to Fluxus 
and the Situationist International and tracing the twin evolution of experimental ‘anti-art’ 
and socially-oriented ‘participatory art’ out of this earlier moment. These twin impulses 
uneasily co-exist in the art of the slacker and are only multiplied when one considers the 
slacker texts as art-objects themselves. Ultimately, the specific brand of slacking practiced 
by the slackers of Richard Linklater and Douglas Coupland’s narratives represent a troubled 
and contradictory alternative art of life and an imperfect ‘withdrawal’.  
 
My second chapter looks at the genre of the fictionalised autobiography, or ‘autofiction’. 
Focusing on female writers who present highly experimental first-person narratives, this 
chapter looks at the ways in which the mode of autofictional writing may be harnessed in 
the service of making the personal political: of generating experimental fictions that are at 
once both personal and universal, addressing with equal weight the authors’ specific 
struggles and the broader issue of negotiating female agency under neoliberalism. 
Beginning with Kathy Acker, I observe a disjunction in critical responses to her work: on the 
one hand, a school of critics working in the vein of Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous focused 
on Acker’s poststructuralist feminist exploration of language; on the other, a more recent 
trend of reading Acker as pro- or anti-neoliberal. I then read works by Siri Hustvedt and 
Chris Kraus with a particular attention to their use of the autofiction form. Undergirded by 
the theories of Foucault and Butler, I observe how these authors attempt to bridge the 
gaps illuminated by the discourse around Acker: how they attempt to speak to both the 
specificity of their own experiences as women and to simultaneously universalise these 
experiences for all women living in contemporary neoliberal America.  
 
If the texts of chapter two privilege affective experience, my third chapter argues on behalf 
of the affectless, and on the possibilities inherent in a critique oriented around systems 
rather than subjects. In this chapter I read fictions of suburban living in relation to the 
neoliberal process of financialisation. Beginning with an account of how suburbia and the 
economic and ethical dimensions of financialisation interrelate, this chapter argues that 
writing about suburbia consists of a strategy of mediation between the economic and 
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everyday aspects of financialisation, employed in different ways and to varying degrees of 
usefulness, by artists working in the 1990s. Through readings of Jonathan Franzen, A M 
Homes, and John Keene, I read various narrative approaches to finance: from subjective, to 
systemic, to social. The question this chapter ultimately seeks to answer pairs with the 
previous chapter: each, to an extent, ask what compromises must be made in order to tell 
the stories of neoliberalism through the medium of fiction.   
 
My penultimate chapter focuses on abjection, transgression, and the bodily in relation to 
the marginal genre of the ‘new queer’ and the queer fiction of Dennis Cooper. Picking up 
on the notion of sociality as it emerges in the previous chapters, my readings are broadly 
structured around Cooper’s five-novel George Miles Cycle, while also considering some of 
Cooper’s peers in the abject: from filmmaker Gregg Araki to visual artists Cindy Sherman 
and Paul McCarthy. The chapter further interrogates the role of affect in political critique, 
arguing in favour of an art that generates sociality through the manipulation of 
‘impersonal’ or ‘bad’ feelings, as described in the recent works of Hal Foster, Rachel 
Greenwald Smith, and Nikolaj Lubecker, and with reference to the classic theories of Mary 
Douglas and Julia Kristeva. Once again, self-referentiality becomes key here, as Cooper’s 
cycle tells a macro-cosmic story of literary failure in the 1990s: from an earnest desire to 
effect material change, to a collapse inwards into theory and meta-reflexivity. 
Nevertheless, these works also represent forward momentum and a move towards positive 
and productive modes of critique.  
 
My final chapter focuses on the 1990s oeuvre of Don DeLillo as representative of DeLillo’s 
unique mode of ‘dialectical writing.’ This chapter will mark a departure in the methodology 
of the thesis, deriving in part from research carried out in DeLillo’s Texas-based archive. All 
three of DeLillo’s texts from the decade feature artists as prominent characters, while each 
text also embodies formal elements discussed in prior chapters: ideas of artistic 
ephemerality, abject transgression, and a mode of anti-affect or ‘impersonality.’ I read 
DeLillo’s work into the energetic theoretical debates of the 1990s, paralleling his literary 
experimentalism to the intellectual project of thinking through the antagonisms of Marxism 
and postmodernism and the legacy and future of Marxist critical theory. At the end of the 
twentieth century, I read DeLillo’s The Body Artist as the culmination of his effort and a 
vision of a new aesthetics and politics of post-postmodernism: one that finally emphasises 
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values of intimacy, sociality, and communality as antagonistic to a neoliberal emphasis on 
competition and individualism. 
 
The US in the 1990s was a strange space. Simultaneously at the end of history and at the 
beginning of the future, it was a decade of endless alternatives but no alternative. Rapid 
social and economic change saw the country transform, and yet neoliberal ideology stifled 
acts of resistance and radical thought. The art of the decade reflects this situation. At once 
desperate to diagnose the symptoms of neoliberalism and to imagine and instantiate 
alternative forms of living, thinking, and socialising, artists in the 1990s faced the seemingly 
impossible task of penetrating a ‘grey curtain’ of totality. Their art frequently collapses in 
on itself in an attempt to theorise and make visible its own machinery, as thinking about 
thinking—thinking to the second power—becomes a way to manage the anxiety induced 
by the apparent absence of alternatives. And yet, at their high moments, artworks of the 
decade do imagine new possibilities, beyond hamstrung postmodern posturing and the 
neoliberal order of normative reason. It is these moments, as well as the struggles and 
failures, that this thesis will ultimately seek to uncover.  
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Chapter 1: Slacker Narratives 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In an early scene in Richard Linklater’s 1991 film Slacker, a character named Dostoevsky 
Wannabe sits in a coffee shop in Austin, Texas, dictating to a friend who feverishly scribbles 
down his stream-of-consciousness musings on art and effort: 
Who's ever written the great work about the immense effort required in order not 
to create? Intensity without mastery. The obsessiveness of the utterly passive. And 
could it be that in this passivity, I shall find my freedom? 
This highly quotable passage neatly captures the concerns of Linklater’s film. Dostoevsky 
Wannabe’s question concerning effort probes the tension between artistic ambition and 
the refusal to create, and his inquiry into passivity draws attention to the challenge of 
protesting mainstream society purely by disengaging from it. At the same time, the snippet 
of monologue is a jumble of unanswered questions and contradictions: how can passivity 
be obsessive? How can a ‘great work’ possibly hope to capture the effort of not creating, 
when the work itself must be created? Can this tension be resolved? And what of 
passivity—what are the ethics of a freedom attained through withdrawal?   
 
This chapter will focus on these questions as they are raised and at times seemingly 
resolved in one of the major generic innovations of the American 1990s: the slacker 
narrative. Revolving around the eponymous figure of the slacker, slacker fiction as a 
coherent genre of media crystallised into being at the beginning of the decade with the 
publication of three texts: Linklater’s Slacker, Douglas Coupland’s debut novel Generation 
X, and grunge band Nirvana’s sophomore album Nevermind (all 1991). Together, these 
texts introduced the figure of the slacker and the basic themes of slacker narratives to the 
American public, providing a blueprint for the host of imitations and co-optations that 
followed throughout the decade.1 
                                                          
1 While this chapter concerns iterations of the slacker narrative across a variety of media, it is 
undoubtedly in film that the slacker flourished in the 1990s. Slacker films from this decade include: 
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An iconic figure in 1990s American independent cinema, in particular, the slacker 
nevertheless has a long and storied heritage. In his comprehensive study Doing Nothing: A 
History of Loafers, Loungers, Slackers, and Bums in America, Tom Lutz confirms the 1990s 
as the ‘golden age’ of the slacker narrative (295), and he positions Linklater’s film as the 
epochal moment of this age. Emerging against a cultural backdrop in which the puritan 
work ethic is pushed into overdrive by a neoliberal political philosophy that imbues 
personal productivity with transcendent import, Lutz argues that the slacker represents an 
important, understudied figure of resistance in contemporary America. As his centuries-
spanning study demonstrates, however, the slacker long predates the 1990s. Indeed, Lutz’s 
account of slacking in America stretches as far back as the founding of the country, to the 
apparent proto-slacker Benjamin Franklin, in whose words Lutz finds the germination of the 
slacker ethos: to be ‘idle of conduct, but of active mind’ (Lutz, 77). But if the slacker, in the 
various incarnations Lutz chronicles throughout the history of America, is the perennial 
‘other’ of a country built on a valorisation of ‘pragmatism, purpose and productivity’ (270), 
it is in the 1990s that ‘doing nothing’ catalyses into a sustained countercultural movement, 
bolstered in no little way by the decade’s opening with the aforementioned trifecta of 
slacker texts. This chapter seeks to explain the slacker’s blossoming at this particular 
moment in American history, and how the slacker of the 1990s is distinct from their 
previous incarnations.  
 
My readings of the slacker narratives discussed in this chapter are grouped into three parts, 
each revolving around a different issue raised in Dostoevsky Wannabe’s brief speech in 
Slacker. Firstly, I will consider the concept of passivity. Later on in Linklater’s film, long after 
the narrative action has left Dostoevsky Wannabe pontificating in his café, a passer-by is 
offered an ‘oblique strategy card’ by a stranger on the street. The card he draws, inserted 
into Brian Eno’s original deck by Linklater, reads ‘withdrawing in disgust is not the same 
thing as apathy.’2 An informing ethos of Linklater’s film, this declarative also implies a 
                                                          
Dazed and Confused (1993), Reality Bites (1994), Clerks (1994), Kicking and Screaming (1995), The 
Low Life (1995), and Bandwagon (1996). An assortment of slacker narratives in other mediums 
might include memoirs such as Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation (1994) and David Sedaris’ Naked 
(1997), and novels such as Nick Hornby’s High Fidelity, Brett Easton Ellis’ The Informers, and 
Coupland’s sophomore effort Microserfs (all 1995).  
2 The ‘oblique strategy cards’ began life as a deck of cards first produced by Brian Eno and Peter 
Schmidt in the 1970s, as a toolkit designed to break creative deadlocks. It is this deck that Linklater 
references in the film, but the cards read by characters have been added by Linklater and are not 
present in the original deck.  
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distinction between Linklater’s slacking and earlier forms of protest based on withdrawal. 
What precisely is the slacker’s practice of withdrawal, then, and how does the slacker 
distinguish passivity from apathy? Central to this question is to understand what the 
slacker is withdrawing from. In the case of both the characters in Linklater’s film and in 
Douglas Coupland’s novel, withdrawal is clearly figured as a move to disengage from the 
working world. In the preceding introduction I delineated some of the major characteristics 
of neoliberalism in the 1990s, but in this chapter I will look specifically at neoliberalism’s 
impact on daily life, particularly as it relates to the demarcations of labour and leisure. 
Understanding how the slacker sought to negotiate a withdrawal from the working world 
and to re-inscribe and reinforce these demarcations is key to understanding the slacker 
project. 
 
From withdrawal, we move to creativity, and Dostoevsky Wannabe’s question regarding 
the effort required not to create. If, as I will argue, the slacker figure orients their identity 
around a practice of creativity for the sake of itself rather than as a means to an end, then 
what precisely does the slacker create? Following the argument that withdrawal does not 
equal apathy imbues the slacker with a political potential that finds its outlet in the creative 
pursuits that recur throughout Linklater and Coupland’s fictions. What model, then, do 
these slackers offer for those aspiring artists of the 1990s looking to make art capable of 
staging a resistance to neoliberal values? Lastly, following my discussion of the work 
featured in the slacker narratives, and of the art after that, in the third section of the 
chapter I will look to the process of producing the slacker narratives themselves: to 
Coupland and Linklater’s creative labour, or art work. When Dostoevsky Wannabe asks who 
will create the ‘great work’ about the effort required not to create, he alights on a paradox 
at the heart of the slacker narrative: that these texts are works of art that required great 
effort to make, and yet glorify a subculture in which effort appears to be reviled. In this 
final section of the chapter I will step back to look at the form of these narratives as well as 
at the circumstances of their creation and distribution, to consider whether Linklater and 
Coupland offer any resolution to this problem, and if, indeed, they consider it a problem at 
all. Here, Nirvana frontman Kurt Cobain’s lyrics and public persona provide an interesting 
alternative vision of slacker art at work.  
 
The slacker is a complex, at times seemingly contradictory figure. Lutz remarks that the 
slacker ‘must mean different things to different people at different times’, the figure 
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operating as a kind of bas-relief to the prevailing work ethic of its particular generation 
(Lutz, 318). The only essential attribute Lutz settles on in his study is that of ‘doubleness,’ a 
dialectical quality he roots in the ‘celebration and denigration’ the slacker faces at any 
point in history (70). By the 1990s this doubleness pervades every aspect of the slacker 
philosophy and the slacker narrative. Slackers are at once passive and creative, political and 
withdrawn, while the narratives themselves both vilify labour through their subject matter 
and yet celebrate it by the mere fact of their existence. By untangling and resolving some of 
these contradictions and complexities, I hope in this first chapter to clarify both the 
potentialities and the limits of resistance embodied in the slacker narrative, in order to 
provide both a unique perspective on slacker fiction and to introduce some of the issues 
central to the following chapters in this thesis.3    
 
 
Work 
 
 
Slacker, Richard Linklater’s debut theatrically released film, is an eclectic and experimental 
opening salvo from a director who would become synonymous with American independent 
cinema, first through his activities with the Austin Film Society, and later with high profile 
indie hits like Dazed and Confused (1993), the Before trilogy (1995, 2004, 2013), and 
Boyhood (2014). Slacker anticipates all of these films with its curious mixture of 
experimental narrative, measured cinematography, and fixation on youthful rebellion, 
philosophical inquiry, and alternative living. The film documents a subculture of slackers 
living in Linklater’s home city of Austin, Texas. While of disparate ages, races, genders, and 
vocations, these slackers share a cluster of characteristics. Broadly engaged in creative 
pursuits, doggedly resistant to the capitalist cycle of accumulation and purchasing, and 
oriented towards a communal model of cohabitation and collaboration, they represent the 
antithesis to the Reagan-era homo economicus and the fast-track consumerism and 
                                                          
3 A unique perspective because, despite the preponderance of slacker fiction in the 1990s and 
through into the present day, there have been few major studies of this genre, and none that bring 
the slacker’s politics of withdrawal into conjunction with the neoliberalism of the 1990s. On Linklater 
and Coupland, arguably the two most important figures for this genre, there exists currently only 
one book length study each (Rob Stone’s The Cinema of Richard Linklater and Andrew Tate’s Douglas 
Coupland, respectively), while the most comprehensive study of Cobain is probably to be found in 
the essay collection Genexegisis. None of these sources, however, argue for the consideration of the 
slacker narrative as a coherent genre of fiction, as I do in this chapter.  
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aggressive foreign policy of the 1980s satirised in everything from Bret Easton Ellis’ 
American Psycho (1991) to John McTiernan’s Die Hard (1988). Eschewing traditional 
naming, Linklater grants his characters titles that capture ‘minor existential states of being’ 
(Lee) that are indicative of the shared temperament of this disparate collective: from 
Recluse in Bathrobe to Has Faith in Groups, Co-op Guy to Having a Breakthrough Day. 
 
While Linklater’s film does a great deal to define the characteristics of the slacker as a 
character archetype, Slacker clearly draws inspiration from the real attributes of Linklater’s 
twenty-something cohort, a generation that Coupland would soon define as ‘generation X.’ 
The attitudes of this cohort are succinctly captured in the 1990 TIME article ‘Proceeding 
with Caution’, a clipping of which Linklater included in the copies of Slacker he sent out to 
various producers and distributors during the months following the film’s completion. 
Alongside sections on marriage, dating and careers, Gross and Scott’s sociological study of 
the youngest adult generation of the 1990s devotes a subsection to the topic of activism, or 
‘the art of the possible.’ Immediately, the authors note that while ‘the impulse to give back’ 
is strong in the twentysomethings, that impulse is paralysed to a certain degree by both the 
size and complexity of ‘the really important problems’, and by ‘the great, intimidating 
shadow of 1960s-style activism.’ The 1960s, they conclude, is viewed paradoxically. On the 
one hand, ‘the new generation pines for a romanticized past when the issues were clear 
and the troops were committed,’ but on the other, this romanticising is seemingly 
tempered by the knowledge of what came after. ‘Because the '60s utopia never came,’ 
write Gross and Scott, ‘today's young adults view the era with a combination of reverie and 
revulsion.’ This revulsion is captured succinctly in the words of 20-year-old student 
interviewee Sean McNally: ‘“A lot of us are afraid to take an intense stance and then leave 
it all behind like our parents did,”’ Sean says. ‘“We have to protect ourselves from burning 
out, from losing faith”’ (qtd. in Gross and Scott).4 
 
The pivot away from ‘an intense stance’ is evident in Linklater’s film in the portrayal of the 
few identifiably ‘radical’ characters. Before discussing the activism the film appears to 
endorse, it is worth considering the politics the film rejects. Seemingly the most politically 
engaged of the younger slackers, the character T-Shirt Terrorist hawks zines and shirts 
accompanied with radically inflected soundbites, most memorably, ‘terrorism is the 
                                                          
4 For a more contemporary fictional account of this tension, see Dana Spiotta’s 2006 novel Eat the 
Document, which arrays in parallel the story of radical protestors in the 1960s and their teenage 
children coming of age in the 1990s.  
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surgical strike capability of the oppressed.’ But the diffuse nature of his critique is telling. 
His brief, Burroughs-esque monologue alights on the necessity for ‘perception’ and 
‘stimulate[d]’ thought in the face of ‘totally subverted’ thought processes, and it draws 
obviously on the Althusserian concept of ISAs as it blames ‘the church, the schools, and the 
media’ for this subversion. But, in line with Gross and Scott’s diagnosis of the ‘paralysis’ felt 
by those attempting to engage with ‘the really important problems’ in this decade, T-Shirt 
Terrorist’s monologue never approaches any concrete identification of targets for, or 
methods of, resistance. His final line in the film, ‘hey, wanna buy a t-shirt,’ seems calculated 
to resemble a punchline to the ostensibly radically anti-capitalist tirade that precedes it.   
 
T-Shirt Terrorist’s speech is one of a number of paranoid monologues in the film which 
serve to highlight the ineffectiveness of those grappling with the large-scale problems of 
capitalism. Slacker calls back to Jameson’s description, in Postmodernism, of conspiracy 
theories as representative of a ‘degraded attempt to think the impossible totality of the 
contemporary world system’ (38).5 Such theorising is ubiquitous in Slacker. Characters 
share their beliefs on government-sponsored kidnapping and experimentation, the JFK 
assassination, electoral fraud, and the shadowy structure of the Freemasons. Beyond this 
‘hard’ paranoia of conspiracy which tends to subsume those characters it afflicts, many 
seemingly more stable characters in Slacker exhibit a ‘soft’ paranoia related to more 
abstract power systems perceived to be residing in language, thought processes and 
apparently innocuous media and cultural products. The aforementioned Having a 
Breakthrough Day describes her eponymous breakthrough as a transcendence of the ‘19th 
Century-type […] thought mode, construct’ in which she had previously been trapped; Papa 
Smurf and Scooby Doo Philosopher deconstruct the ‘whole bunch of values and junk’ 
concealed in Saturday morning cartoons; and Disgruntled Grad Student rails against the 
‘concoction of lies […] that drives man to do things’.  
 
In this latter example, Disgruntled Grad Student raises an interesting example of a 
perceived ‘lie’: the idea of individual ‘unending potential’, which in reality reminds the 
character ‘of his limitations and frustrates[s] him’. The student’s frustration with the 
                                                          
5 In Daniel T. Rodgers Age of Fracture, Rodgers illustrates the ease with which conspiracy theorising 
can be used as a shorthand for the complexities of late capitalism when he describes Jameson’s 
‘unrepresentable totality’ of late capitalism as an unfathomable diffusion of ‘cabals of back room 
elites, webs of influence, an all-pervasive “system” [and] new forms of class domination’ (82).  
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rhetoric of individual potential anchors Slacker in a specifically neoliberal milieu. It evokes 
Wendy Brown’s insightful Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal subject-formation, in which 
Brown observes how neoliberalism ‘carries responsibility for the self to new heights’, such 
that ‘the rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of 
his or her action no matter how severe the constraints on this action’ (Brown 2009, 42). 
Plainly it is the tension between the rhetoric of ‘unending potential’ and the reality of 
‘limitations,’ or constraints, that frustrates the student; what Mark Fisher, in reference to 
bureaucracy, calls the difference between ‘the picture presented’ and ‘the way in which 
capitalism does actually work’ (Fisher, 20). This is the milieu out of which the slacker 
emerges, and from which they enact their withdrawal. A complex world system 
undergirded by an equally complex and diffuse ideology proves too abstract for the 
slackers of Linklater and Coupland’s texts to engage with meaningfully.  
 
Coupland’s GenXer Andy neatly encapsulates the ethos informing his withdrawal when he 
declares: ‘the world has gotten too big—way beyond our capacity to tell stories about it’ 
(6).6 Coupland’s debut novel follows Andy, Dag and Claire, three thirtysomething slackers, 
through several weeks in their lives spent adrift in the California desert drinking, working 
menial jobs and, crucially, telling personal stories through which they can make sense of 
the circumstances of their lives. Neither Generation X nor Linklater’s film presents the 
‘degraded attempt’ of conspiracy theory, nor the ‘intense stance’ of characters like T-Shirt 
Terrorist, as an efficacious means of engaging with and resisting neoliberal political 
philosophy. This leaves only withdrawal in disgust as a viable mode of dissent. As the 
oblique strategy card eloquently puts it, this withdrawal is not apathy, nor is it neutral. 
Rather, it marks a concerted political-philosophical project: not a not doing, but a doing 
nothing. This doing nothing sits comfortably into the tradition of ‘subcultural negationist 
practices’ that John Ulrich attributes to those youth subcultures that have fallen, at various 
times since the 1960s, under the banner ‘Generation X’ (Ulrich, 3). 
 
In their quest to do nothing as protest, the slackers of Linklater’s Slacker expend a great 
deal of effort avoiding waged labour. Under neoliberalism, such avoidance demanded 
                                                          
6  This approach to capitalism has become a target of critique in recent discourse. In her work on 
abstraction, Leigh Claire la Berge has argued against the tendency when engaging with the 
mechanisms of late capitalism in fiction to 'suspend knowledge and description of [capitalism] by 
claiming its mechanisms are beyond our collective cognitive, linguistic, and epistemological reach’ 
(93), arguing that to resign capitalism to ineffability is to give up on the possibility of resistance.  
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increasingly drastic strategies. The intensification of the puritan work ethic, or what Lutz 
refers to as the ‘pragmatism, purpose, and productivity’ (270) celebrated throughout 
American history, had, by the beginning of the 1990s, reached sinister new heights. This 
valorisation of constant productivity has been covered by a wide variety of critics. In 
Undoing the Demos, Wendy Brown describes neoliberalism’s injunction to be ‘always on,’ a 
by-product of the aforementioned embrace of human capital as a model of self-conduct 
and human behaviour as a series of calculated investment strategies. Jonathan Crary, in 
24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, describes how this philosophy manifests in 
everyday life as a new temporal experience: of uninterrupted and interminable non-time, a 
constant activity facilitated by connectivity and enforced through surveillance technology 
designed, theoretically, to maximise productivity. 
 
Against this fetishization of efficiency, the slacker takes pride in slowing down. Slacker’s 
Ultimate Loser memorably describes his plans for the day: ‘oh, I got some band practice in 
about five hours, so I figured I'd mosey on out.’ Hitchhiker Waiting for “True Call” spits his 
disgust into a camera: ‘to hell with the kind of work you have to do to earn a living.’ Juan 
‘wakes up at 11:00 or 12:00 [and] usually falls asleep around 2:00.’ This not doing provides 
a foundation onto which the slacker can begin the project of doing nothing. Asked in an 
interview about his perceptions of slacking, Linklater rejects the dictionary definition of 
‘people who evade duties and responsibilities.’ Rather, the director argues, slackers like 
Ultimate Loser are people who are ‘responsible to themselves’ and who are not ‘wasting 
time in a realm of activity that has nothing to do with who they are or what they might 
ultimately be striving for’ (Linklater, qtd. in Ulrich, 18). It is from this ‘realm of activity’, 
which interviewer John Ulrich later identifies as the everyday working world, that slackers 
enact their withdrawal. The realm into which the slackers migrate, the space of inactivity 
which the working world has ‘structured, colonised and marginalised’, is reclaimed in the 
process as a realm of ‘creativity rather than waste’ (ibid.). This reclamation is foregrounded 
by the film and defines its politics: a politics Linklater goes on in interview to call his 
‘politics of everyday life’. The slacker’s withdrawal in disgust—or as the Criterion Collection 
Blu-Ray cover calls it, their ‘aggressive nonparticipa[tion]’—reframes reclamation work and 
the territories of everyday life as the primary space of struggle against neoliberalism.   
 
The concept of ‘reclamation’ in the context of a politics of everyday life is extensively 
explored in Ben Highmore’s section ‘reclamation work’ in his anthology-study of conceptual 
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scholarship on the everyday, The Everyday Life Reader. For Highmore, reclamation 
‘suggests a transformatory practice (and politics) that works to bring the everyday to the 
foreground of social life so as to reorientate its practices’ (224). The ‘work’ of reclamation 
focuses on ‘recovering forms of pleasure and creativity that have become colonised by 
commodification’ (ibid.). This mode of reclamation-as-recovery is central to the critic sitting 
at the heart of Highmore’s collection, Henri Lefebvre. In his pioneering study Critique of 
Everyday Life, Lefebvre delineates the ‘dialectic of work and leisure’ in capitalist society, 
which he characterises in terms of a ‘vicious circle’: ‘we work to earn our leisure, and 
leisure has only one meaning: to get away from work’ (234). The specific forms of leisure 
available in the capitalist society prove similarly problematic for Lefebvre. ‘Liberation and 
pleasure […] are the essential characteristics of leisure’, Lefebvre remarks—a ‘liberation’, 
specifically, from anything deemed antagonistic to modern man’s relaxation (ibid.). Thus a 
‘mistrust’ develops of ‘anything which might appear to be educational’, and the only 
acceptable forms of leisure come increasingly to resemble ‘pre-digested food’ (ibid.). But 
Lefebvre’s conclusion is not entirely pessimistic, and the Marxist scholar does permit 
himself admiration of one ‘remarkable’ form of leisure: the French phenomenon of the 
‘Sunday painters’ who spend their leisure time painting, providing for Lefebvre the 
possibility yet that ‘at a very high cultural level, leisure transcends technical activity to 
become art’, and thus constitutes ‘an original search—whether clumsy or skilfully is 
unimportant—for a style of living […] and perhaps for an art of living [and] for a kind of 
happiness’ (235). Lefebvre’s Sunday painters thus constitute one example of the 
reclamation of the realm of inactivity for ‘creativity rather than waste’.  
   
It is this project of reclamation which, as for Lefebvre, constitutes for Linklater a ‘politics of 
the everyday’, and the politics of Slacker. The disaffection of the twentysomething 
combines in Linklater’s slackers with an ‘intense curiosity’ (Horsely, 217) that manifests in 
the misfit cast of characters as a celebration of ‘half-baked Weltanschauungen’ and 
knowledge in its ‘strange, even screwball, incarnations’ (Lee). The ‘realm of inactivity’, 
which for Lefebvre appears threateningly educationally-bereft, is reclaimed for creativity by 
the slackers’ shared commitment to questioning, ‘not necessarily to find answers but for 
the simple enjoyment of going deeper’ (Horsely, 218). From the first frames of the film this 
commitment is foregrounded, as Linklater’s own character Should’ve Stayed At Bus Station 
delivers an opening monologue musing on the possibilities of parallel universes and roads 
(and buses) not taken. From this initial salvo the film erupts into a celebration of eclectic 
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passions, from the anti-art of Anti-Artist and the anti-travelling sentiments of Anti-
Traveller, to the Saturday-morning-cartoon philosophising of Scooby-Doo Philosopher, the 
rejection of ‘premeditated fun’ by Bathrobe Recluse, and finally the playful early-morning 
trip to Austin’s highest peak, at which point the film terminates with the gleeful destruction 
of one character’s 8mm camera. Continuing the spatial metaphors of Highmore and 
Lefebvre, we might read this mountaintop on which the slackers play as a physical 
incarnation of that ‘realm of inactivity’ in which the slackers freely pursue their celebration 
of ‘imagination and reflection’.  
 
In Douglas Coupland’s Generation X, this same marginal space is to be found not on a 
mountaintop but in a valley: the Coachella Valley in southern California. The novel’s 
Californian desert setting is an appropriately apocalyptic post-historical wasteland. At the 
beginning of the book the three protagonists travel to ‘hell’, or West Palm Springs Village, a 
‘modern ruin […] vaguely reminiscent of a Vietnam War movie set’ (17). The description 
recalls Baudrillard’s mythic evocation of the desert of America, a space of ‘superficial 
neutrality’ (Baudrillard, 119), the ‘aesthetic form’ of an ‘ulterior, asocial, superficial world’ 
(6) and a vision of ‘future catastrophe’ (5). But Baudrillard’s desert is a terminus, both the 
reflection and conclusion of postmodern America. For Coupland’s characters, the desert 
embodies no such finality. Rather than a wasteland, the desert figures in Coupland’s novel 
as a similar space for creativity as that favoured by Linklater’s slackers; its tabula rasa 
topography a real, physical space into which one can withdraw. Describing the ‘barren’ 
West Palm Springs Village, Andy likens it to ‘the blank space at the end of a chapter’ (19), 
and a few chapters later Dag describes his eventual migration to the desert as motivated by 
the need for ‘a clean slate, with no one to read it’ (36). Starting with this ‘blank space’, 
Coupland’s slackers begin their own project of reclamation: ‘the three of us left our lives 
behind us and came to the desert — to tell stories and to make our own lives worthwhile 
tales in the process’ (10).  
 
Like the slackers of Slacker, Coupland’s GenXers exchange the pursuit of waged labour for a 
pursuit of personal expressions of creativity and intellectual inquiry. But despite their 
ostensible withdrawal, characters in both texts hold menial, unskilled jobs. In Slacker, 
Hitchhiker Awaiting 'True Call’’s declaration ‘to hell with the kind of work you have to do to 
earn a living,’ is the exception, not the rule. Indeed, in the background of every scene of 
impassioned intellectual debate, there is another slacker-type character cleaning the bar, 
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serving coffee, or tending the till. Likewise, in Coupland’s Generation X, two of the three 
protagonists work at Larry’s, a local dive bar, while Claire completes the trio of menial jobs 
by tending the Chanel counter of an I. Magnin department store. Nevertheless, all three are 
college-educated and, in their respective pasts, are described holding ostensibly 
‘prestigious’ jobs: most explicitly, Dag recalls his past life as ‘one of those putzes you see 
driving a sports car down to the financial district’ (22). Coupland captures the GenXers 
deliberate de-skilling with the neologism ‘McJob’: jobs that are ‘low pay, low prestige, low 
benefits, low future’ (5), elsewhere described as stop-gap jobs taken to fund more 
meaningful pursuits. Meanwhile, as we have seen, Linklater qualifies that slackers are 
defined as such by their resistance to ‘wasting time in a realm of activity that has nothing to 
do with who they are or what they might ultimately be striving for.’  
 
In a chapter entitled ‘Remember Earth Clearly’, Coupland’s protagonists share their ‘earth 
memories’; moments that ‘define what it’s like to be alive on this planet’ (104). The 
exchange, which specifically precludes ‘fake yuppie experiences’, details one character’s 
first sight of snow, another’s memory of bacon cooking and for a third the recollection of 
his parents spontaneously dancing to shortwave radio. As well as an exemplary moment of 
the sort of story-sharing championed by Coupland’s characters, Elvissa’s specific 
discounting of ‘fake yuppie experiences that you had to spend money on’ (ibid.) at the 
initiation of her ‘earth memories’ idea highlights another shared facet of the slacker 
identity: a distaste for the trappings and excesses of consumerism. This distaste does not 
manifest in a radical negation of either working or even of consuming—Coupland’s slackers 
evince at least some pleasure in the purchasing of a ‘coiled up antique bead belt’ (86) or a 
‘taxidermied chicken’ (7)—but it does surface in the diminished importance of these 
practices in the slackers’ lives; a clear indication of their preference for the ‘realm of 
inactivity’ over the aggressive careerism that characterises the everyday working world. 
Like Linklater, Coupland acknowledges the realities of living in late 20th century America 
and as such allows his characters access to stable incomes, but like Linklater he upholds a 
crucial distinction: ‘if they have a job, the job doesn’t have them’ (Linklater, qtd. in Ulrich, 
18). What does ‘have them’ is the creative practice of the game of ‘bedtime stories’, which 
proceeds throughout the novel and forms the bulk of the text.  
 
While Andy, Dag and Claire do not invest energy into their jobs, they nevertheless work 
long hours at the behest of their bosses to earn the wage necessary to fund their 
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storytelling picnics and (in Dag’s case) erratic trips to Mexico. At one moment in the novel, 
Mr M., owner of Larry’s bar, takes offence at Dag and reminds him: ‘I’m a person and I pay 
your paycheck, too’ (130). Likewise, menial and low-skilled labour haunts the frames of 
Linklater’s film, backgrounded but never entirely excised. This points, ultimately, to an 
element of pragmatism in the slacker position, but also to a shadow of compromise. The 
mental rebellion of these slackers again recalls Fisher’s diagnosis of anti-capitalist action in 
a post-ideological society, particularly in reference to the centrality of the individualist 
attitude fostered by neoliberalism. Drawing on Žižek, Fisher notes:  
Capitalist ideology in general […] consists precisely in the overvaluing of belief—in the 
sense of the inner subjective attitude—at the expense of the beliefs we exhibit and 
externalise in our behaviour. So long as we believe (in our hearts) that capitalism is 
bad, we are free to continue to participate in the capitalist exchange (Fisher, 17). 
Fisher builds on this idea in a conversation with Jeremy Gilbert, where he describes the 
‘Althusserian’ ideology at work in UK institutions of Higher Education under Blair’s labour 
government: 
the easiest option all round would be for us to go through the motions. We didn’t have 
to believe it, we only had to act as if we believed it. The idea that our ‘inner beliefs’ 
mattered more than what we were publicly professing at work was crucial to capitalist 
realism. We could have left-wing convictions, and a left-wing self-image, provided 
these didn’t impinge on work in any significant way! (Fisher and Gilbert, 91) 
In one sense, this is the same compromise afforded the slackers. They can slack, as long as 
they do it in their own time. And they can ‘not waste any time’—where time equals 
intellectual or emotional labour—in the realm of work, provided they still clock in and out 
each day. But as Fisher notes, ‘the very privileging of ‘inner’ subjective states over the 
public was itself an ideological move’ (91), and so the withdrawal the slackers pursue in 
order to push back against the neoliberal work ethic presents, at best, a compromised 
version of rebellion. 
 
It is worth remarking, however, that Fisher’s invocation of Althusser in this discussion is 
notable because it points to an older conception of work, of the kind discussed by Lefebvre 
and similar mid-century Marxists. Whilst in the 1950s Lefebvre recognised in the dialectic 
of work and leisure the desire for a ‘sharp break’ between former and latter (Lefebvre, 
229), by the 1990s, the neoliberal impulse to bring ‘all human action into the domain of the 
market’ (Harvey 2005, 3) had rendered society somewhat closer in resemblance to the pre-
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capitalist feudal state in which, for Lefebvre, ‘the workplace is all around the house; work is 
not separate from the everyday life of the family’ (227). This is the contemporary situation 
of being ‘always on’ which critics like Wendy Brown and Michel Feher point to when they 
describe the contemporary state of the neoliberal subject as homo economicus. While the 
privileging of internalised rebellion, therefore, represents a complicity with neoliberal 
ideology, in the specifically neoliberal circumstances in which the slackers find themselves, 
doing the bare minimum is still a pushback against the injunction to excel, and to place 
labour at the heart of one’s identity.  
 
Both Linklater’s slackers and Coupland’s trio of storytelling thirty-somethings engage in 
what Rob Stone, with specific reference to Linklater, calls variously a ‘voluntary exile’ (1) or 
‘collective withdrawal’ (18) from the fast-track consumerism and aggressive individualism 
that defines Ronald Reagan’s neoliberal legacy. From the blank space of the margins to 
which they have withdrawn, the slackers of Slacker and Generation X construct an 
alternative, creative lifestyle. Yet, as Linklater himself acknowledges, ‘everyday life is a 
cultural space worth struggling over’ (Linklater qtd. in Ulrich, 19). It is the ‘struggle’, 
specifically, which informs both Linklater and Coupland’s works: the ‘immense effort’ 
required to reclaim everyday life for creativity without drawing it into the ambit of the 
market. The next part of this chapter will focus on the slacker’s creative process and their 
response to this struggle.   
 
 
Art 
 
 
Work, then, occupies a simultaneously centralised and marginalised position in the 
slacker’s identity. Work is the negative against which the slacker defines himself and yet 
also that which he depends upon for the freedom to pursue his reclamation project. If 
dissent begins for the slacker as an internal rebellion, it nevertheless does still manifest in 
external practices. While discussing the work of contemporary artist Lasse Schmidt Hansen, 
the curators of the 2014 exhibition New Ways of Doing Nothing address the dialectic (or 
not) of work and leisure much as I have above. ‘Work and leisure flow into each other,’ 
they write, ‘meaning that the so-called creative workers have become the role model for a 
neoliberal deregulation and flexibalisation that adapts the concept of complete 
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identification with one’s work, ideally perceived as self-fulfillment’ (Muller and Ricupero, 
39). This is the fallacy of the injunction to ‘Do What You Love’ which has rightly been 
identified as an essential rhetorical tool in the neoliberal perversion of freedom 
(Tokumitsu). This is also the paradox the slacker faces: when leisure has become work in 
the broader culture, how can one truly withdraw? One answer to this aporia, for Muller 
and Ricupero, ‘might be an activity that produces nothing,’ (39), or what Dostoevsky 
Wannabe would call an ‘effort […] not to create.’ These concepts capture the tensions that 
plagues the slacker’s artistic dissent: on the one hand, slacking is a mode of lived resistance 
predicated on withdrawal and ‘doing  nothing’; on the other, the slackers hold an emphatic 
commitment to intellectual inquiry and artistic creativity.7 These twin impulses are, to a 
degree, reconciled in the art of slacking; in the creative pursuits of the slacker communities 
depicted in both Linkater and Coupland’s texts, which draw deeply on a history of artistic 
flirtations with absence, inertia, and impossibility as paradoxically socially engaging and 
invigorating. Historically, this ‘immense effort’ has been recognised by figures as disparate 
as Oscar Wilde (’to do nothing at all is the most difficult thing in the world’ (qtd. In Muller 
and Ricupero)) to John Cage (’there is nothing to say… what we require is silence; but what 
silence requires is that I go on talking’ (Cage, 109)) to King Crimson frontman and Lutz’s 
case study of hippie slacking Robert Fripp (‘doing nothing is very hard’). The present section 
will focus on this most difficult of artistic projects by both historicising anti-productive art 
and considering the contemporary circumstances of art production.    
 
Slacker features many instances of creativity, from live music performances to freely 
composed monologues on everything from the Freemasons to the Bush administration, to 
art performances, to an old man recording his thoughts on a dictaphone and a Postmodern 
Paul Revere delivering an aggressively poetic early-morning diatribe on government 
weapons programs from a battered car loudspeaker. These various projects share two 
broadly interrelated attributes: they are performance-based, and they are anti-productive. 
From the simple busking of Street Musician to the elaborate sidewalk installation created 
by Teacup Sculpter and the personal cleansing ritual led by Guy Who Tosses Typewriter, 
                                                          
7 I’m going to argue here that the slackers draw a distinction between the positive attribute of 
creativity and an injunction to productivity that should be resisted. However Dostoevsky Wannabe’s 
speech would seem to reject creativity, also. When he talks about ‘the immense effort required in 
order not to create,’ I take his use of the term ‘create’ in this context to refer to the process by 
which an artist becomes an individual ‘creator’ elevated above their audience. The character’s 
dismissive reference to ‘mastery’ in the same speech confirms his derisive attitude towards artistic 
ego. I’ll return to this scene, and to the irony of Dostoevsky Wannabe’s monologuing, later in the 
chapter. 
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the instances of artistic creation captured in Slacker are almost always what Claire Bishop, 
in her landmark study of participatory art, Artificial Hells, calls ‘projects.’ That is, they 
eschew the ‘finite, portable, commodifiable’ attributes of traditional art to embrace the 
model of the ‘ongoing, long-term project with an unclear beginning and end’ (Bishop, 2). 
Similarly, in relation to their rejection of the ‘commodifiable’, these art projects exclusively 
resist the art-commodity forms suitable for commercial circulation. The hidden video 
installation of Video Backpacker remains hermetically sealed inside a lone apartment room, 
Postmodern Paul Revere’s slam-poetic ravings go unrecorded, and the pixel vision camera 
circulated by Pixel Visionary records without film.  
 
In this case, these artworks reject not just the neoliberal injunction to produce, in the 
broadest sense, but also the neoliberalisation of art production specifically. Neoliberalism 
has observed great shifts in both the production and consumption of art. The former is best 
represented in what Noel Halifax has called 'the rise of artists [...] as "factory" owners, 
employing students on low wages to churn out works for the world's super-rich dealers and 
collectors.' These super-rich collectors have in turn transformed their relation to the 
artworks they buy. In an account of his visit to Singapore Freeport, a 'highly securitised 
luxury warehouse' built in the non-space of Changi Airport, Max Haiven observes a new 
process of art accumulation as financial speculation: 
Secreted away in an eternal, risk-free stasis, dead and yet alive, art becomes a 
crypt for money: a pure asset, a distillation of the logic of private property itself, a 
hermetic vehicle for speculation. Artworks can be exchanged millions of times over 
in faraway locations without ever moving an inch from their hyper-securitized vault 
— simply the deed to ownership changes “hands.” 
As he describes it, Singapore Freeport is a vault containing a thousand smaller vaults: each 
artwork itself being a 'vault in which capital can be secreted,' vaults envisioned by celebrity 
artists and built by a casualised and largely invisible workforce before disappearing from 
the reach of the public entirely.  
 
At its most dystopian, then, neoliberalism has liquidated art, transforming artistry into 
commodity. In its typical lifecycle a piece can be conceived of by an artist and the work of 
creating it outsourced to casual labourers, before it is purchased as a speculative 
investment and confined to freeport storage in order to appreciate in value as part of a 
portfolio of assets. The rise of knowledge work and the concurrent obfuscation of an 
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increasingly exploited labour force is visible in the transformation of the process of art 
production, as is the celebration of individual creativity in the narratives by which these 
artworks are marketed. Likewise, financialisation, or the production of wealth primarily 
through speculative investments, and the expanded field in which such future-oriented 
behaviours are practiced, now includes the consumption and collection of art. As with the 
creative outlets of Linklater’s slackers, the ‘bedtime stories’ told by Coupland’s protagonists 
resist precisely this blend of egoistic creation, diffused labour, and commodifiable 
production. Andy, Dag, and Claire’s stories are always oral, spontaneous and unrecorded, 
and thus remain as ephemeral, as intangible, as Linklater’s slackers’ performances. They 
exist exclusively in the moment they are told—in one extreme example breathlessly 
delivered from a telephone booth in Mexico—and are never shared with an audience larger 
than a handful of likeminded characters. As Andrew Tate recognises in his analysis of 
Coupland’s early oeuvre, a recurrent motif in the Canadian author’s work is the concept of 
‘storytelling as a means to asserting identity’ (Tate, 40). Just as Rob Stone recognises in 
Slacker the means by which a ‘communal identity’ is constructed by the slackers through a 
‘passed-along polyphony’ of questioning and creativity (Stone, 26), so the storytelling in 
Generation X functions for Andy, Dag and Claire as means for the three characters to write 
their own narratives on their own terms, separate from the ‘illusive language of the 
market’ (Tate, 39) and of the market itself, which neoliberalism posits as a ‘a guide to all 
human action, and substitut[e] for all previously held ethical beliefs’ (Harvey 2005, 3). 
 
The values these art practices uphold emerge from a century of influences and appear 
alongside a cluster of loosely collected movements that would lead the pushback against 
the neoliberalisation of art in the 1990s. In Artificial Hells, Bishop identifies 1989 as the 
third of three pivotal historical moments for the establishment of alternative, post-studio 
artistic practice. She traces these practices back to the influence of the avant-garde of 1921 
(Surrealism and Dada), and to the ‘neo’ avant-garde of 1968 (the Situationist International 
and Fluxus).8 These artistic touchstones are alighted on for their significance in the 
development of what Bishop terms ‘participatory art’ in the 1990s, an alternative, ‘post-
                                                          
8  These same nodes occur in Lipstick Traces, Greil Marcus’ sprawling attempt to trace the ‘secret 
history of the twentieth century.’ Marcus maps ‘the mystery of spectral connections between 
people long separated by place and time, but somehow speaking the same language’ (4), focusing 
on the intertextual web that undergirds the Sex Pistols’ song ‘Anarchy in the UK.’ This web of 
circumstance and serendipity encompasses ‘the Situationist International […] the surrealists of the 
1920s, the dadaists […] the young Karl Marx, Saint-Just, various medieval heretics, and the Knights of 
the Round Table’ (19). 
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studio’ practice that emphasises the collectivised process of creativity over the production 
of a finished piece. The influence of the 1960s counterculture on the texts this chapter is 
discussing is quite perceptible, but perhaps more important is the profound influence of 
the 60s neo avant-garde. One of the most significant collectives of this period is Fluxus, an 
obvious antecedent to the slacker art of the 1990s and a useful comparison point. Like the 
slacker’s art, Fluxus art is concerned primarily with nothingness, but just as for the slackers, 
Fluxus nothing manifests in many different ways: from an apparent absence of artistic 
value in Duchampian readymades, to Situationist-inspired happenings and instructions for 
performances that cannot be performed.9 Exploring Fluxus art and philosophy in more 
detail in turn allows for a more nuanced reflection on the slacker art that inherited Fluxus’ 
practices. 
 
Prefigured by Dadaism, Fluxus firmly belongs to the ‘other tradition’ of the 20th century 
avant garde. This is the ‘irrational/supra-rational alternative to the “high-Modernist” 
tendency to formal, self-referential abstraction’ (Frank, 24) that Bishop finds as the 
inspiration for the projects of participatory art. Against a perceived turning inwards that 
would ultimately result in a collapsing spiral of self-referentiality,10 the ‘other tradition’ of 
Fluxus and the Situationists turned outwards, to occupy (in the most affirmative sense of 
the word) the Lefebvreian spaces of everyday life. For Owen F. Smith, the Fluxus worldview 
is fundamentally a challenge to ‘liberal individualism.’ In a deft interrogation of the project, 
Smith argues that the Fluxus worldview  
must ultimately be seen as intimating the rejection of the idea that the individual can 
have an identity apart from the social order. This recognition of self as defined not by 
pre-societal factors, but as developed through the self’s relations to others […] stresses 
the significance of relations, or difference, in identification of a concept or even an 
individual. […] This facet of Fluxus is a simultaneous rejection of freedom as defined by 
                                                          
9 Some examples of Fluxus art include: George Brecht’s White Table with Rainbow Leg (1962), and 
Exit (1963), the latter a Duchampian readymade salvaged and sold in various Fluxus publications; 
Ken Friedman’s Mandatory Happening (1966), which reads, ‘you will decide to read or not read this 
instruction. Having made your decision, the happening is over’; and the musical scores of Ay-O, 
which subvert everything that one might expect from a musical performance. Ay-O’s Rainbow No. 1 
for Orchestra (date unknown), instructs: ‘Soap bubbles are blown out of various wind instruments. 
The conductor breaks the bubbles with his baton.’  
10 Nicholas Brown provides an account of this collapse in his article ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Real Subsumption Under Capital’, when he notes that the modernist tendency to produce works 
within a field of restricted production leads to a situation in which increasingly specific formal 
concerns are addressed in a constant process of ‘narrowing’ of artistic meaning.   
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an autonomy from the social order and an embrace of the other major aspect of the 
Fluxus world view, the freedom of play. (116) 
Thus, we get the directive of George Maciunas—the catalyst and organising force behind 
the loose collective—to artist Ben Vautier: ‘eliminate your ego entirely […] don’t attribute 
anything to yourself - depersonalise yourself!’ (qtd. in Kellein, 14). Parallel to, and 
reinforcing, this anti-individualist model of art production is an emphasis on play. Smith 
understands Fluxus play as ‘a model of open-ended discourse that stresses relations rather 
than a linear production and communication of discrete pieces of information’ (117), a play 
that embodies a ‘model of engagement to replace the model of estrangement’ advocated 
by Modernist autonomists. By both suppressing artistic ego and encouraging collaborative 
play, Fluxus anticipates the wave of ‘post-studio’, socially-engaged practices in the 1990s 
that form the focus of Bishop’s Artificial Hells. Politically, meanwhile, Fluxus rejects the idea 
‘that to effect change the individual must occupy a space outside of society,’ seeking 
instead to manifest as a disruptive intrusion into ‘the arena of social, political and cultural 
debate’ (119). Thus, many of the seemingly opaque performance pieces and orchestral 
scores that make up the canon of Fluxus works were, in fact, performed live.11 Play, for 
Fluxus, was a very literal, physical practice, and yet one determinedly anti-productive in a 
traditional sense. 
 
The common attributes of ephemerality and collectivity that Fluxus and related neo avant-
garde movements emphasised in the 60s, in the context of the neoliberal injunction to 
recognise everything as an asset or an investment, became in the 1990s ever more urgently 
desirable for the countercultural artist. In ‘The Accidental Neoliberal’, Jedediah Purdy 
laments the way in which his own contribution to the culture of the 90s, his book For 
Common Things, had unwittingly exemplified the very neoliberal ideology he had intended 
to rail against. Exasperatedly, Purdy remarks that under the insidious umbrella of 
neoliberalism, ‘trying to imagine, in public, a way of being that is not neoliberal means, 
mostly, making ephemera’ (22). While Purdy laments this state of affairs, the notion of 
creating ephemera as a means of combatting the commodifying grasp of the neoliberal 
market and the consequent modification of ‘art’ into ‘work’, is for the slackers a positive 
lesson in aesthetic resistance. This conflation of the realms of activity and creativity is 
                                                          
11 At the Fluxus International Festival of the Newest Music, held at Weisbaden in 1962, Dick Higgins 
performed Danger Music No. 2, the instructions for which read ‘Hat. Rags. Paper. Heave. Shave.’ 
Meanwhile, at the same festival, a collective of Fluxus artists including Maciunas himself performed 
Philip Corner’s Piano Activities by disassembling a grand piano over four days. 
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further explored in the recent work of Sarah Brouillette. In Literature and the Creative 
Economy Brouillette charts the rise, throughout the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, of a new creative class; a section of the workforce which adds ‘economic value 
through their creativity’ (20). This newly emergent class coincides with a 
reconceptualisation by Western neoliberal governments of the creative arts as ‘a source of 
wealth and competitive advantage’ (27), fostered by acts of privatisation and competitive 
funding designed to turn art into business. This marketisation of creativity effectively turns 
the act of creative production into work. Linklater’s slackers, meanwhile, attempt to create 
whilst resisting commodification. This is either by keeping their endeavours ephemeral, 
unrecorded, and thus existing only in the space and time in which they are performed, or 
else—as in the case of the old man recording his thoughts—remaining pointedly private.12 
As neoliberalism draws the realms of activity and creativity into closer proximity, as a by-
product each realm has a great potential to affect, or disrupt, the other. So when art 
becomes work, not doing art manifests as a challenge not just to the art world—as was the 
case with Fluxus—but to all work, and to the entire realm of activity from which the slacker 
withdraws.  
 
By the 1990s Fluxus had disaggregated, but it and the broader neo avant-garde it belonged 
to continued to inspire and exert influence. While the philosophy and the key players of 
Fluxus largely remained operational in the 1990s, the coherence of Fluxus as a project 
vanished with the death of George Maciunas in 1978. However, two years after the 
slacker’s landmark date of 1991, to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary since the conception 
of Fluxus, American artist Ben Vautier invited contributors to the international Nice Fluxus 
Festival of Nothing. To take part, Vautier gave artists a simple brief: ‘For this Festival you 
are asked to do nothing. You can stay at home and do nothing. NO PERFORMING. NO 
CONFERENCE. NO EXPOSITION. NO WORK.’ That the 1990s would play host to this brief 
resurgence of Fluxus is telling of a milieu that also harboured the burgeoning and related 
movements of ‘relational aesthetics’ and social practice. The former, defined by Nicholas 
Bourriaud in a 1998 book of the same name, is described to encompass ‘a set of artistic 
practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of 
human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space.’ 
Viewing artists as facilitators rather than makers, and regarding art as an ‘information 
                                                          
12 Horsley posits the notion of the ‘pure artist,’ in reference to independent filmmakers, as that 
auteur who resists selling out by destroying or keeping hidden his works (132).  
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exchange’, Bourriaud describes an artistic movement that seeks to reframe the traditional 
power dynamic of art-experience. Claire Bishop is careful to distance her own case studies 
from Bourriaud, describing the ‘participatory art’ on which her project focuses as ‘less 
interested in a relational aesthetic than in the creative rewards of participation as a 
politicised working process’ (2). These two movements together resemble two strands of 
the neo avant-garde project teased out and embellished. Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics 
seek the absolute effacement of the artistic ego (albeit problematically hampered by the 
still-central position of the artist/facilitator and the potentially exploitative practices of 
delegated performance), whilst participatory art seeks social transformation brought about 
from within and through artistic play. 
 
Certainly, the art practices documented in Slacker and Generation X live up to Bourriaud 
and Bishop’s demands for artworks that are created in a communal process of play, and 
that rarely enter into the market as a clear commodity. However, when considering the 
creative practices of the slacker as a form of protest through alternative living, their success 
is not clearly defendable. ‘Could it be that in this passivity, I shall find my freedom?’ asks 
Dostoevsky Wannabe. As I’ve tried to demonstrate, this conflation of artistic passivity and 
freedom taps into a long tradition of doing nothing as a means to a form of collective 
emancipation, from the strictures of both the art market and broader societal constraints. 
However, much as the slackers’ attitudes to work ultimately resemble a compromise, so 
too is their particular brand of artistic resistance open to charges of capitulation, and even 
failure. As we have seen, central to neoliberal ideology is the primacy of the individual. 
Passivity and the diminishment of ego thus becomes the ideal position from which to 
challenge this ideology. Ironically, however, Dostoevsky Wannabe’s monologue is a 
monologue, not a dialogue. It is, in fact, dictated to another passive character in an 
approximate rendering of the modernist relationship between artist and audience, wherein 
Dostoevsky Wannabe adopts an egocentric position of individual importance and creative 
genius.13  
 
Nearly every interaction and instance of creativity in Slacker conforms to the same pattern: 
one character talks at another. Rob Stone describes the film’s structure as a ‘passed-along 
polyphony’ which concretises a sense of communality among the slackers (27). In this 
                                                          
13 For further reading on the distinction between monologic and dialogic art, see Scott Lash, whose 
theories will feature heavily in my final chapter. 
51 
 
respect, he’s half right. In fact, Slacker’s ‘passed along’ structure manifests as a series of 
monologues impressed upon passive receivers, such that the film’s eventual effect is of a 
curiously monologic polyphony disguised as dialogic collectivity. This is the case also in 
Coupland’s novel, whereby the shared storytelling of the three principle characters does 
reinforce affective bonds and a communal sense of identity, but it does not represent a 
collaborative or collective model of art production. Rather, individual texts are circulated 
between individuals, generating an ecology of affect that is far from resistant to neoliberal 
values.14 In the final part of this chapter I want to pursue these faultlines in the slacker 
texts. To an imperfect extent, the contradictions I have described and will elaborate on 
further are absorbed into the slacker texts, as these texts provide a meta-commentary on 
the exact ‘immense effort’ involved in creating nothing that Dostoevsky Wannabe 
highlights. However, as we have seen already with the marginalisation of labour, the 
inability to engage with the complexities of late capitalism, the privileging of internal 
rebellion, and the monologic structure of artistic dissemination each text celebrates, the 
slacker texts ultimately fail to entirely extricate themselves, or to withdraw, from the logics 
of neoliberalism.  
 
 
Artwork 
 
 
Slacker’s formal experimentalism mirrors the tensions it illuminates between monologue 
and dialogue in the practices of its characters. The film is a deviation from the ubiquitous 
‘network narratives’ typical of late-twentieth century cinema.15 The film is structured as a 
sequence of connected vignettes all occurring on the streets of Austin, wherein each scene 
is triggered by the entrance or exit of one character, thus constructing the notion of the 
                                                          
14 I take the term ecology of affect from Rachel Greenwald Smith’s Affect and American Literature in 
the Age of Neoliberalism, in which Smith draws a parallel between the transmission of affect through 
the circulation of literary works to the model of an ecosystem, in order to draw attention to the 
potential for certain artworks to generate non-linear, reciprocal affective relationships with their 
readers. For more on this see Smith’s fourth chapter, ‘Ecology, Feeling, and Form in Neoliberal 
Literature.’   
15 For more on network narratives, see David Bordwell’s Poetics of Cinema. Bordwell argues that the 
rise of the internet, the popularity of communitarian legal theory, and the advent of ‘networking’ in 
business all contributed to a golden age of network narratives in the mid-90s. Network narratives, 
for Bordwell, are ‘converging fates plots’ drawn onto an ‘n-degrees-of-separation template,’ 
evocative of ‘schematic circuits’ (191-193). Examples include Robert Altman’s Short Cuts (1993) and 
Paul Thomas Anderson’s Magnolia (1999). 
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‘passed-along polyphony’. So, for example, Ultimate Loser enters Juan’s house at the end 
of a scene involving his housemates, utters his memorable line (‘I figured I’d mosey on 
out’), and is then followed into the streets where he meets first Stephanie from Dallas and 
then Pap Smear Pusher. Following their conversation, the camera remains with Ultimate 
Loser until he passes T-Shirt Terrorist, who is accosting Anti-Traveller, who then passes 
Sidewalk Psychic, and so on. The camera never returns to a character; it simply moves on-
and-on, tracing a zig-zagging pattern across the streets and buildings of Austin without 
looking back. While the film evokes the ‘six degrees of separation’ theory, it distances itself 
from the traditional network narrative and from the evocative interconnectedness of these 
ideas. The relations Slacker maps are not a network or web at all, but rather a single, linear 
thread. Should’ve Stayed as Bus Station is separated from Tosses Camera Off Cliff not by six 
characters but by more than sixty, and the kind of mythicised connectivity central to a film 
like Paul Thomas Anderson’s Magnolia is eschewed in favour of the much more 
circumstantial connectivity of a group of people who all circulate in the same district of 
Austin, without ever impacting one another’s lives in a tangible way. And yet these 
characters share a fundamental worldview that celebrates connection and communality, 
and is thus seemingly at odds with the structure of the film itself.  
 
The film’s ending sums this tension up perfectly: the gesture of the destroyed camera—
which cannot really have been destroyed if the final shots of the film are understood to be 
captured by it—purely embodies the tension between ethos and aesthetic: between an 
anarchic rejection of mainstream values and ideologies and a capitulation to the demands 
of a market that requires creativity be exercised in the production of a marketable product. 
At the end of Linklater’s film the camera is at once destroyed and yet at the same moment 
this gesture is undone, revealed to be illusory. In a sense, this act represents the same 
internalisation of rebellion described by Fisher: the idea that as long as the film stages an 
act of creative destruction, it doesn’t matter that in reality the footage is preserved for 
commercial distribution. This is a failure born of necessity, one that requires the audience’s 
goodwill to forgive: and this is precisely the point of this scene’s inclusion, along with 
similar scenes in Coupland’s novel. A recurring theme of my broader project will be to focus 
on texts that adopt a meta-reflexive attitude towards their own limitations and failures. 
Such texts stage and reflect upon their own status as artworks and the extent to which they 
can claim agency and autonomy while remaining imbricated in the contemporary late 
capitalist system. This notion will be fully fleshed-out, so to speak, in a later chapter which 
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focuses on the aesthetics of abjection and meta-abjection in 1990s fiction. But Coupland, 
and especially Linklater, mark the first iteration of this critical manoeuvre in the 1990s with 
their hesitant, compromised portraits of the slacker ethos. 
 
To make better sense of this idea, we can look to another figure from the early 90s: the 
iconic Kurt Cobain, the instrumental third figure in what John Ulrich terms the slacker’s 
‘canonical triumvirate’. Following the release of Coupland’s novel in March, and Linklater’s 
film in July, in September 1991 Nirvana unleashed their sophomore album Nevermind on 
the American public, defining the soundtrack to a subculture. Ulrich and Harris’ anthology 
collection of work on 90s alternative youth culture, GenXegesis, inevitably focuses heavily 
on Nirvana. Perhaps equally inevitably, critical consensus regarding Cobain’s aesthetic 
project remains undefined. To make sense of Cobain and to make sense of the disparate 
critical perspectives that surround him it is necessary, I want to argue, to make reference to 
a movement only just beginning to emerge in the 1990s, one that in the twenty-first 
century has since gone on to establish itself critically and creatively as the most coherent 
artistic project of the post-postmodern period: the new sincerity. The turn towards 
sincerity in these early slacker texts represents a way forward and a renewed commitment 
to a productive literature after the ‘impasse’ of postmodernism and the end of history.16 
 
In Neil Nehring’s GenXegesis essay ‘Jigsaw Youth versus Generation X and Postmodernism,’ 
Nehring claims that the riot grrrl movement, taking inspiration from feminist philosophies 
of affect, harnessed a musical aesthetic of ‘anger without an articulated ideology’ (71) as an 
‘antidote to postmodernism’ (61) and as a means of moving beyond the ‘waning of affect’ 
identified by Jameson as symptomatic of a culture no longer able to locate any meaning as 
a possible and appropriate source for impassioned commitment (64). Nehring goes on to 
identify in Kurt Cobain’s vocal performance and stage persona this same ‘lack of 
articulation’ (71) that nevertheless derives subversive political potential from its authentic 
expression of emotion in the face of a prevailing postmodern climate in which ‘we have all 
been trained to take nothing seriously’, and in which emotion and meaning have become 
detached and disconnected from political significance. Eschewing intellect in favour of 
emotion, for Nehring, means reconfiguring political discourse on affective, not intellectual, 
terms, and grounding politics in personality. This, Nehring argues, involves a renewed 
                                                          
16 On the notion of a postmodern ‘impasse’, see Capitalist Realism, in which Mark Fisher describes 
the paralysis of ‘pre-corporation’ that plagued a generation of attempted rebels in the 1990s, as well 
as David Foster Wallace’s ‘E Unibus Pluram,’ which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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emphasis on ‘self-creation’ and the pursuit of a project to ‘break with learned identities’ in 
order to ‘put together the puzzle pieces of a more authentic identity’ (72).  
 
For Catherine J. Cresswell, also writing in GenXegesis, Cobain’s performances are notable 
for their deliberate negation of a stable, authentic identity. In what she calls a 
‘performance of pathology’ (80), Cresswell recognises in Cobain’s ‘ambiguous, repetitive or 
simply alliterative’ vocals an imitation of depressive speech modes; modes that erase 
signification and thus ‘expose the void on which language is founded’ (95). From this void, 
Cobain, in what Cresswell reads as a resistance to becoming a ‘commodified identity’, 
cultivates a selfhood that ‘collapse[s] distinctions’ and renders himself as subject 
‘unreadable’ and thus resistant to ‘easy translation into the appropriable poses of 
postmodern capitalism’ (97). Thus, for Cresswell, Cobain politicises pathology, whilst for 
Nehring he politicises emotion. Yet the end result is quite different. The ‘void’ of language 
into which Cobain taps, as well as the ‘void’ of identity which for Cresswell is produced 
through Cobain’s blankly parodic, contradictory onstage personas, both would seem to fit 
conventionally into a poetics of postmodernity—a poetics of ‘involution […] absurdity […] 
sardonic fatigue […] iconoclasm and rebellion,’ to quote David Foster Wallace (Wallace 
1993, 182)—and appear to eschew any claims towards authentic self-expression. 
Meanwhile Nehring reads Cobain’s performance of inarticulate anger precisely as a means 
to authentic self-expression, and the foundation of a politics that is rooted in a belief in 
identity and a rejection of postmodern scepticism regarding the possibility of stable 
selfhood. What, then, are we to make of these contrasting accounts of Cobain’s musical 
project?  
 
Both Cresswell and Nehring read Cobain’s music into a dialectic of irony and authenticity. 
For Cresswell, Cobain embraces irony in order to resist becoming a fixed and thus 
commodified identity, whilst for Nehring, rejecting irony and re-siting politics in affect 
allows Cobain to cultivate an authentic identity on his own terms. In both cases, the 
authors concede that Cobain must contend with what Nehring, drawing on the work of 
Larry Grossberg, calls the danger of ‘authentic inauthenticity’; the ‘transparently calculated 
emotional intensity’ Grossberg finds in the work of artists like Bruce Springsteen 
(Grossberg, qtd. in Nehring, 64). This danger, long acknowledged as an impasse beyond 
which artists like Cobain struggled to move, has in the twenty-first century invigorated a 
turn to sincerity in a crop of authors including Dave Eggers, Jennifer Egan and Benjamin 
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Kunkel, all of whom owe a spiritual debt to the work of David Foster Wallace, whose own 
early work on the subject in the 1990s—far from an isolated phenomenon—marks a 
response to the cultural milieu of which the early slacker fictions I am discussing are a part.  
 
At the conclusion to his essay ‘E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction’, Wallace 
famously posits his vision for the future of art after irony. He imagines ‘the next great 
literary “rebels”’ championing ‘single-entendre values’ and treating ‘with reverence and 
conviction’ the ‘old untrendy human troubles and emotions in US life’ (192-193). 
Contrasting these imagined rebels with the ‘old postmodern insurgents’ who risk ‘shock, 
disgust [and] outrage’, the new ‘anti-rebels’ would instead risk ‘the yawn, the rolled eyes’ 
and the accusations of ‘sentimentality [and] melodrama’ (193). For contemporary critics, 
Wallace’s essay, which presents sincerity as the antidote to postmodern irony, marks a 
crucial development in what Adam Kelly calls ‘the dialectic of sincerity’ (Kelly 2014). Lionel 
Trilling’s work Sincerity and Authenticity (1972) observes a turn in the twentieth century 
from the ideal of sincerity, ‘performed’ towards others, to the primacy of the ‘authentic 
autonomous self,’ so that, in Trilling’s terms, a dialectical relationship arises between 
sincerity and authenticity. For Kelly, Wallace’s preoccupation with irony modifies this 
formulation to incorporate irony, not authenticity, as the dialectical opposite of sincerity. 
Recognising that ‘the fight to preserve personal authenticity’ in a society saturated with 
advertising and consumerism had ‘proven impossible,’ Wallace and his contemporaries 
instead pursue the ‘reconstruction of new forms of sincerity’ in opposition to postmodern 
irony (ibid.). 
 
Emblematic of the late-twentieth century ‘turn to theory’, Kelly routes Wallace’s new 
sincerity through Derrida. For Kelly, the legacy of post-structuralism denotes that sincerity 
‘expressed through language […] can never be pure’, in much the same way that for Derrida 
‘a gift’ can always be (mis)taken for manipulation. Kelly suggests that it is this very 
uncertainty as to whether a particular ‘promise of truth to the other’ might be 
contaminated by the ‘threat’ of manipulation from which sincerity derives its power:  
that sincerity can always be taken for manipulation shows us that sincerity depends 
not on purity but on trust and faith: if I or the other could be certain that I am 
being sincere, the notion of sincerity would lose its normative charge (Kelly 2015, 
7). 
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Thus, sincerity ‘has the same structure as the gift’, and to be sincere means to risk that 
which for Wallace is the most frightening prospect for the well-conditioned subject of 
postmodernity: ‘leaving oneself open to others' ridicule by betraying passé expressions of 
value, emotion, or vulnerability’ (181). Sincerity becomes a radical response precisely 
because it pushes beyond the comfort zone of the ‘fetal position’ encouraged by 
postmodern irony, demanding commitment through faith to something unstable, 
potentially contaminated, but also potentially meaningful and connective. Undermined by 
the failed possibilities of ‘truth to oneself’ which for Trilling is the ‘means to the end’ of 
sincerity, the new sincerity, characterised by undecidability, is instead defined ultimately by 
‘the affective response’ it invites (Kelly 2015, 13).   
 
Returning to Cobain, we might better understand the singer’s project then not as a pursuit 
of authentic self-expression, but as an attempt to form a sincere connection with his 
audience. In this sense we may situate the practices identified by both Nehring and 
Cresswell side-by-side, as complementary aspects of the same sincerity. By rendering 
himself ‘unreadable’ through his pathological and parodic performances, Cobain negates 
any pretensions to an authentic autonomous self—pretensions Kelly rightly acknowledges 
had, by the 90s, proven impossible. Meanwhile, Cobain’s inarticulate ‘anger without […] 
ideology’ provides a blank space for identity-formation not for Cobain himself but for his 
fans, who could write their own personal tragedies into the negative space of Cobain’s 
inarticulate shouts and unintelligible lyrics. Cobain’s performed identities—ranging from 
hyper-masculinity to gender-bending insecurity—render him an inauthentic self, but a 
potentially sincere other, should his fans agree to take the leap of blind faith necessary to 
the acceptance of his ‘gift’ of a sincere dialogue.  
 
Cobain’s sincerity functions partially through his position as a performing figure. A direct, 
intimate connection with his audience facilitates the affective charge, thus Cobain’s 
inarticulacy and indeterminacy reach their apex in his live performances. In this respect, 
expressing sincerity through filmmaking or literary fiction presents both challenges and 
opportunities inherent to the distance between artist and audience. One such way 
Coupland’s novel overcomes this challenge is by staging scenarios in which characters must 
themselves reconcile their scepticism and detachedness in order to develop a connection. 
This value of blind faith is articulated with clarity in Generation X. In a story told by Claire 
and set in ‘Texlahoma’—a ‘mythic world […] an  asteroid orbiting the earth, where the year 
57 
 
is always 1974’ (Coupland, 46)—an astronaut named Buck suffering from ‘space poisoning’ 
attempts to convince three sisters to fall in love with him, in order to harness the ‘radiation 
waves emitted by a woman in love’ to power his spaceship and escape Texlahoma. The 
catch, Buck explains to each of his prospective lovers, is that without enough oxygen in his 
ship, the sister who accompanies him must temporarily die, until they reach the moon and 
she can be revived. The first two sisters fall in love with Buck but turn down his request. 
The final sister, Serena, whom Buck realises is his ‘real True Love’, however, complies with 
Buck’s request. Serena accompanies Buck into his rocket, and before she dies is rewarded 
with the sight of the ‘dashing pink astronaut’ shedding his space-sick skin, and outside the 
‘glistening pale blue marble of Earth against the black heavens’ (52). On Earth, Serena’s 
sisters watch the rocket disappear. Despite both agreeing that Buck’s promise of reviving 
Serena is ‘horseshit,’ both sisters concede that nevertheless, they feel jealous (ibid.). Buck’s 
offer to show Serena ‘the views of the heavens’ is a classic Derridian gift, haunted with the 
spectre of manipulation. Yet Serena chooses to accept the gift and is rewarded with a 
transcendent moment, apprehending both Buck and the Earth in a manner inaccessible to 
her Texlahoma-bound sisters. Despite Buck’s betrayal, Serena’s leap of blind faith is thus 
framed by the novel as its own reward. 
 
Beyond staging scenes of faith, narrative fiction may also manifest sincerity through a 
mixture of formal experimentalism and meta-commentary, whereby the artist can either 
mobilise the text’s aesthetics to energise an affective response, or can reveal themselves 
by shedding the illusion of fiction in order to directly communicate with their audience. 
Coupland’s novel manifests its own form of sincerity aesthetically distinct but thematically 
akin to Cobain’s performative work through a metatextual blending of ‘unillusioned 
acknowledgement of formula’—the formula of the modern novel—and a ‘genuine and real’ 
expression of feeling (Kelly 2014). This self-awareness is evident from the opening chapters 
of the novel, which feature the author’s now iconic use of marginalia as well as the 
paragraph markers and cloud pictures that for G. P. Lainsbury draw attention to ‘the 
conventions of the literary presentation of [the novel’s] material’ (186). The marginalia, 
which Lainsbury describes as ‘a mutant crossbreed of the continental aphoristic tradition 
and the pragmatic considerations of magazine journalism’ (185), at once acknowledges 
both the history of the novel as an art form and the immediate, material reality of the 
novel as commodity. Once safeguarded against accusations of naivety, Coupland allows 
himself to be ‘downright sentimental’ in regard to ‘the sacredness of friendship […] love […] 
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and the value of narrative itself’ (Ulrich, 16). Indeed, as Ulrich notes, whilst the novel 
appears to ‘epitomise […] the postmodern aesthetic of surface play and self-conscious 
irony’, in actual fact it is ‘surprisingly concerned with […] the search for depth and meaning’ 
(16). Like Cobain and Wallace, Coupland adopts postmodern literary means, but applies 
them to sincere, not ironic, ends.  
 
Furthermore, in Generation X the reader frequently finds themselves invited into dialogue. 
This invitation is necessarily extended by Andy, Coupland’s narrator, and is often advanced 
at the expense of the characters surrounding the protagonist. Whilst the majority of the 
storytelling acts in Generation X are social ones, at points in the novel Andy specifically 
appeals to the reader to share in a story with him alone: ‘a secret story, a story I won’t even 
tell Dag and Claire’ (53). Andy’s first ’secret story’ concerns a man named Edward who, 
after a ten-year withdrawal from society, is forced out of his hermetic library and into ‘a 
vast city, built not of words but of relationships’ (57). Forced to negotiate this city alone, 
Edward vows eventually to build a tower, a ‘beacon’ for the voyagers like himself, and from 
this tower to sell maps (58). The story, an allegorical retelling of Andy’s own late arrival into 
the human world of relationships and feelings, is a personal confession of inadequacy and 
failure to connect. Andy’s own narration becomes a ‘map’ for the reader, a fellow voyager 
slouching through postmodern America. Once again, the reader is invited into a 
‘transaction’ with Andy, one paralleled in the transactions Andy imagines between Edward 
and the voyagers seeking to buy his maps. Coupland’s decision to have Andy narrate his 
story to the reader rather than his friends allows the author to work through the 
opportunities unique to the novel form—opportunities not accessible to Andy in his 
everyday oral storytelling routine. Andy, Dag and Claire’s face-to-face storytelling practice 
perpetually risks being infected by the ‘carapace of coolness’ (10) from which the three 
friends struggle to liberate themselves; preoccupied as they are with the same accusations 
of ‘sentimentality and melodrama’ theoretically endured by Wallace’s ‘anti-rebels’. The 
novel form, however, with its depersonalised reach and its material distance from the 
originating voice, provides Andy a safe space in which to take his own leap of blind faith 
into sincere dialogue with a reader who must likewise cross the gulf opened up by the 
material realities of the novel. By eschewing authenticity in favour of artifice, Andy, and by 
extension Coupland, posit the novel as a simultaneously distant and intimate form of 
communication, in much the same way Kelly recognises that Wallace’s own self-conscious 
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novelisation of sincere sentiment allows ‘potential triteness’ to be simultaneously 
‘embraced and held at a distance’ (Kelly, ‘Dialectic’).  
 
Fundamental to new sincerity is the rebirth—after an apparent death in the postmodern 
period—of the author. New sincerity fiction frequently blurs the boundaries of the ‘real’ 
and ‘fictional’ not in order to undermine the former, but in order to reinforce the latter. So 
Dave Eggers writes the fictionalised autobiography A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius, or David Foster Wallace populates The Pale King with David Wallaces, or Coupland 
writes himself into his 2005 novel jPod. All of these metafictional flourishes respond not 
only to the advent of reality TV and the perceived intensification of the very Baudrillardian 
postmodern simulacra, but equally to a desire to short-circuit the impersonality of the 
novel as a means to affectively connect with a reader.17 Such a move speaks to the ubiquity 
of paratextual information that accompanies contemporary texts and that, to an extent, 
facilitates the desired effects of new sincerity writing. No longer is it possible to read 
Jonathan Franzen or Bret Easton Ellis without the authors’ looming personas crowding out 
the text, their controversies colouring the reading experience. The reinvigoration of this 
connection between author and text, even at a moment in which many artists desire the 
aforementioned effacement of such an artistic ego, further complicates the artistic projects 
of the post-postmodern. 
 
Returning momentarily to the 1960s, central to Fluxus was the movement’s would-be 
architect, the aforementioned George Maciunas. An enigmatic figure, Maciunas’ 
contradictions figured him as much a proto-Linklater as his art tastes did a proto-slacker. 
From 1962 onwards Maciunas began organising concerts and events under the Fluxus 
umbrella, which he saw ‘developing into an organisation which would protect the copyright 
of the individual artists and successfully market and monopolise their work’ (Kellein, 10). 
Though ‘insoluble economic problems’ and artistic disfavour conspired against Maciunas, 
he nevertheless ‘continued to aim for a dictatorship of the artistic proletariat’ on the 
foundation that ‘Fluxus production depended entirely on him, like a one-man factory’ 
(ibid.). Existing in a permanently precarious financial situation brought about by spending 
up to 90% of his income on Fluxus projects (ibid., 12), Maciunas embodied the 
contradictions of slacking as articulated by Dostoevsky Wannabe: he devoted an ‘immense 
                                                          
17 This move is taken to its logical conclusion in the genre of autofiction, the subject of the following 
chapter.  
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effort’ to the art of doing nothing. A further tension between his dictatorial ambitions and 
his advice to Vautier—‘eliminate your ego entirely […] don’t attribute anything to yourself - 
depersonalise yourself!’—are likewise mirrored in the uneasy reconciliation Coupland and 
Linklater are forced to make between their celebration of ephemeral art and the material 
realities of the products they produce.  
 
Like Maciunas, Linklater’s directorial persona sits uneasily alongside the philosophies 
espoused in his oeuvre. Anecdotes regarding the production of the film—that it cost only 
$23,000, that it was funded by a credit card and a loan from the director’s parents—and 
Linklater’s intensive efforts to establish the Austin Film Society and with it the Texas city as 
a bastion of alternative filmmaking, contribute to the mythos of Linklater as a ‘one-man 
factory’ in the style of Maciunas. The comfort his career reflects with flitting between 
independent and major studio productions further compounds Linklater’s ambiguously 
anti-establishment persona.18 Linklater’s name is synonymous with the indie wave of the 
early 1990s, the moment of ‘the triumph of the under $100,000 film’ that Pierson identifies 
occurring between ’91 and ’94 (Pierson, qtd. in Savlov). Yet as ambiguous as the director’s 
philosophy is the label ‘indie’ itself. Various critics have attempted to define the term, 
usually shying away from concrete signifiers of ‘indie-ness’ to instead portray it as a 
mindset, an attitude, or an approach to filmmaking. For Payne, indie is an ‘authorial and 
personal spirit’ (qtd. in Horsley, 131), while for Lee, it is an ‘ethical vision’ of ‘democratic 
filmmaking.’ But these accounts have their limitations: after all, due to the necessarily 
collaborative process of filmmaking, isn’t all filmmaking ‘democratic’? And regardless of the 
‘spirit’ or ‘vision’ of the process, isn’t it true that, as Horsley eventually concedes, ‘no 
matter what has gone into it, the artist’s work winds up as just another product’ (132)? The 
closest to an agreed consensus among critics would appear to be that any attempt to 
define a binary relationship between independent and mainstream is a vain effort. For 
Horsley, ultimately, ‘the dividing line between ‘independent’ and ‘mainstream’ is both 
blurred and constantly fluctuating’ (130), and for Lesley Speed, ‘the relationship between 
independent and mainstream feature films has become one of “sliding” inter-dependence’ 
(100). This ambiguity of purpose and process necessitates in the indie film a particular 
embrace of the values and aesthetics of the new sincerity. At once imbued with a greater 
earnestness derived from their perceived authenticity, and yet in their very production, 
                                                          
18 Linklater’s oeuvre ranges from the arthouse experiments of Tape and Waking Life (both 2001) to 
family-friendly blockbusters like the Jack Black vehicle School of Rock (2004). 
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promotion, and circulation co-opted by the same machinery that perpetuates the existence 
of the Hollywood blockbuster, to view an indie film is always to enter into a pact with the 
director to believe in the sincerity of the film’s sentiment.   
 
On the surface, the proposition of the slacker narrative seems simple: to reject the working 
world and the neoliberal values of productivity, profit, and self-interest, and to turn instead 
to a peripheral and bohemian existence in which creativity is king. However, the reality 
presented in these texts is much more complicated. Withdrawing from the world of work 
entirely proves impossible for those slackers not radical enough to commit to voluntary 
impoverishment, and thus their withdrawal remains at all times compromised, where 
internal rebellion and a lack of commitment to work must be reconciled with the necessity 
of earning a living. When not working, the slackers divert their energies into creativity, but 
again must take care to maintain the boundaries between themselves as artists and the 
rapaciously neoliberal art market. To do so, they engage in communal art practices that 
result in intangible rewards, and yet even still these practices risk drawing the realms of 
activity and inactivity together as undifferentiated labour time, rather than as subversive 
play time. The texts don’t resolve these problems, standing instead as tributes to 
compromise and to the immense challenges neoliberalism presents to those artists 
attempting to generate narratives that resist, or at least resist complicity with, 
neoliberalism’s core philosophies as they manifest in everyday life. What Slacker, 
Generation X, and the performances of Kurt Cobain do in fact do, however, is to invite their 
audiences to look beyond their failures, in order to appreciate their attempts. Early 
gestures towards formal practices that would become standard with the flourishing of new 
sincerity writing in the twenty first century take steps not to reconcile the contradictions at 
the hearts of these texts, but to move beyond them. In doing so, the slacker narratives of 
the early 1990s anticipate the texts discussed in the following chapters. This chapter, 
however, can only provide an answer to Dostoevsky Wannabe’s question: who will make 
the great work about the immense effort not to create? The answer: Linklater, Coupland, 
and all those directors, writers, and artists who contributed to the slacker’s ‘golden age’ of 
the 1990s. 
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Chapter 2: The Autofiction Novel 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The 1991 release of the slacker triumvirate of Generation X, Slacker, and Nevermind 
inaugurated a certain approach to the political that, throughout the decade, would be 
imitated again and again in American art. Coupland, Linklater, and Cobain narrate projects 
of passive resistance and considered withdrawal, and in doing so they provide the blueprint 
for a generation of artists, filmmakers, and writers who would continue to develop and 
expand the canon of slacker narratives. But while the slacker’s vision of ephemeral, 
communal, and post-ironic art is specific to the slacker genre, some of the broader 
strategies put to work by Coupland and Linklater surface repeatedly in a broad variety of 
texts from the decade. Such strategies include the exploitation of the tensions between 
form and content, in an echo of Jameson’s ‘thought to the second power’; the soliciting of 
complex affective responses to texts through direct entreaties to an audience; and the 
bringing into confluence of an aesthetic challenge to postmodernism with a political 
challenge to neoliberalism. These strategies are particularly prominent in another genre 
that would experience a moment of relative popularity in the 1990s, following the 
publication of a number of novels throughout the decade that share unmistakable 
aesthetic and thematic preoccupations. Grouped together, Kathy Acker’s My Mother: 
Demonology (1993), Siri Hustvedt’s The Blindfold (1992), and Chris Kraus’ I Love Dick (1997) 
all represent entries into the genre of autofiction. This genre, and these representative 
autofiction texts, will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the figure of the slacker as a fictional archetype 
occludes certain realities of everyday life. That labour is marginalised in these texts situates 
the slacker as a figure of some privilege. In Linklater’s film, particularly, labour and money 
figure only incidentally in the lives of some of the many slacker characters depicted.1 
                                                          
1 I define the term labour here in the Arendtian sense, as distinct from the ‘work’ of world-making to 
which the slackers devote their lives. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the basic philosophy of 
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Similarly, the demographics of the slacker community are inordinately skewed towards the 
white and male. In a sense, these issues may function reciprocally. That the historically 
wealthiest demographic in America should also be the one most equipped to withdraw 
from the business of labour should come as no surprise to any viewer of Linklater’s film. 
Nevertheless, the limited vision of these texts fails to meet the requirements of a truly 
inclusive critique of neoliberalism: an aporia that the texts discussed in this chapter will 
redress, and that will, in turn, redress the balance of this thesis itself.   
 
The slacker vision of withdrawal as protest also proves problematic. As Lee Konstantinou 
rightly observes in the introduction to Cool Characters, ‘We should […] remain critical of 
anyone who would pursue symbolic political projects at the expense of organizing efforts 
and coordinated activism’ (28). There is, undoubtedly, a gulf between the art projects 
depicted in the slacker narratives—storytelling, happenings, improvised performances—
and direct collective political action. Linklater and Coupland attempt to overcome these 
problems by using formal techniques that can instantiate or at least imitate collective 
action in their broader audience; however, in being confined to the realm of aesthetics 
these attempts are naturally limited in effect. This compromise preoccupies the slacker 
artists to a lesser degree, perhaps, than some of the more theoretically inclined figures 
studied in this project. Indeed, the focus of this chapter will be on the much more self-
interrogating work of Acker, Hustvedt, and Kraus. These writers all produce what Joan 
Hawkins, in reference to Chris Kraus, terms ‘theoretical fiction,’ fiction in which ‘theory 
becomes an intrinsic part of the “plot”’ (247).2 These fictions mark a turn from the utopian 
ideals of the slacker narratives to a focus on the pragmatics of everyday life and the 
circumvention of compromised or restrictive artistic forms. As in the previous chapter, my 
focus when reading these texts will be divided between content and form: between what 
                                                          
the slacker can be defined as an attempt to disrupt the reversal of the vita activa described in 
Arendt’s Human Condition: an attempt to distinguish and to privilege work—particularly art-work—
over the Sisyphean drudgery of labour, and to reclaim action as the highest principal of daily life. Of 
course, by divesting themselves from labour, the slacker runs the risk of living what Arendt calls ‘the 
life of the exploiter’ (176), a life in which labour is cynically outsourced to the less privileged. In 
Coupland’s case, the ‘McJobs’ each character maintains shifts the issue of labour slightly more into 
focus, but these jobs are mostly figured in the novel as sort of sociological curios, and never prove to 
overtly impair the protagonists in their primary business of withdrawing from society.   
2 Mark Currie, in Postmodern Narrative Theory, also uses the term ‘theoretical fiction’ to define 
fiction texts that contain ‘theoretical intent’ (51). In contrast to metafiction, Currie describes 
theoretical fiction as ‘a performative rather than a constative narratology [that] performs what it 
wishes to say about narrative while itself being a narrative’ (52). It is this balancing of commentary 
and narrative, or, for Hawkins, theory and plot, that makes autofiction such a powerfully self-
reflexive form.  
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Acker, Hustvedt and Kraus depict in their narratives, and the way in which they frame and 
present their fiction.3 Their attentions are directed towards the female experience under 
neoliberalism and meta-textually ask not only what this experience looks like in everyday 
life, but also how it might be represented. This immediately involves interrogating some of 
the assumptions that lie un-prodded at the heart of the slacker texts of the previous 
chapter. As Kathy Acker notes bitterly in her retrospective essay ‘A Few Notes…’, ‘the 
hippies [and we might say by extension the slackers] had been mistaken: they had thought 
that they could successfully oppose American post-capitalism by a lie, by creating a utopian 
society' (Acker, ‘A Few Notes’).  
 
The first text featured in this chapter is Acker’s 1993 novel My Mother: Demonology, which 
abrasively deconstructs the utopian ideals of the hippie-slacker continuum in favour of a 
nihilistic vision of life in contemporary America. Following that, I turn my attention to Siri 
Hustvedt’s 1992 debut novel The Blindfold. Like Acker’s novel, Hustvedt’s follows a young 
woman as she attempts to claw together some essential sense of selfhood in the face of 
pressures both material—particularly financial—and existential, as a series of surreal 
psychosexual encounters threaten to erode her identity. Finally, I consider Chris Kraus’ 
1997 novel I Love Dick. Kraus’ novel, mostly epistolary in form, tracks the protagonist’s 
deepening obsession with an academic named Dick, as well as providing a platform for a 
broader reflection on what it means to create art as an occupation for women in 1990s 
America.     
 
At their essence, each of these texts represents a personal narrative contained within an 
ambiguous, pseudo-fictional frame, and each narrative is at its most efficacious when 
exploiting this tension between content and form. To make sense of what is at stake at the 
narrative level, we can turn to a representative example of one text’s reception. In late 
1992, David Foster Wallace reviewed The Blindfold for the Philadelphia Review in a piece 
titled ‘Iris’s Story: An Inversion of Philosophical Skepticism.’ Despite Wallace’s enthusiasm 
for Hustvedt’s work, his review is nevertheless problematic. While Wallace appreciates the 
way in which Hustvedt explores ‘the ontological insecurity of a female whose sense of her 
                                                          
3 As mentioned above, the tension between content and form is central to much of the work this 
thesis will discuss. What Jameson, in Marxism and Form, terms ‘thought to the second power’ or ‘a 
thought about thinking’ determines the approach of a variety of artists in the decade to the problem 
of authentically representing radical challenges to neoliberal hegemony within the strictures of 
traditional modes of cultural production.   
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own authentic existence is bound up with how she herself is perceived by other (male) 
subjects,’ he also goes on to note that what is specifically under threat in the novel is Iris’ 
‘sexual (the equivalent, for these feminists, of ontological) security.’ Wallace’s conflation of 
the ontological with the sexual represents a flattening of the female experience that 
Hustvedt attempts to narrate. In I Love Dick, Kraus signals that she is alive to the possibility 
of such a flattening when she laments that ‘to be female means being trapped within the 
purely psychological […] because emotion’s just so terrifying the world refuses to believe it 
can be pursued as discipline, as form’ (180). She goes on to entreat Dick, the object of her 
epistolary writing: ‘Dear Dick, I want to make the world more interesting than my 
problems. Therefore, I have to make my problems social' (ibid.). With this, Kraus rebuts 
reductionist accounts of female experience that limit themselves to the sexual or the 
psychological at the expense of affective experience, and the politicisation of that 
experience. Kraus’ declaration echoes the famous dictum of second-wave feminism that 
‘the personal is political’—an observation that originates with writer Carol Hanisch but 
quickly spread to undergird the consciousness-raising techniques of feminist collectives in 
the 1970s. One problem that this chapter will be concerned with, then, is how the earlier 
feminist realisation that ‘personal problems are political problems’ (Hanisch) is modified or 
subverted by feminist writing in the 1990s in response to the intensified neoliberal politics 
of the decade.  
 
This politicisation of the personal is framed within a formal exercise in autofictional writing. 
While none of the texts discussed are entirely autobiographical, all incorporate aspects of 
autobiography: Acker’s protagonist Laure—a recurring figure in Acker’s work—shares 
striking similarities with the author, from her penchant for motorbikes to her mother’s 
death by suicide; Iris, the protagonist of Hustvedt’s The Blindfold, inverts the author’s name 
and similarly shares biographical details, including studying for a literature degree in New 
York; Chris Kraus’ novel veers closest to the biographical, featuring in its cast of characters 
both Kraus herself and her husband Sylvere Lotringer, himself a prominent academic in 
both the novel and in reality. Drawing on a potted critical history of the term, Alison 
Gibbons labels Kraus’ novel as autofiction in her essay for the edited collection 
Metamodernism: Historicity, Affect, and Depth After Postmodernism. In her chapter, 
Gibbons writes that contemporary autofiction, far from being simply ‘a postmodern version 
of autobiography,’ represents neither ‘a straightforward, uncritical return to the affective 
subjectivity that defined modernism nor is it a complete rebuttal of postmodern 
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disintegration but a vicissitude of both’ (119). As we have already seen, central to an 
investigation into American art in the 1990s is the legacy of postmodernism and the artistic 
responses it invites. By drawing autofiction into the canon of metamodernism—which, for 
the contributors to the Metamodernism collection, at least, should be considered 
postmodernism’s successor—Gibbons suggests that texts like Kraus’ somehow move 
beyond postmodern irony. How Acker, Hustvedt, and Kraus achieve this, and how they 
utilise the autofiction form to address everyday life under neoliberalism in 1990s 
America—how, in other words, these authors make the personal political or social—will be 
the ultimate focus of this chapter. 
 
 
The Remnants of a Common Language: Kathy Acker 
 
 
My Mother: Demonology (henceforth abbreviated to Demonology) is typical of the literary 
style Acker honed and maintained throughout her writing career. The novel is a patchwork 
of transgressive surrealism, candid life writing, and pastiche appropriations from a range of 
intertexts, from the epistolary correspondence between Georges Bataille and Colette 
Peignot, to Dario Argento’s 1977 cult horror film Suspiria. Loosely binding together the core 
plot and extended hallucinatory sequences that punctuate the novel is the protagonist, 
Laure’s, maturation; a journey from abusive childhood, through torturous boarding school 
years, and eventually into the motorcycle-riding bohemian figure that closes out the novel. 
In a sense, there is little to distinguish Demonology from Acker’s broader oeuvre—indeed, 
constant repetition and reiteration of material is a hallmark of Acker’s style, and this 
contributes to the sensation, when reading her, that each individual work is a fragment of a 
broader whole. As Chris Kraus notes in her biography of Acker, 'Acker worked and 
reworked her memories until, like the sex she described, they became conduits to 
something a-personal, until they became myth' (58). This constant revision of the same 
source material in the service of myth-making means that, by the time one reaches the 
1990s texts, the essential sameness of Acker’s work can often eclipse the subtle differences 
each reworking evinces. Demonology is no exception, and the novel’s core plot follows the 
same ‘primal narrative’ that Glenn Harper attributes to all of Acker’s fiction: 
a young woman, sometimes called Kathy, in a loveless but wealthy family; her 
father abandons her mother; her stepfather rapes her; her mother, having spent 
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her fortune, commits suicide in a cheap hotel; and Kathy lives in poverty and 
becomes an artist. (44-45) 
 
Further to this, individual sections of a novel like Demonology—like, for example, the 
ekphrastic account of Argento’s Suspiria—by their very nature could easily be transposed 
into another of Acker’s novels. All of which is to say that Demonology is a fascinating, but 
not a distinctive, text. It treads little new ground for Acker, though its politics are updated 
for the 1990s—most prominently in the long, grotesque parody of the Bush administration 
at the centre of the novel. As an emblematic Acker text, for the purposes of my discussion, 
Demonology’s true value lies in this continuity. Acker’s formulaic narratives have invited a 
robust critical response over the decades, and my interest, in this section of the chapter, is 
in how this critical community has divided into distinct schools of seemingly opposing 
thought. Earlier responses to Acker’s work hailing from the 1980s and 1990s tend to offer 
poststructuralist feminist readings performed in the tradition of Luce Irigaray and Hélène 
Cixous; while a more common trend since the 2000s has been to read Acker from a 
political-economic position that takes the author’s work to be, to varying extents, either 
pro- or anti-neoliberal. Juxtaposing these two veins of criticism serves to bring to light a 
deeper schism between brands of feminist and Marxist criticism. This schism has been 
highlighted in recent critical work on the topic of so-called ‘neoliberal feminism,’ and 
Acker’s work provides a useful entry point into these debates. The ways in which liberal 
feminist and neoliberal thought equally draw on a countercultural ethos and prioritise the 
concerns of the individual is echoed in Acker’s autofictional writing, despite the ostensibly 
progressive and highly politicised tenor of the author’s work.  These tensions prompt 
several questions: is it possible to connect a feminist critique to an anti-neoliberal critique 
of Acker’s work? Has this reading of Acker’s work been neglected thus far because of an 
aporia in criticism, or because of an aporia in the texts themselves? Is this aporia grounded 
in the autofictional form Acker chooses to use, or can other authors mobilise this form in 
different ways? Asking these questions ultimately leads to another: can highly personal 
writing also be political writing?  
 
To answer these questions, we must first confront the personal and the political aspects of 
Acker’s writing in turn. Demonology begins with the adult Laure on a mission to lose her 
sense of self through a series of dysfunctional and dangerous relationships with others: 
‘once I had fucked,’ she claims, ‘the only thing I wanted was to give myself entirely and 
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absolutely to another person’ (14). This wilful self-erasure can be read as an immediate and 
radical defence of bodily agency and an argument in favour of the supreme right of the 
individual to engage in behaviour that may result in self-harm or even self-destruction. As 
we shall see, this question of agency was a cultural flashpoint in America as Acker was 
writing, as a discourse around bodily autonomy erupted from debates over abortion rights. 
The implications of the loss of selfhood through sex also resonates with a broader critique 
of patriarchal power, while at the thematic level, Laure’s self-destructive urges coincide 
with her struggle to articulate her anger, with both struggles emanating from her gendered 
experience of language and, partly by extension, power. Acker directly addresses the 
gendered dimension of language when she has Laure remark to another female character, 
‘for us, there is no language in this male world’ (168). This problem is explored in more 
detail in a conversation Laure holds with a male lover, during which Acker's narrator 
highlights something fundamentally at odds in their experiences of reality: '"you believe 
that everything that's outside of you ('reality') is a reflection of your perceptions [...] that 
you can see, feel, hear, understand the world. [...] I believe that I am so apart from the 
world' (28). This condition is an inversion of the state of Cartesian doubt.4 For Acker's 
narrator, Cartesian doubt is an affirmation of one's own sensory power, but the self-
confidence required to place faith in one’s own perception of the world is a uniquely 
masculine attribute.  
 
Laure’s condition emblematises a core anxiety in feminist poetics relating to the 
phallocentric nature of discourse, summarised by Adrienne Rich as the problem of how ‘our 
language has trapped as well as liberated us, how the very act of naming has been til now a 
male prerogative […]’ (Rich, qtd. in Showalter, 182). In the 1980s this problem captivated 
feminist philosophers in the West, and particularly in Europe, provoking responses from 
the ecriture feminine of French philosophers like Cixous and Irigaray, to the ‘feminist 
reading’ of American Elaine Showalter. Nelly Furman usefully summarises what is at stake 
in these disparate movements:     
                                                          
4 David Foster Wallace credits Hustvedt with a similar manoeuvre in his review of The Blindfold, and 
as I continue to refer to this concept of Cartesian doubt, I do so with Wallace’s formulation in mind:  
The problem of skepticism is Cartesian and phallocentric and presumes the ontological 
priority of the Subject: I know I exist all right, but how can I trust my perceptions enough to 
be equally sure that any of the non-me Objective stuff I seem to see around me exists? […] 
this skeptical Subjective insecurity […] sits brooding astride the whole canon of Anglo-
American 20th-century lit. [… ] A defining characteristic of this century's important feminist 
fictions, though, has been its obversion of the skeptical dilemma. 
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It is through the medium of language that we define and categorise areas of 
difference and similarity, which in turn allow us to comprehend the world around 
us. Male-centered categorisations predominate in American English and subtly 
shape our understanding and perception of reality; this is why attention is 
increasingly directed to the inherently oppressive aspects for women of a male-
constructed language system. (Furman, 182) 
Acker’s Laure, finding her own ‘understanding and perception of reality’ tainted by the 
gendered quality of language, is unable to trust in her own perceptions. The narrator's 
identity fractures, and to resolve this problem, Acker’s narrator turns to self-dissolution, 
following the author’s favourite bodybuilding maxim: that identity, like muscle, ‘must be 
broken down before it can be rebuilt better’ (112). 
 
Unsurprisingly, Acker’s writing has resonated with critics working in the tradition of 
Irigaray, Cixous, and Furman, whose interests lie in how Acker engages with the challenges 
of phallocentric discourse. Nicola Pitchford observes how Acker’s use of pastiche resonates 
with Jameson’s critique of the term as the ‘wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead 
language’ (Jameson, qtd. in Pitchford). Pitchford quotes Acker’s Don Quixote in support of 
this claim: 
BEING DEAD, DON QUIXOTE COULD NO LONGER SPEAK. BEING BORN INTO AND 
PART OF A MALE WORLD, SHE HAD NO SPEECH OF HER OWN. ALL SHE COULD DO 
WAS READ MALE TEXTS WHICH WEREN'T HERS. (Acker, qtd. in Pitchford)  
This notion of language being subject to male ownership is similarly raised in Demonology, 
in the above quoted moment in which Laure observes that ‘for us, there is no language in 
this male world’ (168). Martina Sciolino also quotes the passage from Don Quixote to justify 
her observation that 'any fiction by Acker engages a poststructural skepticism regarding the 
constative efficacy of language' (437). Returning to the notion of repetition and the ‘primal 
narrative’ or ‘myth-making’ that undergirds Acker’s literary project, Sciolino notes that 
Acker’s critique of phallocentric discourse is articulated through the technique Sciolino 
terms ‘autoplagiarism’: the mixing of autobiography and pastiche that defines the formal 
experimentalism of Acker’s fictions.5 
                                                          
5 Sciolino remarks that ‘the autoplagiarist takes the phrase "life-story" literally—as a literary term.' 
Acker's fictionalising approach to her own biography takes issue with 'the notion of artistic 
authenticity underlying conventional authority,' (440) by which Sciolino suggests that a principal 
function of Acker’s work is to celebrate the death of the artist and by extension the death of 'the 
incredible egotism [of] phallic centrism' (Acker, qtd. in Sciolino, 440). Thus, Acker’s autoplagiarism is 
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What Sciolino calls autoplagiarism we can also call autofiction. It is the technique of 
autofiction, the melding of modernist subjectivity and postmodern disintegration as 
Gibbons defines it, that Acker harnesses to articulate her critique: a critique that focuses on 
how the valorisation of individual subjectivity is made inaccessible to female language 
users due to the hostility of the patriarchal symbolic order. The term ‘autofiction’ is 
frequently attributed to French novelist and critic Serge Doubrovsky, who first coined the 
term on the back cover of his 1977 novel Fils.6 Since Doubrovsky’s introduction of the term 
it has received considerable attention and various competing definitions have been offered 
in the attempt to delineate the exact borders between fiction, autofiction, and 
autobiography. The most useful and comprehensive of these attempts can be found in 
Marion Sadoux’s work on French writer Christine Angot. In a discussion of Angot’s 
autofictions, Sadoux notes that ‘notions of truth and fictionality in literature are extremely 
complex and at times highly paradoxical,’ but nevertheless attempts to concretely define 
autofiction as distinct from both fiction and autobiography:  
Autofiction is fundamentally and willingly ambiguous in that it borrows discursive 
strategies from first-person narrative and autobiography at the same time. 
Autofictions never allow the reader to identify the real from the fictional at the 
level of enunciation. (176) 
Fundamentally, for Sadoux, autofiction is 'willed ambiguity.' More pertinently for my 
discussion, Sadoux also alights on one common theme to the many otherwise competing 
definitions of the term: the notion that autofiction is always, fundamentally, ‘a resilient 
attempt to deal with notions of self and subjectivity in writing in an age of multiple crisis’ 
(177).7 Combined, Sadoux’s definitions situate autofiction as a formal strategy appropriate 
for describing exactly the crisis of Cartesian thought found in Acker’s work.   
 
                                                          
a particularly feminist one: it presents a challenge, at the level of form, to an individualised 
phallocentrism. 
6 Doubrovsky writes that ‘fiction, of facts and events strictly real, if you prefer is called autofiction, 
where the language of adventure has been entrusted to the adventure of language in its total 
freedom’ (np, italics mine). 
7 Sadoux notes that for Doubrovsky, 'autofiction […] is a form of writing in which autobiographical 
and fictional elements are intertwined in a creative activity linked to psychoanalytical experience.’ 
See also Mortimer, who notes that 'one thing that has characterized all versions of the idea of 
autofiction, at least, is the idea of the self. […] Whatever the precise definition, autofictional writers 
of today seem to want to tell the truth about themselves, in fiction' (23); and Tuck, who defines 
autofiction as the ‘search not only for truth and justice but for the self.’ 
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Acker’s work is certainly relentlessly focused on her own selfhood.  When Acker has one 
artist-character explain his process in Demonology, she may well be invoking her own 
practice: ‘to paint horror,’ her character explains, ‘I have to eradicate all distance between 
horror and me: I have to see/show my own horror, that I’m horrible’ (109).8 Demonology is 
filled with these moments of horror. Laure is radically candid, sharing at various moments 
in the text everything from perversely sexualised dreams of her father (‘the maggot, huge, 
translucent, and slimy, was my father’ (54)) to intimate details of her own bodily functions 
(‘I decided that I must be having one of those periods that are so heavy they could be 
natural miscarriages (52)). The candour of Laure’s narrative voice takes on particular 
resonance when one considers the aformentioned similarities the character shares with the 
author. From a fascination with motorbikes and bodybuilding to the formative details of 
her life, including the loss of her mother to suicide, Laure’s biography intersects regularly 
with the heavily publicised and widely known details of the author’s life. This candour 
constitutes a melding of fiction and fact that represents the autofictional impulse to 
‘eschew […] the entire truth vs. fiction debate in favor of the question of how to live or how 
to create’ (Sturgeon, qtd. in Gibbons).   
 
* * * 
 
The autofictional form of Acker’s Demonology mirrors the psyche of its protagonist: a 
fragmented assemblage cobbled together from a seemingly incoherent selection of 
unsuitable texts. Read in this light, Demonology’s adherence to Acker’s mythic ur-narrative 
and deliberate signalling of the issues defining contemporary feminist philosophy marks 
Acker’s novel as another entry into her career-long exploration of language and gender. 
However, in recent years an entirely different reading of Acker has also been advanced, 
                                                          
8 In her taxonomic work Aggressive Fictions, Kathryn Hume labels Acker a proponent of ‘complaint.’ 
For Hume, Acker’s principal aim is the ‘relentless articulation of discontent’ (44), likening the act of 
reading the author’s work to ‘manning a suicide hotline’ (50). This affective content has particular 
repercussions at the formal level. Hume describes the way in which aggressive fiction like Acker’s 
‘tramples reader sensibilities, offends and upsets wilfully and deliberately’ in pursuit of its intent to 
‘expres[s] and provok[e] emotion.’ The proper response, Hume suggests, is ‘surrender [to the text]. 
We should open ourselves to the emotions, and eventually, after full exposure, we should think our 
way through the ideas’ (8). This recalls the recent work of Nikolaj Lubecker, who argues in Feel-Bad 
Film that films which refuse to deliver ‘satisfaction and narrative containment’ (3) do so in order to 
demarcate a space in which ‘society can engage with and negotiate its relation to that which is 
socially problematic’ (14). Hume and Lubecker join a whole canon of critics whose recent work has 
focused on the ways in which unpleasant, disturbing, or subversive fiction can engage with a 
viewer’s intellect by first provoking a strong affective response. For more on this, see my later 
chapter on ‘Abjection.’ 
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one less concerned with Acker’s feminist politics than with her engagement with 
neoliberalism as it has emerged and evolved along the same timeline as her career. Since 
around 2010 Acker’s work has enjoyed renewed attention by a series of critics intent on 
mapping the political projects of postmodern and contemporary fiction. These critics seek 
primarily to map Acker’s varying shades of resistance to, or complicity with, neoliberal 
ideological values.  
 
In American Literature and the Free Market, 1945-2000, Michael Clune sets forth his theory 
of ‘economic fictions’ as fictions that ‘open a space in which market relations are set to 
work organising experience’ (15). Clune positions Acker as a key proponent of economic 
fiction, and he finds in her work an underlying commitment to the principles of the 
neoliberal free market including deregulation, privatisation, and the restructuring of non-
market relationships according to market ideals, going so far as to parallel the author’s 
hostility towards societal convention and control to Friedrich Hayek’s rejection of artificial 
controls over the market (109). Lee Konstantinou’s Cool Characters follows this argument, 
again using Acker as a paradigmatic example of an essentially pro-free market literature.9 
Konstantinou argues that Acker’s anarchistic liberal philosophy is compromised by her 
infatuation with a very capitalist-compatible vision of freedom—a compromise, he 
suggests, that sits at the heart of the subculture of punk to which Acker belongs. 
Konstantinou ultimately arrives at the controversial conclusion that punk is a form of 
‘management theory,’ one that ‘aims to teach a mass audience how to overturn 
convention’ (115) in much the same way that neoliberal economic theorists like Hayek and 
Friedman constructed ‘fantasies of spontaneous order in response to centralised state 
power, relatively strong unions, and bureaucratic corporate forms’ (136). For Konstantinou 
and Clune, the anarchic self-expression central to Acker’s work constitutes not primarily an 
engagement with feminist theories of language, but a celebration of neoliberal theories 
                                                          
9 Both critics specifically focus on Acker’s favoured pirate imagery. For Clune, Acker’s work captures 
the zeitgeist of post-1989 America. In this late period, Clune argues that the key conflict in Acker’s 
work is between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘piracy’; or between a market subordinated to non-market rules 
and an anarchic, radically free market. Paying specific attention to Empire of the Senseless, Clune 
argues that ‘For Acker, the pirate is the revolutionary avatar of an entirely economic world, with the 
free market imagined as the open sea, the horizon of the possible' (104). Meanwhile, Konstantinou 
argues that Acker's plagiaristic literary technique and her vocal rejection of artistic 'creation' 
supports her view that piracy 'overcom[es] capitalist property relations in the name of making, 
friendship, and use value' (150). Konstantinou suggests that Acker’s association of piracy with anti-
capitalism ignores the laissez-faire ideology at the root of piracy that justifies an existence of 
deregulated market activity. The problem with reading Acker’s politics as anti-capitalist is that 'a 
world without state-enforced property rights would not necessarily be a noncapitalist world’ (ibid). 
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that hold as sacrosanct the uninhibited freedom of the individual and the market. This 
argument bears particular relevance to Acker’s use of the autofictional mode. While, in the 
eyes of a poststructuralist feminist reader, autofictional techniques critique phallocentric 
norms; a sceptical reader addressing Acker’s work alongside Konstantinou and Clune might 
see in the relentless focus on the individual, and in the self-promotion and packaging of life 
experiences as a commodity to be sold on the literary marketplace, a model of literature 
that neatly follows a neoliberal logic. Indeed, Acker’s calculated ‘myth-making,’ as Kraus 
terms it, may be considered a shrewd marketing technique in which the author’s life 
experiences—her human capital, in neoliberal terminology—is the product.10  
 
Clearly there is a disjunction between these latter readings of Acker’s work and the earlier 
critics I cited above. Neither school incorporates aspects of the others’ reading into their 
own theories, leading to a distinct split between those reading Acker through a 
poststructuralist feminist lens, and those through an economic lens. In fact, this split is one 
that has similarly plagued feminism more broadly. As Nancy Fraser has argued, 
contemporary liberal feminism—like punk—has developed a ‘perverse, subterranean 
elective affinity’ with neoliberalism, based on a shared commitment to individual freedom 
and a focus on the critique of culture at the expense of the critique of political economy. 
Fraser notes that neoliberal capitalism 'would much prefer to confront claims for 
recognition over claims for redistribution, as it […] seeks to disembed markets from social 
regulation in order to operate all the more freely on a global scale’ (Fraser 2009, 113). The 
proper response, for Fraser, ought therefore to be to ‘reconnect feminist critique to the 
critique of capitalism’ (ibid., 116). Fraser’s intervention is but one in a series of critiques 
focused on the ways in which liberal feminist thought and neoliberal logic intersects.11 
These critiques pitch a narrative that reads liberal feminism as either unwittingly co-opted 
by, or actively colluding with, neoliberal ideology. Returning to Acker, we can see this in the 
critical division between poststructuralist readings of Acker’s work as a radical challenge to 
phallocentrism and economically-oriented readings of her work as a complicit endorsement 
of the free market. In a sense, Acker’s work contains within it two feminisms in tension: 
                                                          
10 For more on the intersection of life-writing and neoliberalism see Walter Benn Michaels critique of 
memoir in ‘Forgetting Auschwitz,’ Pablo Larios on self-representation and the sharing economy for 
Frieze, and Niels van Doorn’s article ‘Measuring Human Capital in Information Economies.’ The 
latter’s observation that ‘self-branding has become one of the preeminent communicative activities 
of the neoliberal subject of value,’ seems particularly relevant when discussing Acker.  
11 See also: Eisenstein on ‘free market feminism’; Roberts on ‘transnational business feminism’; Elias 
on ‘post-feminism’; and Prügl on ‘the neoliberalisation of feminism.’ 
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poststructuralist, with its focus on critiquing deep structures of inequality as they manifest 
in language and perception; and liberal, with its focus on an individualised inequality 
capable of being rectified through the exercise of personal agency, congruent with a 
broader neoliberal worldview. This division is neatly encapsulated in the autofictional form 
of Acker’s text, which might equally be read as a critique of an unequal language system or 
as an attempt to exercise personal agency. These two readings seem incompatible, 
however, and for those looking to Acker’s work for a narrative that engages with and 
challenges both patriarchal and neoliberal hegemony, Demonology disappoints.  
 
* * * 
 
To conclude my reading of Acker, I want to consider a moment in Demonology when the 
patriarchal and the neoliberal do appear to be challenged concurrently. In an extended and 
hallucinatory scene of Burroughs-like surrealism at the centre of the novel, Acker paints a 
parodic vision of the Bush administration as a corrupt Papalcy, replete with doctrines that 
resemble neoliberal policies intensified to their extremes: biopolitical control becomes 
open torture, bureaucratic obfuscation becomes nonsensical language, and deregulation 
and privatisation are imagined as the decimation of education and the replacement of the 
state prison system with outsourced mass executions. Alex Houen, in his recent study 
Powers of Possibility: Experimental American Writing Since the 1960s, contextualises these 
biopolitical aspects of Acker’s novel specifically as an engagement with George H. Bush’s 
war on abortion (Houen, 186). The decimation of the education system becomes a 
particularly heinous crime of Acker’s fictional Bush in this respect, as he vows to 
simultaneously end ‘human termination,’ and to determine that ‘education in the primary 
and secondary schools shall be completely devoted to learning how to change diapers’ 
(Acker, 180). Meanwhile, ‘there will be no more university education […]’ (181), and as 
Acker remarks just pages later, the limits of education will be ‘third grade […] when babies 
turn into girls’ (187). By drawing together gendered experiences of education and language 
acquisition with the bodily agency represented by abortion rights, Acker demonstrates how 
women are oppressed equally by the explicit power of government and a subtler power 
dynamic expressed through the gendering of language. In a frothing speech, Acker's Bush 
rails against the 'scum-mangy artists' responsible for depicting his funeral and 
appropriating his speeches. His secretary responds, '"that can't be possible, sir, [because] 
no one understands a word of what you say."' Bush's semi-coherent response—'"this 
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century is finally coming to understand itself. This use of My language. The homeless 
[artists] are not allowed to use my language because they turn truth into lies"' (186-187)—
is suggestive of the way in which tension in the novel is focused almost entirely at the 
linguistic level: language in the novel is both patriarchal and capitalist, a threat to both 
Laure’s sense of self and her agency as a subject.  
 
Houen’s study uniquely reads Acker’s work through her engagement with these ideas of 
power, specifically in relation to Foucault, to argue that Acker’s focus on poststructuralist 
critiques of language and the symbolic can also be read as a critique of neoliberalism. 
Houen argues that Acker’s later narratives (from 1988’s Empire of the Senseless onwards) 
constitute a blueprint for methods of resistance to biopolitical control. Taking Foucault’s 
call for an ‘aesthetic of existence’ as a response to the effects of biopolitics as his 
foundation, Houen combines this with the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on the 
intimacy of communication and language as a pillar of biopolitical regulation. Hardt and 
Negri argue that language’s power to ‘create subjectivities [and put] them in relation,’ is 
key to the function of biopolitical power (Hardt and Negri, 404). In light of this, for Houen 
Acker’s work with language exceeds feminist poetics to become an equally resonant stand 
against late capitalism. As Houen argues, ‘The antipathy and fantasy that Acker levels 
against Bush is […] intended to parody and combat the circulation of his speaking image as 
a regulating biopolitical power' (186). That Acker’s Bush would direct particular vitriol 
towards artists compounds Acker’s sense of victimisation, raising the stakes of what her 
novel can hope to accomplish. Reading Acker in this way, Houen approaches a marriage of 
the poststructuralist feminist and political-economic readings of Acker’s work that 
represents an effective form of critique: by incorporating a feminist critique of language 
into a Foucauldian analysis of biopower, one can begin to recognise how, in Acker’s work, 
being female and being a subject under capitalism are bound and intertwined states of 
being.  
 
However, Houen’s reading of Acker is limited, and the limits of Houen’s account illuminates 
the limits of Acker’s project. Powers of Possibility demonstrates a consistent interest in the 
capabilities of literature for ‘realising individual potential’ (5) and ‘altering the way 
individuals feel, think, and interact with their social environment’ (10). The operative 
subject here is the individual, and throughout his study Houen couches the ‘possibility’ of 
change in terms of small-scale, concrete resistance, as when he declares Alan Ginsberg’s 
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poetry a successful demonstration of ‘how one can combat symptoms of a war’s “Myth 
rationalization” in oneself, even when the pervasiveness of those symptoms are at their 
zenith’ (61, italics original). What’s missing from the account Houen offers is any version of 
the narrative seen above in the work of Clune and Konstantinou: of the notion that perhaps 
seemingly radical oppositional movements like punk and like the 60s counterculture—
movements that championed individualism and anti-institutionalism—in fact may have 
abetted the rise of neoliberal thought.12   
 
This brings us full circle back to the problem of ‘neoliberal feminism,’ something that Acker, 
in her own unique way, struggles to move beyond. As the parallels between Laure and 
Acker’s everyday life become more explicit as Demonology develops, the question of ‘how 
to create’ increasingly dominates the text. Here, Acker begins to harness the potential of 
the autofictional form, marrying her personal circumstances to an implicit, broader critique 
of the social conditions that determine them. At the end of the novel, Laure, now an 
author, takes a motorcycle trip across Germany as part of a European tour of American 
writers. Referring to her bike as a ‘pirate ship,’ Laure reveals the mundane obstructions to 
her personal agency that this occupation represents:  
The pirate ship was sitting on a cobblestoned street in the town of Weimar. Before 
I could be free, I had, because I was a dog, to attend the lunch to which the 
German publisher was treating all of the American writers. (230) 
These frustrations continue throughout the text: 
I realised that the bike was out of gas. I rode through small village after small 
village, all of whose houses were stone, and stopped by three mechanics. They 
looked like mechanics. It happened that we didn’t share even the remnants of a 
common language. (232) 
Throughout this episode, Laure seeks to leave behind the group she is travelling with, and 
yet she is consistently hampered: her bike breaks down, she gets lost, she is forced to 
attend functions as part of her work as an author, and so on. The freedom that her biking 
represents is a poor approximation of the true freedom of the pirate life Acker so often 
reveres in her work. An acute awareness of the infrastructure to which she belongs 
pervades description in this section: the geographical realities of autobahns and backroads 
and the mechanics of the motorcycle and its constant need for gas. Furthermore, we are 
                                                          
12 A more detailed critique of Houen’s work from this perspective can be found in Adam Kelly’s 
review of Powers of Possibility in Comparative American Studies.   
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frequently reminded that Laure, and by extension Acker, is dependent on earning her living 
through writing, and is beholden to the obligations this generates. These realities—of gas 
and roads and books—are the realities of late capitalism.  
 
Laure’s approach to these problems is to turn inwards, and the novel ultimately ends in 
failure. Focusing on the absent ‘remnants of a common language,’ we are returned to the 
earlier moment in the novel when Laure explains her inability to function as a cohesive self 
in a society organised according to phallocentric discourse. Once again, Acker’s focus 
remains on the inability to articulate oneself using a language that is not one’s own. As the 
novel draws to a close, Laure reflects on her approach to this problem: ‘I tried everything: 
to lose myself, to get rid of memory, to resemble whom I don’t resemble, to end. […] In my 
search in myself, I found nothing’ (266-267). Ending in Laure’s dissolution, Acker’s novel 
performs a pendulum swing towards the ‘postmodern disintegration’ which for Gibbons 
should be equally balanced with a ‘return to affective subjectivity’ in autofiction. The 
erosion of such subjectivity constitutes a kind of implosion at the denouement of the novel, 
a collapse into extreme solipsism and an emphasis on the individual, internal crisis of Laure 
that constitutes a critique of phallocentric culture and an articulation of the pressures 
leveraged against bodily and artistic agency, but no deeper engagement with the neoliberal 
undercurrents that taint such feminist critique or the autofiction form. The question 
remains at the end of Acker’s work as to whether such a balancing act is possible.   
 
 
Out of Sight: Siri Hustvedt 
 
 
Siri Hustvedt's 1992 debut novel The Blindfold takes up the autofiction form to tell several 
interrelated stories in the life of Iris Vegan, a literature student living in New York who 
enters into a series of complex, dangerous, and surreal relationships with a cast of 
characters around her. The novel is structured as a series of a-chronologically presented 
parts. In the first, Iris takes a job recording descriptions of objects for Mr Morning, an 
inscrutable man whom Iris begins to suspect is guilty of murdering his neighbour. The 
second part of the novel describes Iris' masochistic relationship with her lover Stephen, and 
the disintegration of this relationship when a third figure, Stephen's friend George, 
photographs Iris and places the resulting image in an exhibition. In the third section, Iris is 
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admitted to a hospital with extreme migraines, and there encounters the domineering Mrs. 
M and the altogether more insidious character of Mrs. O, a disturbed woman who begins 
harassing Iris. Finally, the longest and final section of the novel describes Iris' relationship 
with Professor Rose. Rose initially invites Iris to translate a short German novella, The 
Brutal Boy, about a young boy named Klaus who experiences uncontrollable sadistic 
impulses. Following the rape of one of her neighbours, Iris begins wearing a man's suit and 
assumes the identity of Klaus, mimicking his illicit exploration of the city and submitting to 
increasingly dangerous desires, including attempting to steal a police officer's gun. Iris is 
eventually discovered by Professor Rose and enters into an affair with him that culminates 
in his increasingly controlling behaviour and a climactic scene of attempted rape. 
 
Hustvedt's novel, like Acker's work, is intently interested in the condition of the female 
subject in late capitalist America. Like Acker’s text, Hustvedt’s novel balances a 
poststructuralist feminist interest in an unequal language system with an economically-
oriented critique of life under late capitalism. As we have seen, Acker’s novel draws these 
strands of thought together in a way that ultimately privileges the individual struggle over 
the systemic critique (whether this be the individual’s struggle to assert their identity 
within the strictures of a repressive symbolic order, or their struggle to assume a form of 
agency based on their value as an embodiment of capital), and thus opens itself to the 
charge of promoting certain neoliberal values. Hustvedt’s novel, however, attempts to 
harness the autofiction form to realign the balance of these two critiques in order to 
challenge these neoliberal values. This is first of all achieved by Hustvedt through her 
foregrounding of the issue of labour. While Acker's Laure finds herself inhibited by the 
demands of her work—of publisher's dinners and other obligations—for Hustvedt's Iris 
financial insecurity is a seemingly more vital, perennial problem.13 From the opening pages 
Iris informs us that 'I had always been poor as a student' (10), and the precariousness of 
her everyday life determines much of what follows. It is this precariousness that pushes Iris 
to respond to an advert for work posted by Mr Morning, an enigmatic and potentially 
dangerous figure who hires Iris to record a series of tapes describing everyday objects that 
Morning (it seems) salvaged from the apartment of a murdered woman who lived in his 
building.  
 
                                                          
13 Returning again to Arendt, there is a distinction between Laure’s complaint, which focuses on the 
unpleasantries that arise when artistic work shades into labour, and Iris’ much more fundamental 
struggle with pure labour as a necessary and urgent means of subsisting.  
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It is in her interaction with Mr Morning, during which Iris negotiates a price for her labour, 
that the poststructuralist themes concerning language and identity are introduced 
alongside the more pragmatic commentary on late capitalist living conditions. Iris’ first 
interaction with Morning proves prescient of later events in the novel. Describing sitting 
with Morning, Iris reports, 'he looked at me, taking in my whole body with his gaze. [...] I 
felt assaulted and turned away from him, and then when he asked me my name, I lied. [...] I 
became Iris Davidsen. It was a defensive act...' (11). Assuming a false identity as a means of 
defence, Iris finds herself cast as a subject under Mr Morning’s scrutiny. This moment of 
identity formation echoes the Cartesian doubt evoked by Acker at the beginning of 
Demonology. As Alise Jameson argues of The Blindfold, 'the protagonist [experiences] 
nothing less than a self-shattering, a dangerous destabilization of any sense of personal 
identity' (422). The gender dynamics of moments such as these inevitably place the male 
figure in the dominant position, and so for Iris, divested of control of the situation, it 
'becomes impossible to consider oneself a unified subject, centered around a solid core' 
(ibid).  
 
 In the second section of the novel, Iris reluctantly submits to be photographed by George, 
an acquaintance of her inscrutable on/off boyfriend, Stephen. In an early encounter with 
George, the three friends are sitting on a New York rooftop when a woman in the street 
below suffers an epileptic attack. George, standing above her, takes several photographs of 
the woman as she seizures and urinates herself. Iris accuses George of callousness, arguing 
that 'photographing an epileptic fit entails some kind of responsibility' (50), but she is 
ridiculed by the two men. The gender dynamics of this scene—the man in an elevated 
position taking the image of the vulnerable woman without consent or concern—resonates 
with later events in the section. After George photographs Iris, she is unhappy with the 
image he selects for his upcoming art show, but he goes ahead and uses it anyway. Iris 
describes how the act of being photographed begins to pressurise—and ultimately 
breaks—her and Stephen’s relationship: 'for Stephen I had become invisible. An 
unexpected turn had been taken, and I had dropped out of sight' (64). In typically 
postmodern fashion, the image begins to replace the reality it captures: Iris’ photograph 
takes on a life of its own, spreading around her university and causing strangers to 
recognise her. When one confronts her, Iris denies she is the woman in the photograph. 
Reflecting after the incident, she remarks, 'the ease with which I had sidestepped my 
identity alarmed me’ (76). George’s camera lens, like Mr Morning’s gaze, robs Iris of her 
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sense of self, forcing her to become something or someone other. The last time Iris sees Mr 
Morning, he requests an object from her. Initially resistant, she eventually gives him ‘an old 
green eraser, blackened with smudges,’ before fleeing his apartment and disposing of the 
object he had entrusted her to describe. Both George and Mr Morning explicitly take 
something from Iris, but it is the effect of their apprehension of her that resonates more 
deeply. Despite ostensibly benefitting from these relationships, each interaction is sinisterly 
exploitative and takes an untold affective penalty that Iris surrenders without reward. 
 
Hustvedt’s and Acker’s novels see, to varying degrees, the ultimate dissolution of their 
protagonists’ subjectivities through these sustained assaults, whether willingly invited, as in 
Acker’s case, or unwillingly inflicted, as is the case for Hustvedt. In both cases the novels 
posit a potential strategy of performativity, as Judith Butler describes it, as a means to 
negotiate the patriarchal societies that inflict such violence, only to demonstrate the 
eventual failures of this strategy. One of the most influential feminist philosophers working 
in the 1990s, Butler’s theories of identity and performativity resonate through the texts 
studied in this chapter. Indeed, I want to suggest that there is a loosely observable parallel 
between the trajectory of Butler’s thinking from Gender Trouble (1990), through Bodies 
That Matter (1993), to Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) and the distinction between 
Acker’s nihilistic, and Hustvedt and Kraus’ somewhat more optimistic, attempts to translate 
their life experiences into autofictional texts.  
 
When Acker’s Laure reflects on her attempts ‘to resemble whom I don’t resemble’ she 
invokes Butler’s basic theory of performativity, explicated in the author’s 1990 text Gender 
Trouble. Here, Butler argues that ‘identity categories often presumed to be foundational to 
feminist politics,’—that is, categories of gender—‘simultaneously work to limit and 
constrain the very cultural possibilities that feminism is supposed to open up’ (147). Butler 
thus advocates for practices of parodic signification, or ‘performativity,’ as a means of 
‘destabilising substantive identity’ and ‘expos[ing] the illusion of gender identity as an 
intractable depth and inner substance’ (146). Laure practices precisely this resignification 
process throughout Acker’s text, but the ultimate ‘deconstruction of identity’ advocated by 
Butler brings Laure to the point of finding ‘nothing’ within herself.14 Hustvedt’s The 
                                                          
14 This, we might assert, is one logical conclusion to the processes sketched out in Butler’s Gender 
Trouble. Butler’s hostility to the notion of a pre-existing subject, a Cartesian identity, and her 
assertion that ‘gender is always a doing’ suggests that performativity is a constant process. When 
Laure stops performing, then, she finds in herself an absence of any pre-existing identity.  
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Blindfold in many ways represents the refining of this theory as Butler builds on it in her 
follow-up texts to Gender Trouble, the 1993 work Bodies That Matter and 1997’s The 
Psychic Life of Power. In these later texts, Butler clarifies and reiterates her initial theories. 
Bodies That Matter addresses those critics who, reading Butler, wonder where one might 
locate the agency in Butler’s theory from which is derived the decision to perform, or 
construct, a specific identity. To which Butler retorts that ‘if gender is constructed, it is not 
necessarily constructed by an “I” or a “we” who stands before that construction in any 
spatial or temporal sense of “before,”’ rather, since gendering is ‘the differentiating 
relations by which speaking subjects come into being, […] the “I” neither precedes nor 
follows […] but emerges within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves’ (8). This 
matrix represents a continually reiterated process of interpellation, and it is by virtue of 
this reiteration that, for Butler, the ‘gaps and fissures’ (9) that represent transgressive 
possibilities open up.15    
 
In line with Butler’s theories, performativity in Hustvedt’s narrative is not freighted with 
the same purely destructive potential as in Acker’s work. Indeed, there are glimmers in Iris’ 
story that hint at a sense of possibility bound up in the act of performance. The fourth and 
final section of the novel is by far the longest, taking up 104 of the novel’s 221 pages. This 
section, which temporally spans and brackets the other three stories, tells of Iris’ 
relationship with Professor Rose, her translation of the novella The Brutal Boy, and her 
experiments in cross-dressing, during which she assumes the identity of a man named 
Klaus, loosely based on the child protagonist of the novella. Iris’ transformation is 
prefigured when Iris is called upon to recall the details of Giorgione’s painting The Tempest 
at a dinner party. Iris describes the painting with forensic accuracy but omits to mention 
the male figure that occupies the foreground of the image, causing her fellow dinner guest 
Paris to exclaim, '"You became the man […] You stepped into his shoes and promptly 
deleted him from the painting"' (152). Later, Iris ‘becomes the man’ again, when she dons a 
man’s suit as a means of protection following a rape in her building. As she begins to 
wander the streets of New York at night, visiting dive bars and becoming acquainted with 
                                                          
15 To clarify: if performativity constituted an agent’s choice prior to interpellation into the social 
order, the fixity this implies would not allow for the possibility of flux that transgression depends on. 
Clarifying her (misread) theories, Butler argues that understanding performativity as a reiterative 
process responding to a continued process of interpellation offers innumerable moments for the 
subject to perform transgressively.  
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their various misfit denizens, Klaus’ grip over Iris increases. Iris describes the seductiveness 
of her alter-ego:    
The gap between what I was forced to acknowledge to the world--namely, that I 
was a woman--and what I dreamed inwardly didn't bother me. By becoming Klaus 
at night I had effectively blurred my gender. The suit, my clipped head and 
unadorned face altered the world's view of who I was, and I became someone else 
through its eyes. (170) 
By inventing Klaus, Iris learns to exist within a patriarchal world, modifying and subverting 
her own image in order to manipulate its rules. Iris comes finally to recognise that ‘the line 
can't be drawn, that we're infected at every moment by fictions of all kinds, that it's 
inescapable' (190). Rather than resist, Iris takes charge of her fiction, and of the possibilities 
inherent in the Butlerian ‘reiterative’ process of interpellation. 
 
At the end of the novel, and in the scene from which the novel draws its title, Iris is 
blindfolded by Professor Rose, with whom she is having an affair. In her apartment, Rose 
begins to kiss Iris, who at first enjoys the sensation of a lack of sight. ‘It was good not to see 
him,’ she says. ‘Like a child, I felt that my blindness made me disappear, or at least made 
the boundaries of my body unstable’ (203). Rose, however, becomes aggressive, and 
attempts to rape Iris as she tries to resist. She bites his finger and causes him to withdraw, 
and in the aftermath he is repentant. ‘“Tonight […] I was someone else,”’ Rose tells her 
(207). Sitting on her bed, he implores Iris to ‘“look at me […] I’m an old man, absurd, 
contemptible”’ (203). She does, and sees his once attractive body as ‘a thing of comic 
horror, vulnerable, aging, the site of decay’ (206). With Iris blindfolded, Rose had been free 
to became something different, something Iris associates with ‘unspeakable acts, seizures 
of cruelty, Klaus’ (204). With her eyes back on him, he resumes his identity as an aging and 
essentially harmless professor. This represents an important moment in Iris’ development. 
Throughout The Blindfold Iris endures an existence defined by marginality. For Mr Morning 
she acts as a conduit, channelling the essence of objects while divesting her descriptions of 
any traces of herself. For George she is the anonymous subject of a photograph that 
obscures her identity and yet paradoxically also absorbs it. When she is committed to 
hospital, she is fixated upon by a madwoman who eventually comes to believe Iris is her 
daughter. Finally, for Professor Rose Iris works as a translator, transfiguring someone else’s 
story while being entreated by Rose not take ‘liberties’ (139). In each of these situations, 
Iris’ own subjectivity is elided. However, in the act of creating fiction—the fictional figure of 
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Klaus—Iris comes to understand how she can make herself visible. This visibility comes at 
the cost of her authentic self—or perhaps, in Butlerian terms, is made possible by an initial 
absence of a self. However, this price allows Iris access to spaces within both New York City 
and her own psyche that are normally shuttered to her. When she finally shrugs off the 
identity of Klaus and embarks on her affair with Rose, she finds that her vision, as much as 
his, has the power to shape in both its presence and, startlingly, its absence.  
 
* * * 
 
Returning to the issue of labour with which I opened this chapter, Iris’ performativity, 
particularly in the fourth section of the novel, invites being read in congruence with the 
notion of human capital. As Foucault explains it, human capital is a 'conception of capital-
ability which, according to diverse variables, receives a certain income that is a wage, and 
income-wage, so that the worker himself appears a sort of enterprise for himself' (225). 
This condition is specific to neoliberalism, driven as it is by the imperative to extend market 
rationality into all aspects of life. The neoliberal homo economicus is, for Foucault, ‘his own 
capital [...] his own producer, [...] the source of his earnings’ (ibid.). The stress Hustvedt 
places on Iris’ identity in her negotiation of various labour contracts, and the affective toll 
these contracts take on her, would seem to suggest that Iris engages in this 
entrepreneurialism. Certainly, one could be tempted to read Iris’ exchanges with Professor 
Rose and Mr Morning as figurative examples of the marketing of selfhood that defines the 
concept of human capital, given how intrinsic each employer views Iris’ personality and 
identity to their contracts. However, in trying to hold in tandem both the feminist focus on 
gendered identity formation and an economically-oriented critique of late capitalist living, 
Hustvedt’s vision of the latter becomes less focused. 
 
Hustvedt is keenly aware of the implications of the parallels between her character’s 
performativity and the performative aspects of her own writing, and she reflects this 
dynamic back onto the form of the novel. Despite ostensibly being a work of fiction, we 
may certainly consider Hustvedt’s novel to fall under the umbrella of autofiction. Similar to 
Laure in Acker’s fiction, Iris’ identity is complicated by her obvious relation to the author, 
Siri Hustvedt. Clever postmodern tricks like inverting her own name to name the 
protagonist of her story signal Hustvedt’s commitment to the tricky mode of autofiction, 
and shared biographical details like the study of literature at a New York university further 
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compound this. Hustvedt’s novel is keenly interested in how the self becomes a commodity 
for exchange under neoliberalism, and how this economising of human relationships 
intensifies the stakes of the process of subject formation. By using an autofictional form 
and thus introducing herself and the process of life writing into the novel, Hustvedt 
parallels her own work writing autofiction with the entrepreneurial endeavours of her 
protagonist. Crucially, by using the autofictional rather than the biographical form, the 
picture of Hustvedt’s self is incomplete, balanced as it is by the fictional elements of the 
novel that grant the same distancing effect Iris’ performativity affords her. This constitutes 
a self-awareness that seems absent from Acker’s text, and that contributes to the latter’s 
failure to meaningfully engage with the broader social conditions that determine her 
personal struggles. In the same vein, however, Hustvedt’s self-awareness does not 
automatically translate into a successful challenge to the neoliberal ideology that 
structures both her and her character’s attempts to create as a means of subsistence.     
 
There is little doubt that Hustvedt at least aims to critique neoliberalism. Her continued 
return to the impoverished circumstances of her protagonist highlight the precarity of an 
underclass that, in the late 1970s, were facing a future of increased persecution, 
dismantled support networks, and shrinking sympathy.16 The New York setting is 
particularly significant in this regard. If Chile is to be considered the epicentre of 
neoliberalism globally (see introduction), New York was Ronald Reagan’s domestic testbed. 
As David Harvey remarks throughout A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York set the 
precedent for all aspects of neoliberal practice: from the first dismantling of municipal 
labour unions in 1975-7 (Harvey 2005, 52), to Manhattan’s rise as a centre of financial 
power and as a ‘spectacular island of wealth and privilege’ (157). Writing with hindsight in 
the 1990s, Hustvedt’s description of the underbelly of the city as being at once dangerously 
precarious and yet liberating manages to simultaneously make visible those to whom 
neoliberal policy would be most punitive, and lament the process of gentrification applied 
to the city and often regarded as proof of progress. The success of this critique, however, 
diminishes when read in dialogue with the novel’s other concerns regarding gender and 
identity. On the one hand, The Blindfold narrates a dynamic of performativity that allows 
Iris to resist submitting to a patriarchally dictated process of identity formation. On the 
                                                          
16 The novel doesn’t clarify when it is set. However, given that The Blindfold is a work of autofiction 
and that biographical details of Hustvedt’s time as a graduate student at Colombia University, NY, 
match Iris’ employment as a student at an unnamed New York university, we can assume the date of 
these two academic careers is also the same: 1978-9.  
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other hand, the novel seeks to mount a critique of neoliberalism partly through the 
dehumanisation of the protagonist as a Foucauldian ‘ability machine.’ These two 
conceptions of Iris—as performative and polymorphic, and as entrepreneurial investor—
are fundamentally incompatible. The theory of homo economicus relies on a self in which 
to invest, while Butler’s performativity disavows precisely this selfhood. It is here, I suggest, 
that Hustvedt’s critique breaks down.   
 
* * * 
 
While Hustvedt’s novel would seem on the one hand to endorse Butler’s theories of 
performativity, The Blindfold ends not with Iris’ triumph but her despair. Confessing the 
events of the novel to the character Paris, Iris finds herself mocked and belittled by him, 
and the narrative ends with her fleeing into the night. Exposing herself to a hostile Other, 
Iris demonstrates the limits of Butler’s theory and the aporias in Butler’s work which are 
reflected in Hustvedt (and to an extent Acker’s) texts. As I have already discussed, Acker’s 
work is ultimately hampered by a fixation on the self that can be boiled down to a shade of 
identity politics not incompatible with neoliberal logic. Butler’s work on performativity 
displays a similar fixation on the individual. In 1997’s Excitable Speech, Butler demonstrates 
how performativity can be put into practice, arguing that ‘insurrectionary speech becomes 
the necessary response to an injurious language’ (163), and that ‘resignification’ or 
‘reversed interpellation’ can act to generate resistant rather than conformist subjects. As 
several critics have noted, this stance places the onus on the individual rather than the 
institution to act as a corrective to perceived injustices, and disregards the role of socio-
political power in the process of interpellation.17 Perhaps registering these critiques, 
Butler’s much documented ‘ethical turn’ in 2005’s Giving an Account of Oneself recalibrates 
performativity to encompass an ethics of sociality, and it is noticeable that Hustvedt’s 
formal use of autofiction to an extent anticipates this turn.  
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler rebuts the poststructuralist argument—one she 
previously endorsed—that ‘if a subject is to be 'divided, ungrounded, or incoherent from 
                                                          
17 Martha Nussbaum identifies Butler as a prime example of a ‘feminist thinker […] of the new 
symbolic type,’ a type that holds the linguistic subversion and transgression promised by ‘symbolic 
verbal politics’ as the only possible politics, and that views large-scale social change as unachievable 
in the face of imprisoning structures of power (2). See also Boucher’s critique of Butler’s ‘thorough-
going individualism’ (130), and McNay’s observation that Butler’s theories ‘disregard […] the 
specificity of socio-political power’ (178).  
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the start,' it will be impossible to ground a notion of personal or social responsibility (2005, 
22). Instead, Butler argues that the subject's opacity to itself can prompt self-scrutiny and 
thus the forging of important ethical bonds derived from the act of narrating, or ‘giving an 
account,’ of oneself—however fragmentary or incoherent—as a means to both self-
knowledge and the formation of a social community. This revises Butler’s earlier theories of 
power to recognise that interpellation is not always a form of violence, but also a collective 
and reciprocal process of identity-making that, if an ethics of responsibility is adhered to, 
can lead to a positive process of subjectification. Central to Butler’s account is the work of 
philosopher Adriana Cavarero, whom Butler quotes at length in support of her argument 
for this social conception of storytelling:  
In [Cavarero’s] view, I am not, as it were, an interior subject, closed upon myself, 
solipsistic, posing questions of myself alone. I exist in an important sense for you, 
and by virtue of you. [...] In her view, one can only tell an autobiography, one can 
only reference an "I" in relation to a "you": without the "you," my own story 
becomes impossible. (24) 
For Cavarero and Butler, the self depends not on a system of subjection, but on an Other. 
Butler’s work provides a useful framework through which to understand the dynamics of 
Hustvedt’s novel at the formal level, as a piece of autofiction.    
 
In The Blindfold, as in Acker’s Demonology, spaces in the narrative fulfil the dual purpose of 
pinning the text to a specifically American context, and metaphorically allowing the author 
to engage with the novel form as a space to be occupied in itself. The abject state of 
America is central to both texts, with the ‘belly of hell’ (np) that is Acker’s United States 
paralleled by the urban decay of Hustvedt’s New York. The Blindfold is replete with dimly 
lit, claustrophobic spaces, from Iris’ spartan apartment to her hospital ward and Mr 
Morning’s ‘tiny, stifling room’ (10). These spaces—indicative of the coercive and restrictive 
systems that govern Iris’ daily life—are drawn into relief by Hustvedt’s frequent use of 
spatial metaphors to describe the effects of fiction. Referring to her actions in imitation of 
the protagonist of The Brutal Boy, Iris explains, 'I don't mean to blame a work of fiction for 
my own behaviour. That would be stretching the truth. I'm saying that the story was a door 
to another place, and in the end we chose to open it and cross the threshold.' This recalls 
the Heideggerian metaphor with which Michael Clune begins his work on economic 
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fiction—the idea that fiction ‘opens up […] regions’ (12).18 This is echoed in the form of 
Hustvedt’s novel, which J. A. Fleiger has noted follows the classic model of the postmodern 
paranoid narrative.19 For Fleiger, 'paranoia is not just a theme of the novel; it is a structural 
device. [The Blindfold] explicitly links delusion with the reading and writing game, as well as 
with a certain projective mode of thinking' (105). Fleiger explains this in more detail: 
The novel leaves us to wonder if Paris, and the other persecutors, are projections, 
figments of Iris’s own fevered imagination. In other words, the “paranoid” point of 
view of the narrative itself lends a certain undecidability to the reader’s 
experience—the reader too is caught in the collapse or failure of the Symbolic 
order, beginning to suspect that simple things harbor more significance than the 
reality they appear to reflect. (ibid.) 
The unreliability of Iris’ narration draws the reader into her paranoid psyche. This is evident 
from the first story, when Iris’ impressions of Mr Morning turn from suspicion to conviction 
that he is a murderer, despite her having no material evidence to base this idea on. The 
surreality of Morning’s tasks, alongside other coincidental events that pressure the 
believability of Iris’ narrative (who is the omnipresent figure of Paris? Why does Rose 
discover Iris/Klaus in a New York dive bar?) undermine the assumed veracity of the text. At 
the same time, Iris’ candour regarding such traditionally sensitive topics as her ailing 
finances and shameful neuroses invite us to empathise with her character. As Fleiger 
concludes, paranoia in the novel exceeds plot or character and enters into ‘the dynamic of 
reading itself […] engrossing the reader in a lurid delirium’ (106). Just as Iris recognises that 
The Brutal Boy ‘was a door to another place’ that she chose to ‘open […] and cross the 
threshold,’ so The Blindfold invites a similar crossing from its reader.  
 
Returning to Butler, the implications of Hustvedt’s invitation is that the novel itself—at 
least the element of the novel pertaining to the ‘auto’ of autofiction—represents 
Hustvedt’s account of herself, and invites her reader to do the work necessary to parse fact 
from fiction. Quoting once again from Cavarero, Butler observes that 'the you is a term that 
is not at home in modern and contemporary developments of ethics and politics. The "you" 
is ignored by [...] individualistic doctrines...' (25). By relinquishing the importance of the “I” 
in favour of the you, these narratives begin to instantiate a sense of community with 
                                                          
18 Clune quotes Heidegger: ‘Where does a work belong? [...] It belongs uniquely within the region it 
itself opens up’ (Heidegger, qtd. in Clune, 12). 
19 Fleiger is one of the few critics to have published work on The Blindfold, a text that has received a 
surprisingly small amount of critical attention.  
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likeminded readers. Both Demonology and The Blindfold extend an invitation to their 
reader which amounts to a reciprocal relationship, but one that is not unaware of the 
dangers of economic rationality seeping into the non-market arena of reading and writing. 
Hustvedt’s novel proves Butler’s observation at the end of Giving an Account: that ‘all of us 
are already not precisely bounded, not precisely separate, but in our skins, given over, in 
each other's hands, at each other's mercy' (39). Where Hustvedt succeeds, however, Iris 
fails, and while The Blindfold gestures formally towards the possibility of a progressive 
participatory relationship between reader and text, Iris’ own fate resembles Laure’s: a 
complete disintegration of identity. The reader is left at the end of the novel wondering, 
then, to what degree the ratios of ‘auto’ and ‘fiction’ are balanced.  
 
 
Yours Sincerely: Chris Kraus 
 
 
In a sense, Chris Kraus' 1997 novel I Love Dick picks up where The Blindfold leaves off, with 
a man looking at a woman, and with an author giving an account of herself. In Kraus' case, 
the man is Dick and the woman/author is Chris Kraus herself. Kraus, unlike Hustvedt's Iris, 
luxuriates in Dick's gaze, relishing the attention he is paying her at their dinner at his house: 
'Dick's attention,' Kraus writes of herself, 'makes her feel powerful' (3). This night, which 
Dick will eventually, shatteringly, describe as a 'genial but not particularly intimate or 
remarkable meeting,' catalyses an obsession on Kraus' behalf that leads her to leave her 
husband and business partner, the theorist Sylvere Lotringer, and produce a novel's worth 
of epistolary writing directed at the enigmatic Dick. At first Kraus' infatuation with Dick is 
encouraged by Sylvere, as the two take it in turns to write letters to Dick, and then envision 
delivering them as part of an art performance. When that doesn't happen, Kraus eventually 
leaves Sylvere at the end of the first part of the novel and continues her correspondence to 
Dick. Increasingly, these letters take on a 'dear diary' format, as Kraus writes reams of text 
that fluctuates between the intensely personal and the incisively philosophical. The novel is 
self-admittedly a 'new genre, something in between cultural criticism and fiction' (Kraus, 
27), or what Joan Hawkins calls 'theoretical fiction [...] the kind of books in which theory 
becomes an intrinsic part of the "plot"' (Hawkins, 247). Indeed, central to the novel is 
Kraus' belief that 'it's possible to do something and simultaneously study it' (Kraus, 137), 
and it is this parallel condition of performance and theorising that allows Kraus, even more 
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so than Acker or Hustvedt, to present a text that is resolutely concerned with 
understanding how the condition of being a single—as in singular—woman in late capitalist 
America can be fictionalised in a way that does not also preclude social or political 
commentary, either thematically or formally.  
 
Like Acker and Hustvedt’s narrators, Kraus’ literary persona in I Love Dick is radically candid. 
Once again, this candour is particularly notable when it comes to Kraus’ discussion of her 
finances, about which she is unapologetic and unashamed. When asked how she 'really' 
made money, Kraus responds with an abruptness calculated to force a reaction: '"It's 
simple," I told [the questioner]. "I take money from Sylvere"' (70). In a clear break from the 
slackers’ treatment of money, wherein ‘making a living’ is a concern that is marginalised by 
texts like Linklater’s Slacker without acknowledgement, Kraus characteristically lays bare 
her simultaneous need for and rejection of money, contradictions included. In an early 
description of her and Lotringer’s daily routine, Kraus writes,  
the conversation usually peaked with a passionate discussion of checks and bills. So 
long as Chris continued making independent films they'd always be juggling money. 
[...] Luckily [...] with Chris' help, Sylvere's career was becoming lucrative enough to 
offset the losses incurred by hers. Chris, a diehard feminist [...] smiled to think that 
in order to continue making work she would have to be supported by her husband. 
"Who's independent?" [...] In late capitalism, was anyone truly free? (16) 
With the Thatcherite dictum of ‘no alternative’ echoing across the Atlantic, Kraus rightly 
asks if freedom can be considered a possible or even desirable condition. However, Kraus 
also makes it clear that participation, for her, is not equal to approval. After discussing the 
‘very long leash’ (65) she had woven for herself from a mixture of real estate and managing 
her husband’s career, Kraus idiosyncratically remarks that 'money's abstract and our 
culture's distribution of it is based on values I reject' (71).  
 
Kraus’ inward rejection of the capitalist distribution of wealth combined with her outward 
investment in real estate recalls Mark Fisher’s evocative description of the ideological bind 
of neoliberalism, which he succinctly summarises with the phrase ‘we didn’t have to 
believe it, we only had to act as if we believed it’ (91). For Fisher, ‘the very privileging of 
‘inner’ subjective states over the public’ was itself an ideological move characteristic of 
neoliberalism (91). As such, Kraus once again seems to subscribe to the neoliberal 
fetishization of individualism negotiated by Acker and Hustvedt. However, by making visible 
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these contradictions, Kraus’ use of autofictional writing allows her to speak back to 
precisely the ‘ideological move’ that neoliberalism seeks to keep hidden. Just as Kraus 
experiments with a radical transparency that depends on her privileging her individual 
selfhood in sections of the novel, she is equally interested in how the personal can be 
diluted in service of a broader political goal. These experiments in individuality, which 
constitute neither a retreat inwards nor a fragmentation but are more akin to the tuning in-
and-out of an analog radio, are perhaps the most important aspect of I Love Dick and of the 
promise of the autofiction form. 
 
In the second half of the novel, titled ‘Every Letter is a Love Letter,’ the narrative 
propulsion of the plot is slowed almost to a halt in favour of a ranging exercise in genre 
blending, from memoir to art criticism. Throughout the letters-cum-essays that make up 
the text of this section, Kraus refers frequently to her own writing activity, including her 
experiments in form. Central to this process, for Kraus, is the mode of the first-person 
narrative. Facing, at the end of the first part of the novel, the collapse of her marriage, 
Kraus asks '"Who's Chris Kraus? […] She's no one! She's Sylvere Lotringer's wife! She's his 
'Plus-One'!" [...] In ten years, she'd erased herself’ (100-101). This sense of erasure recalls 
the predicament of Iris, and like Iris, Kraus seeks to give an account of herself through her 
writing. Crucially, Kraus’ erasure is directly tied, by her account, to her financial reliance on 
Lotringer. Tying the gendered sense of erasure in marriage to an economic form of erasure 
based on her inability to access an art market that welcomes Lotringer enables Kraus to be 
successful where we have seen Acker and Hustvedt ultimately fall short. While Hustvedt, in 
particular, holds her gendered experience in balance with her experience of financial 
precarity under neoliberalism, these conditions are not presented as interrelated. Kraus, on 
the other hand, recognises that economics and identity each impact one another. This in 
turn freights Kraus’ attempts to assert her identity with a broader political potential.   
 
Kraus’ experiments in the first-person stem, by her own telling, from her initial avoidance 
of the form: ‘I’d chosen film and theater, two artforms built entirely on collisions, that only 
reach their meanings through collision, because I couldn’t ever believe in the 
integrity/supremacy of the 1st person (my own)’ (122). Once again, this harks back to the 
problem of Cartesian doubt that likewise plagues Laure and Iris—the idea that female 
subjectivity is pressurised by a hostile symbolic order to the extent that even the reliance 
on one’s own perceptions—the minimum requirement of Cartesian solipsism—is beyond 
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reach. Kraus’ eventual realisation is to understand that ‘there’s no fixed point of self but it 
exists and by writing you can somehow chart that movement’ (122). Writing, here, 
becomes a means of pinning down the self in a single moment, parcelling it out from the 
constant state of flux it enjoys. This is precisely the recognition Butler advocates, in Giving 
an Account of Oneself, when she emphasises the importance of recognising one’s epistemic 
limits and advocates for the acceptance of fragmentation, incoherence, and contradiction. 
This viewpoint allows Kraus, therefore, to simultaneously value and reject the value of 
money, not by embracing a neoliberal privileging of inner subjectivity, but by harnessing a 
fragmentation of that subjectivity emanating from her gendered experience of the 
symbolic order.   
 
And yet, the first-person mode of writing still ostensibly performs the privileging of the 
individual which Fisher attributes to neoliberal ideology, and which clings to 
poststructuralist and liberal feminist critique alike. When Kraus complains, for example, 
that ‘every act that narrated female lived experience in the 70s has been read only as 
"collaborative" and "feminist" [while] the Zurich Dadaists worked together too but they 
were geniuses and they had names’ (134), she risks undermining the potential located in 
collective work in service of individual recognition. And yet, as she rightly recognises, 
collectivity is frequently a gendered attribute of art. As my previous chapter suggested, 
Fluxus artists like Ben Vautier and George Maciunas may have advocated producing works 
of total anonymity and the erasure of ownership, but their individual names are still 
associated with the movement and are still the subject of articles and retrospectives. How, 
then, can one create art that holds the individual and the collective in tandem? In a quote 
with which I opened this chapter, Kraus offers Dick an answer to this problem: ‘Dear Dick,’ 
Kraus writes, ‘I want to make the world more interesting than my problems. Therefore, I 
have to make my problems social.' In my introduction, I connected this line to the famous 
dictum of second-wave feminism that ‘the personal is political.’ In the essay that 
popularised this maxim, Carol Hanisch argues that for women, ‘personal problems are 
political problems.’ There is an obvious similarity between Kraus and Hanisch’s positions 
here, but also important differences. What is the distinction between making something 
political, and making it social? To answer this, we can look to another difference between 
the two statements. When Hanisch argues that personal problems are always already 
political, Kraus argues for a more active role: a need to make problems social. To do this 
requires an act of self-synecdoche that Kraus models on one of her artist-heroes, Hannah 
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Wilkes. As Kraus explains, the question that underlies Wilkes’ work is, 'If women have failed 
to make "universal" art because we're trapped within the "personal," why not universalize 
the "personal" and make it the subject of our art?' (195, italics original). Echoing this, Kraus 
herself observes, 'the only way to understand the large is through the small. It's like 
American first-person fiction’ (138). Herein lies the difference between the political and the 
social: in stressing recognition of the process of universalisation, Kraus holds the ‘I’ and the 
‘we’ in tandem, stressing a sociality that does not impinge upon her individuality (which 
returns us to the problem of collaborative art). Meanwhile, writing from the 1970s 
perspective that Kraus critiques, Hanisch argues that ‘there are no personal solutions […] 
there is only collective action for a collective solution.’ In other words, to make problems 
political, one must sacrifice one’s individuality for the greater cause.  
 
Following this line of reading, which of Kraus’ personal problems does the author seek to 
make social? One answer is surely the financial circumstances discussed above. If, as Kraus 
suggests elsewhere, 'by understanding one simple thing—a strike—it’s possible to 
understand everything about corporate capitalism in third world countries,’ (37), then 
similarly, by reading of Kraus’ own struggles to access the critical and artistic markets that 
seem to frustratingly welcome Lotringer while leaving her rejected, one can understand the 
gender and class dynamics of contemporary art history. This is something Kraus returns to, 
more explicitly, as the novel progresses into the series of art-critical essays which appear in 
the latter half of the text. Kraus describes, for example, a series of photos of artists 'living, 
drinking, working' in the 40s-70s. 'It was the first time in American art history,’ she writes, 
‘thanks to allowances provided by the GI Bill, that lower-middle class Americans had a 
chance to live as artists, given time to kill' (107). Implicit in this observation is the 
understanding that these ‘lower-middle class Americans’ no longer enjoy this access, and 
that, like Kraus, one needs the luxuries of real estate investments and a successful husband 
to make art in 1990s America.  
 
Kraus’ personal candour regarding her artistic failures universalises the reality of 
contemporary art production. An entirely more complex problem similarly addressed 
involves the act of writing. In a quote I have already returned to several times in this 
chapter, Joan Hawkins calls Kraus’ novel a ' theoretical fiction [...] in which theory becomes 
an intrinsic part of the "plot"' (247). I have already demonstrated how Kraus relentlessly 
self-theorises everything from her attitude to money to her attitude to first-person writing, 
93 
 
but perhaps the most complex manoeuvre involves Kraus’ theory of fiction itself, which 
begins with the question of first-person writing but soon far exceeds it. Key to this idea is 
the form of the novel, which is broadly epistolary, with some exceptions. The bulk of the 
text, though, is composed of Kraus’ letters to Dick, which until the final pages of the novel 
either go unsent or receive no response. Dick’s blankness allows Kraus to convert Dick into 
something of service to her—a ‘Dear Diary,' as she later observes (90). The inscrutability of 
Dick is a ‘blank screen,’ for Kraus, one onto which Kraus and Lotringer can ‘project [their] 
fantasies’ (13). Later, when Kraus is writing to Dick on her own, she observes that Dick is ‘a 
perfect listener […] my silent partner,’ and that consequently her writing has taken on a 
previously unimaginable quality of ‘direct communication’ (80).    
 
Kraus' relationship with Dick, therefore, melds with her relationship with the reader. We as 
readers are interpolated into Kraus and Dick's epistolary correspondence by Kraus’ 
consistent hailing of a mute and unresponsive other. Prior to her project writing Dick, at 
the very beginning of the novel this is made even more explicit, as Kraus asks of the reader, 
‘shall we attempt a reconstruction?' (8). Even as it changes form, Kraus’ prose is typified by 
direct address. In an early short story she refers to, the object of address is her deceased 
friend David Rattray; then it's the reader, and then, of course, it is Dick. Dick and the reader 
share an impassiveness that facilitates Kraus’ candour, allowing her to express herself to 
someone she believes can provide non-judgemental understanding. In her first meeting 
with Dick, Kraus notes how 'Dick [was] flirting with her, his vast intelligence straining 
beyond the po-mo rhetoric and words to evince some essential loneliness that only she and 
he can share' (4). Explicitly signalling her own move beyond postmodern ‘rhetoric’—
implied as the emptiness of a philosophy intent on disproving meaning—Kraus feels a 
connection to Dick that the reader can similarly enjoy in surrogate form. In this sense, 
Kraus, like Acker and Hustvedt, extends to the reader an invitation to participate in her 
account of herself, using the personal, mobilised by the form of autofiction, to instantiate a 
social relationship that includes a core of political critique. Kraus’ personal problems, then, 
become social.  
 
Just as Hustvedt’s writing ultimately depends on an Other for validation, so for Kraus the 
situation is no different. In fact, Kraus takes this relationship one step further when she 
observes that 'the ideal reader is one who is in love with the writer' (116). While Dick 
shows no signs of this romantic connection, it is clear from Kraus’ prose that this is the 
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effect she desires of her writing. Later in the text, as her theorising begins to return 
answers, Kraus acknowledges this idea explicitly: 
my personal goal here [...] Is to express myself as clearly and honestly as I can. So in 
a sense love is like writing: living in such a heightened state that accuracy and 
awareness are vital. [...] The risk is that these feelings'll be ridiculed or rejected, & I 
think I'm understanding risk for the first time: being fully prepared to lose and 
accept the consequences if you gamble. (114) 
As I have demonstrated, when Hustvedt and Kraus attempt to write fiction that depends on 
the acceptance of the reader, they begin to work towards a circumvention of the problem 
of the idea of the primacy of the individual. It is with this technique that Kraus can 
overcome the problematic of privileging the individual while simultaneously resisting the 
subsumption of her identity into a catch-all collectivity which denies individual female 
agency in favour of a homogenised feminist mass. When Kraus recognises the need of 
being ‘fully prepared to lose’ and to ‘accept the consequences’ of gambling with the 
frankness and transparency that her fiction embodies, as well as with the flirtations with 
values that may be construed as neoliberal, she signals a movement beyond the ‘po-mo 
rhetoric’ that dogs both her flirtations with Dick, and her textual experiments. 
 
This preparedness to lose recalls the theory put forth by David Foster Wallace in his 1993 
essay ‘E Unibus Pluram,’ to which I made reference in the previous chapter when discussing 
the post-postmodern literary movement of new sincerity. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, Wallace’s vision of new literary ‘anti-rebels’ who would instead risk ‘the yawn, the 
rolled eyes’ and the accusations of ‘sentimentality [and] melodrama’ (193), posits an 
aesthetics of sincerity that prioritises meaning and feeling while acknowledging the 
essential impossibility of authenticity. Adam Kelly underpins Wallace’s theory by 
introducing the notion of the Derridian gift, which serves as a model for communication in 
the face of a legacy of post-structuralism that denotes that sincerity ‘expressed through 
language […] can never be pure.’ For Derrida, ‘a gift’ can always be (mis)taken for 
manipulation, just as for Kelly, so can literary sincerity. To be sincere means to risk that 
which for Wallace is the most frightening prospect for the ‘well-conditioned’ subject of 
postmodernity: ‘leaving oneself open to others' ridicule by betraying passé expressions of 
value, emotion, or vulnerability’ (181). Sincerity becomes a radical response precisely 
because it pushes beyond the comfort zone of the ‘fetal position’ encouraged by 
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postmodern irony, demanding commitment through faith to something unstable, 
potentially contaminated, but also potentially meaningful and connective.20  
 
When Kraus talks of being ‘prepared to lose’ she echoes Wallace’s injunction to ‘leav[e] 
oneself open to others’ ridicule.’ This is the gamble that Kraus makes with her autofiction, 
opening herself up to the ridicule of both Dick and, by the process of universalisation that 
her formal experiments with the epistolary genre enable, the reader also. Kraus asks of 
Dick, 'don't you think it's possible to do something and simultaneously study it?' This is 
precisely Kraus’ approach to sincerity—an attempt to both perform it, and simultaneously 
to theorise it. This allows Kraus to apply her problem with the first-person universally, and 
by overcoming this problem through writing to another Kraus signals a way beyond the 
inward-looking, ontologically preoccupied postmodernism towards a form of literature that 
can attempt to generate meaningful affective-intellectual bonds between writer and 
reader. This conception of sociality similarly anticipates Butler’s turn, in the twenty-first 
century, towards an ethics of interdependence. With the incorporation of the social into 
Kraus’ novel the problem discussed throughout this chapter becomes surmountable. Kathy 
Acker’s work, while radically drawing attention to, and subverting, the gendered language 
system exposed by poststructuralist theory, ultimately treats both the problem of systemic 
inequality and individual restriction of liberties as something that can be resolved through 
personal expression conveyed through the autofiction form. Siri Hustvedt’s novel works, to 
an extent, as a corrective to this impulse by using autofiction as a means to comment on 
the performative work needed, particularly by women, to function successfully in both a 
symbolic and capitalist patriarchy. But like Acker, Hustvedt’s solution remains mired in 
individualism, and furthermore problematises the possibility of a form of protest anchored 
in authenticity. Kraus, finally, offers some resolutions to this complex knot of issues. By 
substituting performativity for candour, and authenticity for sincerity, Kraus acknowledges 
the importance of collectivity even as she simultaneously holds in balance the necessity of 
personal, experiential accounts of life under late capitalism.  
 
                                                          
20 That is not to say that sincerity is automatically anti-neoliberal. Indeed some of the principles on 
which new sincerity writing is founded, namely the embrace of risk and the appeal to a future 
moment of return, are the same principles which guide the neoliberal phenomenon of 
financialisation—the topic of the following chapter. For the purposes of this reading, however, I 
prefer to take Kraus’ work in good faith. The emphasis Kraus places on sociality and her candid 
embrace of contradiction, for me, trumps any elements of self-interest at work in the novel.  
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Chapter 3: Suburban Fiction 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter seeks to correlate the phenomenon of financialisation, as it emerges as a 
structuring principle of American daily life under neoliberalism in the 1990s, to the 
abundance of suburban fictions released during this decade. The 1990s saw the release of a 
slew of satirical and often bitingly critical fictions focusing on the lives of America 
suburbanites.1 Working in the tradition of the genre’s leading figures, including Richard 
Yates, Richard Ford, and John Updike, the authors of these fictions position the suburban 
lives they document as symptomatic of a broader cultural milieu.2 Despite popular 
portrayals of the suburbs as a timeless, changeless space (most prominently in Gary Ross’ 
1998 film Pleasantville) the suburban setting frequently holds a mirror up to the specific 
societal conditions of its historical moment. In the 1990s daily life in middle-class middle 
America found itself overwhelmingly organised around the phenomenon of 
financialisation. In this decade, financialisation emerges as both an integral economic 
principle for global finance and the personal finances of everyday Americans, and as a 
system of ethics that encourages these same individuals to approach traditionally non-
market activities and relationships with the same rational analysis and mindfulness of cost 
and benefit ordinarily reserved for financial decision-making. Suburbia, as the traditional 
home of the white middle-class Americans for whom financialisation as both economic 
principle and everyday logic proves particularly important, is thus an ideal setting for 
fictions seeking to probe and critique this phenomenon as a representative branch of the 
neoliberal project. As we shall see, the myths that shape contemporary understanding of 
                                                          
1 For examples of novels, see David Yates, Jernigan (1991); Jeffrey Eugenides, The Virgin Suicides 
(1993); and Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections, A M Homes’ Music for Torching, and John Keene’s 
Annotations, all discussed in this chapter. In film, see Todd Haynes’ Safe (1995); Richard Linklater’s 
SubUrbia (1996); Todd Solondz’s Happiness (1998); Sam Mendes’ American Beauty (1999), among 
many others.  
2 Some recent work on suburban fiction can be found in Robert Beuka, SuburbiaNation: Reading 
Suburban Landscape in Twentieth-Century American Fiction and Film; Bernice Murphy, The Suburban 
Gothic in American Popular Culture; and Martin Dines and Timotheus Vermeulen (eds.) New 
Suburban Stories. 
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suburbia correlate closely with the contradictions that, when exposed, put pressure on 
financial logic. 
 
The story of financialisation and the story of modern suburbia are intricately woven 
together throughout the history of the twentieth century. Chronologically, the story of the 
modern American suburb begins in 1868, when Emery E. Childs commissioned landscape 
architect Frederick Law Olmsted to design and build the planned community of Riverside, 
Illinois, the first of its kind in the United States. Riverside’s development was intended to 
resolve a crisis in the urban cores of the country that a ‘laissez-faire urban economics’ had 
rendered as inefficient tangles of competing uses (Fishman, 12). In Europe the resolution of 
this crisis—the ‘reclamation’ of the urban centre for the middle-class—came about through 
massive governmental intervention. In the United States, developers looked instead to the 
urban periphery for the distance and potential for innovation it offered (ibid., 119). 
Olmsted, working for Child’s Riverside Improvement Company (RIC), built his community at 
this periphery. The success of Riverside is in direct inverse proportion to the failings of the 
RIC, however, and the principles of land speculation and financial legerdemain by which the 
company financed Olmstead’s vision would eventually lead to the company’s bankruptcy. 
The project was, by Olmstead’s own admission, ‘a regular flyaway speculation’ (qtd. in 
Fishman, 132). Even from its inception, then, the bourgeois playground of suburbia belied a 
certain fragility; a dependence on the whims of a market kept barely at bay behind white 
picket fences.3   
 
Despite the failings of the RIC, the twentieth century nevertheless became the century of 
the suburb in the history of United States housing development. The Second World War 
proved a catalysing influence as a severe housing crisis and labour shortage led to a rash of 
rapidly assembled prefabricated neighbourhoods designed to accommodate an influx of 
returning veterans. These developments catered to, or in a sense created, a very specific 
subset of American individuals. The first wave of suburbanites were white veterans newly 
minted into the middle-class by the generous benefits of the 1944 GI Bill.4 The enclaves 
they occupied prompted further migration, drawing previously city-dwelling families in 
                                                          
3 Robert Fishman observes that the history of Riverside reveals an essential contradiction inherent to 
the suburban project: that suburbia ‘exclude[s] the urban world of work which is the ultimate source 
of its wealth’ (x), and that it nevertheless depends for its survival on ‘market forces’ that comprise a 
‘frighteningly unstable economic base’ (113). 
4 See Claire Suddath’s TIME article ‘The Middle Class’ for a brief history of how the GI Bill contributed 
to a 1950s defined by ‘backyard barbecues [and] black-and-white TVs.’ 
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such numbers that the phenomenon of their exodus from the urban cores earned the 
nickname ‘white flight.’5 Together, the emigres and the veterans coalesced into the 
contemporary American middle class. As Andrew Hoberek has demonstrated, the post-war 
period saw the transformation of this middle class as it had existed in the previous century 
through what Hoberek calls the ‘managerial turn,’ by which an old middle class of small 
producers and business owners became a new middle class of salaried employees—in 
short, a turn from entrepreneurship to employment. This ‘managerial turn’ saw the middle-
class ceding control of their ‘historical control over property’ (9) to the minority of 
capitalists at the head of a handful of rapidly expanding corporations at work absorbing the 
small businesses of the pre-war period at an unprecedented pace. The loss of productive 
property was substituted, by these workers, with a fetishization of home ownership that 
suburban developments could readily address.  
 
In Hoberek’s narrative, this loss of autonomy is perceived by the middle class on an 
individualised basis, as a sense of alienation rather than as the systemic proletarianization 
it really represents. In fiction, this alienation is explored in a slew of mid-century novels 
from Yates, Ford, and Updike that speak to what Auden, in 1948, terms the ‘age of anxiety.’ 
This turn inwards to an individualised sense of loss can then also be considered one of a 
number of factors that would, in the 1970s and 80s, make the neoliberal promises of 
freedom and personal entrepreneurship such an enticing proposition, as they transform 
alienation into a renewed opportunity to engage in affirmative entrepreneurial behaviour. 
As several critics have noted, the mid-century suburb seemed primed to accept the values 
of privatisation, individualisation, and personal autonomy decades before neoliberalism 
proper would come into ascendency. Robert Fishman observes that suburbia in the mid-
twentieth century onwards fundamentally subscribed to a vision ‘of community [built] on 
the primacy of private property and the individual family’ (x), a vision that would 
foreshadow Margaret Thatcher’s famous declaration that ‘there's no such thing as 
society[,] there are individual men and women and there are families’ (Thatcher). A 
common misconception of suburbia regards its promotion of conformity.6 In fact, as many 
                                                          
5 For more on the demographics of suburbia in the early to mid-20th century, see: David Thorns, for 
whom suburbia accommodated a ‘flood of middle class people’ (64); Robert Fishman, who describes 
suburbia as ‘the collective creation of the Anglo-American middle class: the bourgeois utopia’ (x); 
and Roger Silverstone, who reads suburbia as the embodiment of the desire ‘to create middle class 
middle cultures in middle spaces in middle America’ (i).   
6 See for example John C. Keats critique The Crack in the Picture Window (1956) which attacks the 
‘singular monotony’ of suburban living. Keats’ critique was echoed in fictional form by the likes of 
Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road (1961), and the 1962 protest song ‘Little Boxes.’ 
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have since noted, the notion that identical houses signifies identical lives—the association 
of ‘the physical structure and a particular way of life,’ as David Thorns describes it—deflects 
from the actual ideologies most often found lauded in suburban communities: self-
determination, private ownership, local control, and an emphasis on the individual and the 
family above all else.7 Suburbia was thus a demographic primed and ready for 
neoliberalism to legitimise as policy the beliefs suburbanites had already internalised as 
lifestyle.  
 
The neoliberal policy of financialisation has proven particularly fundamental to suburbia 
and the suburban lifestyle. As an economic policy, financialisation connotes the turn from 
the accrual of profits through trade and commodity production, to the generation of profits 
through financial channels, where ‘financial’ refers to ‘activities relating to the provision (or 
transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains’ 
(Krippner). Fundamentally, financialisation can be understood as what Leigh Claire La Berge 
calls a ‘temporal displacement’ (95) of value into a future expectation of payment or profit. 
The history of the RIC demonstrates the importance of speculative investment to the 
development of planned communities, but equally important is financialisation’s effect on 
individual borrowing and specifically on the extension of mortgage borrowing. As Paul 
Langley has demonstrated, neoliberal policies like Margaret Thatcher’s ‘right to buy’ 
scheme predicated on the ideology of ‘property-owning democracy’ both relied on the 
financial system of mortgage lending and further intensified financial activity by extending 
the possibilities of mortgage-backed securitisation. The individual suburban house is made 
accessible through the mortgage, an investment which is then bundled into a security and 
sold on as another investment product. The existence of the suburban housing market thus 
intensifies economic financialisation in an ostensibly endless feedback loop that, of course, 
came crashing to a halt in 2008. This economic financialisation lead also to what Langley 
terms the ‘financialisation of the suburban subject’ (290). The loss of entrepreneurial 
autonomy through the expansion of big business documented by Hoberek left an 
ideological vacancy in middle class Americans that neoliberal policy eagerly filled.8 As the 
                                                          
7 See Nancy and James Duncan’s study of Bedford, NY featured in Visions of Suburbia for more on 
the politics of suburbia.  
8 There is a sense in this context, too, that a temporal displacement is at work: one which defers the 
middle-class’ realisation of their proletarianization through the illusion of wealth provided by credit. 
This illusion arguably did not truly come to an end until after the 2008 recession, when movements 
like Occupy finally succeeded in introducing terms like ‘the one percent’ into the everyday 
vocabulary of Americans.  
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suburban home became financialised, Langley demonstrates how the liberal suburban 
homeowner also became a neoliberal property investor, engaging in home improvement or 
practices of ‘flipping’ and buying-to-let as entrepreneurial investment schemes designed, 
on a micro-scale, to mirror the financial behaviours of the hedge-funds and investment 
banks whose securitisations were in fact derived from these homeowners’ own mortgages.  
 
Home ownership via mortgage, by the end of the twentieth century, was just one of a 
number of ways in which individual suburban subjects engaged in financial practices. In The 
Financialisation of Daily Life, Randy Martin tracks the expansion of the market into 
everyday life. Martin describes how developments in personal computing enabled middle-
class individuals in the 1990s to take an active role in their own personal finance, offering 
them the freedom to participate in personal investing, day-trading, and other previously 
inaccessible forms of money-management to complement their home-ownership. 
‘Personal finance,’ he notes, ‘becomes the way in which ordinary people are invited to 
participate in that larger abstraction called the economy' (17). But this is a two-way street, 
and as individuals began to participate in the market, so the market began to infect 
ordinarily separate areas of daily life, leading eventually to the condition of financialisation 
not just as an economic principle but also a ‘moral code’ that valorises calculation and 
accumulation, investment and return, as the principles to be abided by for a fruitful and 
prosperous life not just financially, but ethically, affectively, and spiritually also.9 The 
suburbanites dabbling in day-trading and property flipping gazed into the abyss of the 
market, only to find that it also gazed back at them.  
 
What emerges from this potted history is a twofold account of financialisation: 
financialisation as an economic principle of temporal displacement; and financialisation as 
a moral code and structuring logic of everyday life. Each of these principles of 
financialisation are strongly tied to the history of the middle-class suburbanite. As an 
economic principle, financialisation both makes possible suburban home ownership and 
encourages a new entrepreneurialism as well as an illusion of wealth through credit that 
satiates this proletarianized class’ desire for an autonomy lost in the post-war 
intensification of capitalism. This economic entrepreneurialism, in turn, begins to influence 
the daily lives of these suburbanites, intensifying the neoliberal values already present in 
                                                          
9 This story of financialisation is told in greater detail in Stan Davis and Christopher Myer, Blur: The 
Speed of Change in the Connected Economy. 
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the suburban community and infecting ordinarily non-market relationships and behaviours 
with a financial logic of value, investment and return.  
 
Annie McClanahan, whose work on credit crisis fiction proves invaluable to this chapter, 
argues in the introduction to her study Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First Century 
Culture, that cultural texts ‘perform the urgent work of mediation’ between the scale of the 
visible and experienced and the complex, global, and systemic.10 As a nexus of economic 
financialisation and everyday financialisation, suburbia offers itself as the ideal territory in 
which to perform this work. Many artists in the 1990s rise to this challenge, and this 
chapter will focus on just three of the dozens of suburban fictions produced in this decade 
in response to the intensification of financial logic at both the economic and everyday level. 
Jonathan Franzen, A M Homes, and John Keene all take the suburbanite and the suburban 
space and organise a critique of financialisation as the market’s extension into the domain 
of everyday life. They do this by documenting the effect of financialisation on the individual 
(Franzen), by allegorising the suburban house as an embodiment of market patterns 
(Homes), or by drawing attention to aporias in the ‘good life’ narrative of accumulation 
which the suburban home signifies (Keene). 
 
 
Subjective Critique in Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections 
 
 
Jonathan Franzen’s 2001 novel The Corrections is a decade-spanning profile of the 
midwestern Lambert family and their troubles. Alfred and Enid are an elderly couple living 
in the fictional midwestern city of St. Jude, their relationship wound increasingly taut by 
the authoritarian impulses of Alfred and his gradual decline into dementia. Their three 
children, Gary, Chip, and Denise, are, respectively, a suburban-dwelling banker struggling 
with alcoholism and depression, a Marxist academic whose affair with a student leads to 
                                                          
10 Paul Langley notes a similar aporia in accounts of finance in his work on mortgage-backed 
securities. Langley’s 2006 article presciently analyses the phenomenon of MBS and calls for greater 
critical attention to be placed on them. Their neglect, he writes,  
is largely typical of common sense and critical representations of contemporary finance that 
tend to overlook the interdependencies between the capital markets on the one hand, and 
the apparently routine, habitual and mundane practices of everyday borrowing and saving 
on the other. [...] The predominant metaphors used to describe finance such as "flow", 
"movement" and "circulation" posit it above and beyond [...] our everyday "real" economic 
practices. (284) 
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his dismissal and involvement in a Lithuanian investment fraud scheme, and a successful 
chef who loses her job after sleeping separately with both her boss and his wife.11 
 
This section of the chapter will focus on Gary, the oldest of the Lambert siblings and an 
archetypal denizen of suburbia. Gary is depicted living in a large house with an attractive 
wife and three sons, working an unchallenging job at a local bank while dabbling in 
speculative investments on the side, and with a considerable disposable income which he 
spends mostly on expensive consumer products. But Gary also struggles throughout his 
section of Franzen’s novel with an escalating cocktail of anhedonia, alcoholism, and 
paranoia; a cocktail that eventually culminates in a depressive breakdown. Despite these 
weighty issues, Franzen portrays Gary as a comic character, ripe for satirical skewering. 
When we first meet Gary we are made privy to his internal monologue:  
 As he entered the darkroom, he estimated that his levels of Neurofactor 3 (I.e., 
serotonin: a very, very important factor) were posting seven-day or even thirty-day 
highs, that his Factor 2 and Factor 7 levels were likewise outperforming 
expectations, and that his Factor 1 had rebounded from an early-morning slump 
related to the glass of Armagnac he’d drunk at bedtime. He had a spring in his step 
[…] his seasonally adjusted assessment of life’s futility and brevity was consistent 
with the overall robustness of his mental economy. He was not the least bit 
clinically depressed. (159-160) 
As the narrative progresses, Gary’s ‘mental economy’ continues to be charted in its decline, 
consistently rendered in the language of stocks and investments. His interiority colonised 
by market rationality, Gary proves an archetypal example of the subject living by what 
Martin calls the ‘moral code’ of financialisation. In this respect, he is an exemplary example 
of homo economicus.   
 
In Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, Wendy Brown laments 
neoliberalism’s ‘economisation of everyday life’ for its part in the intensification of human 
capital (30). Briefly, Brown charts the development of labour theory from Marx, through 
Foucault, to arrive at a position roughly analogous to that of Belgian philosopher Michel 
Feher. In this narrative, Marx’s understanding of labour power as an exchangeable 
                                                          
11 The Lithuanian investment scheme narrative represents another instance of Franzen’s treatment 
of financialisation in The Corrections, but I will not be discussing it in this chapter as I wish to keep 
my focus on the genre of suburban fiction, which, as we shall see, is Franzen’s primary means of 
engaging with financialisation as both an economic and ethical principal.   
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commodity, possessed by but not intrinsic to the worker, transmutes into Foucault’s 
reading of the worker, or subject, as human capital wherein the subject as a ‘human 
individual’ is inextricably bound to the income-generating ‘ability machine’ (Foucault, 226). 
Foucault articulates his theory of human capital in the 1979 lectures collected in The Birth 
of Biopolitics. In the years since, during which the theoretical ‘neo-liberalism’ of interest to 
Foucault became the real neoliberalism of Thatcher, Reagan and Volcker, human capital 
underwent a further transformation. With economic dominance moving from productive 
capital to financial capital, both Brown and Michel Feher observe a similar secondary shift 
in human capital. For Feher, Foucault’s human capital is a ‘pre-neoliberal’ or ‘utilitarian’ 
human capital (27). Where utilitarian subjects ‘seek to maximise their satisfaction’ based 
on a short-term exchange model, their true neoliberal counterparts ‘are primarily 
concerned with the impact of their conducts, and thus of the satisfaction they may draw 
from them, on the level of their self-appreciation or self-esteem’ (27). So while Foucauldian 
subjects are ‘entrepreneurs of the self’, Feherian subjects are, by contrast, ‘investors in the 
self’, engaged in what Brown calls a process of ‘speculation on the self’s future value’ 
(Brown, 33).  
 
Thus, we arrive at Gary. Gary’s value as human capital is speculative, and therefore 
fictitious in the same way that for Marx, financial capital is fictitious.12 It is, in Marx’s terms, 
an illusory appearance of value predicated on an endless process of deferral which, if 
halted, would surely precipitate crisis. In The Corrections, Gary’s specific crisis is depression, 
the ‘Warning Signs’ of which abound throughout his section of the narrative. Faced with a 
manipulative spouse and two disloyal sons, Gary comes to a realisation in the course of the 
novel:  
 a “sense” that he survived from day to day by distracting himself from 
 underground truths that day by day grew more compelling and decisive. The truth 
 that he was going to die. That heaping your tomb with treasure wouldn’t save you. 
 (182) 
                                                          
12 In the third section of Capital, Marx describes how credit can be understood as fictitious capital:  
With the development of commerce and of the capitalist mode of production, which 
produces solely with an eye to circulation, this natural basis of the credit system is 
extended, generalised, and worked out. Money serves here, by and large, merely as a 
means of payment, i.e., commodities are not sold for money, but for a written promise to 
pay for them at a certain date.  
This promissory system requires ‘no eventual transformation into actual money’ (Marx, italics added 
for emphasis).  
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Gary’s mental distraction, or deferral, is the internalisation of the speculative practices on 
which his life is built: the land speculation that financed his house, the mortgage that he 
bought it with, the small-scale investments that pay the mortgage. Everything in Gary’s life 
is deferred. The pressure of this deferral builds up over the course of the novel until, 
inevitably, he threatens to default.13  
 
The most significant event in the history of financialisation as an economic phenomenon is 
undoubtedly the closing of the gold standard in 1971 and the consequent rapid boom in 
speculative, high-risk investing driven by a belief in future profitability and a general faith in 
the certainty of increased returns on any investment.14 As Annie McClanahan has 
persuasively argued in the Journal of Cultural Economy, such a belief equates to what is 
essentially a ‘temporal fix’ for the market, wherein any present deficit is ‘fixed’ by invoking 
the certainty of future profit. Gary embodies—and pressures—this ‘temporal fix’ by which 
crisis is occluded through deferral. His status as a father further reinforces this 
embodiment. In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault offers several material examples of the 
ideology of human capital in action. One such example is the ‘formation of a genetic human 
capital’—or, of producing and raising a child—through a long-game of capital accretion, 
strategic matchmaking, and ‘educational investments’, the culmination of which is a 
capital-rich child (Foucault, 29).15 In Gary’s section of Franzen’s novel, children are 
repeatedly figured as contested sites: as assets that characters speculatively invest in on 
the promise of a later return. Frequently, this return is understood in terms of its rhetorical 
value in the various family conflicts that play out throughout The Corrections. Gary hugs 
Jonah, his youngest son, whilst questioning whether it is ‘love’ or ‘coalition-building’ that 
the hug represents (186). During Enid’s ‘campaign’ for Christmas in St. Jude, she ‘enlist[s] 
Jonah […] exploiting [him] for leverage’ (205). Elsewhere Caroline’s campaign to force Gary 
to admit his depression necessitates using her three sons to achieve ‘strategic 
advantage[s]’ through a manipulation akin to ‘wartime tactic[s]’ (231). These manipulations 
                                                          
13 This notion of warning signs is particularly evocative of Giovanni Arrighi’s notion of ‘signs of 
autumn’—the warning signs that precede the imminent decline of a hegemon in Arrighi’s oscillatory 
long history of capital in The Long Twentieth Century. 
14 Arrighi refers to the breakdown of Fordism-Keynesianism and the Bretton Woods system as the 
moment at which states became ‘at the mercy of financial discipline’ and, quoting Harvey, 
simultaneously saw an ‘explosion in new financial instruments and markets’ (Harvey, qtd. in Arrighi, 
3). 
15 In this example, Foucault also comes close to breaching the 'pre-neoliberal' division by which 
Michel Feher segregates Foucault's idea of entrepreneurship from his own model of human capital 
as investment.  
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all require speculative emotional investments that promise a deferred return at an 
unspecified future moment of conflict, and this further confirms Gary’s status as an 
archetypal figure of financialisation.16  
 
In McClanahan’s treatment of financialisation, she twins the ‘temporal fix’ of investment to 
a parallel ‘spatial fix,’ the concept of which she borrows from David Harvey’s seminal work 
on neoliberalism, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Combined, these ‘fixes’ provide an 
ostensibly stable platform for neoliberal economic policy. Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ is a process 
of re-narration by which the de-industrialisation of the Global North and the subsequent 
industrialisation and exploitation of the Global South is masked by a rhetoric of post-
industrialism and the providence of ‘knowledge work.’ This ‘fix,’ for McClanahan, is 
similarly integral to financialisation as it severs the connection between value and labour, 
allowing for a ‘fantas[y] [of] frictionless, immaterial, labour-free value,’ that leaps over the 
‘physical and historical limits’ of capitalist accumulation, thus eliding any objection to the 
limitless potential the ‘temporal fix’ foretells.     
 
If, in Franzen’s novel, Gary’s crisis represents the unravelling of the ‘temporal fix’ of 
financialisation, then we might equally read the sections of the novel concerned with his 
father, Alfred, as Franzen’s evocation of the ‘spatial fix’ that makes financialisation possible. 
Alfred’s nostalgia for, and devotion to, the Fordist-era rail company Midland Pacific 
Railroad remains a constant of his personality even as his dementia begins to erode his 
sense of self. This dementia, a ‘betrayal’ that had ‘begun in signals’ (78), continues 
alongside a very literal deindustrialisation as the Orfic group acquire Midpac and tear up 
the railroads, which Alfred maintained, for copper salvage. Alfred’s disease, meanwhile, 
pushes him through a series of increasingly humiliating situations, the most graphic of 
these undoubtedly being the bout of incontinence Alfred suffers on a cruise holiday, which 
is accompanied by hallucinations of a taunting fecal character. A quintessential Fordist 
individual, Alfred’s debilitation and infantilisation functions metonymically to reflect a 
similar decline in American industry. And yet the solution offered—significantly, by Gary—
is a gleaming embodiment of the new knowledge economy that rushes in to fill the space 
left vacant by Midpac: a wonder drug named ‘Corecktall,’ still in its seed-funding stage. 
Gary’s investment in Corecktall unifies the twin ‘fixes’ with which the plot is concerned, as 
                                                          
16 Gary’s behaviour embodies what Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi has described as neoliberalism’s impact on 
‘the subsumption and subjugation of the biopolitical sphere of affection and language to financial 
capitalism’ (13) in The Uprising. 
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he seeks simultaneously to ensure a significant return for his own future, and to rectify the 
damaging effects of de-industrialisation on his father.17 Ultimately, Gary is unable to secure 
his investment in ‘Corecktall,’ and Alfred thus proves ineligible for the drug’s trial and ends 
up dying in a care home. Just as Gary’s personal crisis undermines the boundless optimism 
of financialisation, so the shining allure of the knowledge economy is proven a poor 
corrective to the damage done by the de-industrialising of the American Midwest.  
 
Through Alfred and Gary, Franzen would seem to pressure the temporal and spatial fixes 
that define neoliberal financialisation, respectively exposing the rewritten history and 
future of capital. However, far from being regarded as a uniformly successful skewering of 
neoliberal ideology, The Corrections has been the subject of significant debate, down in 
part to the novel’s structural conceit, which mirrors the eponymous ‘correction.’ After 
Gary’s breakdown, the last time we see his character in the novel he has regained some of 
his former authority and recovered from the moderate financial losses that he suffered at 
the burst of the dot-com bubble. The rest of the Lambert siblings experience similar 
narrative arcs: from success, to problem, and then back to a more moderate form of 
success. In Affect and American Literature in the Age of Neoliberalism, Rachel Greenwald 
Smith problematises this narrative structure. Through the character of Gary, Smith writes, 
Franzen satirises ‘the emotional consequence of neoliberal ideology’ (7). However, turning 
to the ‘corrective’ structure, Smith finds in The Corrections a troubling affirmation of the 
very neoliberal ideology that Franzen is at a thematic level ostensibly critiquing. In the 
narrative arcs of the characters, Smith finds a logic resembling the neoliberal vision of the 
financial market: ‘the notion that independently generated upward movement is ultimately 
achievable, and that problems along the way are likely to merely signal the end to an 
unusual bout of euphoria and a return to less spectacular but more predictable progress’ 
(9). Furthermore, the individual trajectories of each character are guided through a process 
of self-management and moderation that seems to reinforce the neoliberal vision of 
personal emotional responsibility. What this leads to, for Smith, is no less than Franzen’s 
complicity in naturalising neoliberal ideology:  
                                                          
17 Alfred’s condition is also central to Susanne Rohr’s argument that Franzen’s novel can be read as a 
‘novel of globalisation’. As I have done, Rohr reads Alfred’s decline as symptomatic of the changing 
landscape of capital. She observes that the novel ‘follows the dynamics of a disease that makes 
reality vanish’, the result of which is ‘the gradual loss of familiar structures that have constituted a 
known reality’ (96). This, for Rohr, is the essence of both dementia and globalisation. 
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 Through the apparent naturalness of its patterning—the rise and fall of its 
 characters, the separation of points of view, and the vision of the market that 
 informs both—the novel trains readers to see those patterns in their daily lives. 
 The novel can therefore be read as affectively reinforcing neoliberal norms as a 
 result of its formal operations. (11) 
Franzen’s text, then, is a very sophisticated critique of neoliberalism articulated through 
the subjective experiences of his characters. But in privileging the subject, Smith suggests 
that Franzen neglects the structural implications of his work.18 This notion—that Franzen’s 
novel is somehow complicit in contributing to the ideological foundations of the system it 
ostensibly critiques—is not unique to Smith, nor is the terms on which this critique is based 
confined just to Franzen’s novel. 
 
The question of formal complicity underwriting subject-based critique—or of the 
importance of a consideration of form—recalls a perennial debate, in Marxist theory, 
regarding the roles of form and content in critique. While this topic receives perhaps its 
most comprehensive treatment in Jameson’s Marxism and Form, a more contemporary 
text deals in more detail with the specific juxtaposition of humanist and anti-humanist 
narratives: Walter Benn Michaels’ 2015 book The Beauty of a Social Problem, in which 
Michaels advocates for a reinvigoration of form over pathos. The ‘beauty’ in Beauty is 
borrowed from Brecht: in the notes to Mother Courage, Michaels tells us, Brecht famously 
says that ‘if the actress playing Mother Courage invites the audience to identify with her,’ it 
would be ‘disastrous,’ because it would deprive spectators of the opportunity to feel ‘the 
beauty and attraction of a social problem’ (38). Brecht’s quote sets up the conflict between 
politics and pathos that Michaels’ pursues throughout his book. For Michaels, works of art 
that mobilise pathos in order to critique inequality typically do so to draw attention to 
‘hierarchies of vision’: the identity-based inequalities that for Michaels hinge on ‘ways of 
seeing’—discrimination against race, gender identification, sexuality—whilst 
simultaneously denying class-based structural inequality. To draw attention to capitalism, 
the deep structure which is the true root of inequality in America, Michaels thus advocates 
for a form of art that denies identification with the subject, or pathos, in favour of a formal 
                                                          
18 For a similar critique of Franzen, see James Annesley’s response to Susanne Rohr. Annesley argues 
that Franzen’s novel, by stripping its characters of agency, embraces a narrative of complexity that 
portrays globalisation as ‘a defining and definitive reality’. In doing so, Franzen ‘closes off the 
possibility that his characters (and indeed his own writing) may have a dialectical relationship with 
the conditions of globalisation’, the result of which is a work of fiction ‘that actually strengthen[s] 
the ideological and conceptual foundations of globalising consumer capitalism itself’ (123-124). 
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‘beauty’ which illuminates structural inequalities. In Michaels’ terms, The Corrections, 
through its invocation of identity crisis as an analogy for financial crisis, largely represents a 
fiction of hierarchies of vision. Franzen’s emphasis on what Smith calls the ‘emotional 
consequences of neoliberal ideology’ places Franzen firmly in the camp of pathos, his 
critique routed through the subjectivity of his characters.  
 
The debate which Michaels enters into with Beauty is an energetic one in the study of 
contemporary art. There is an increasingly vocal discourse critiquing what could broadly be 
called the ‘humanist turn’ in post-postmodern fiction; the turn which is most often 
celebrated by those critics who welcome the end of postmodern ‘sterility’ and ‘coldness’.19 
But equally vocal are those critics championing anti-affective art. In Bad New Days, Hal 
Foster exhorts the sort of abject art which ‘troubles subjecthood’. In The Feel-Bad Film, 
Nikolaj Lubecker endorses the Haneke ethos of filmmaking: to bludgeon the viewer ‘into 
independence’ (Haneke, qtd. in Lubecker, 33). In their introduction to the ‘Fictions of 
Finance’ issue of the Radical History Review, Carico and Orenstein criticise the ‘facile 
humanism’ with which art predominantly tries to represent the abstractions of financial 
capital (4), and argue as a matter of urgency that artistic representations of finance move 
beyond the currently dominant question: ‘do the rich have inner-lives?’ (10). And in Affect, 
Rachel Greenwald Smith challenges the sort of affective identification that appeals to a 
‘contract’ model of reading. In the context of the suburban fictions with which this chapter 
is concerned, this debate, which pits a humanist aesthetics against an anti-humanist one, 
offers a framework through which to read the efforts of suburban fiction writers’ efforts to 
narrate financialisation. Suburbia, as a signifier of the processes of financialisation and a 
space of intensified neoliberal rationality, offers artists working in the genre of suburban 
fiction the opportunity to enter into this debate prior to its articulation in theoretical terms. 
It asks of these artists a question: how should one attempt to represent, and thus critique, 
financial capital? 
 
Franzen’s efforts certainly represent one response to this question. As several critics have 
suggested, The Corrections represents the resurrection of a down-to-earth realism after the 
                                                          
19 I'm thinking particularly here of the works of critics such as Mary K Holland, Marshall Boswell, and 
Robert L. McLaughlin, all of whom have offered distinctly pro-affect takes on this debate grounded 
in readings of one of the 1990s’ most important literary figures, David Foster Wallace. 
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excesses of postmodernism.20 There is certainly an argument to be made that the narrative 
form of the correction is in fact representative of any conventional drama—what narrative 
doesn’t put a character through a journey of transformation, of trial and redemption? 
Certainly, this structure can be generalised to a great deal of realist fiction. But as a host of 
recent studies have argued, the realist genre holds particular relevance in the discussion of 
finance. From Deidre Lynch’s The Economy of Character to Mary Poovey’s Genres of the 
Credit Economy, a strong case has been made that realist fiction served to produce a 
confidence in fiction, preparing readers to take the leaps of faith necessary to jump 
wholesale in the equally fictitional (or fictitious, in Marx’s terms) world of financial 
capitalism. Franzen’s embrace of the untrendy realist genre and its core conceit of the 
‘correction’ and the articulation of a critique through the individual, humanist subject, all 
represent facets of the same project: to represent finance subjectively, at the expense of 
formal consideration for financialisation’s systemic qualities. The formal reinforcement of 
financial logic thus betrays the novel’s failure to properly do the essential work of 
‘mediation’ of these two levels critical to a successful critique. 
 
 
Systemic Critique in A M Homes’ Music for Torching 
 
 
Turning to A M Homes’ 1998 novel Music for Torching offers an opportunity to consider the 
way in which a writer might take an alternative response to the problem of representing 
and critiquing financialisation. Thematically speaking, Homes’ novel is similar to Franzen’s: 
it is another suburban tale documenting a milieu of misfortune, depression and 
transgression. The plot of Homes’ novel follows Paul and Elaine’s marriage as they attempt 
to navigate shattering mid-life crises. Plagued by ennui and constrained by each other’s 
foibles and failures, the couple try to burn down their house by kicking over a barbecue. 
Unfortunately, the fire doesn’t properly take, and the house is left standing with a gaping 
hole in one wall. Neither does the fire have the desired effect on the couple’s lives. The 
destructive behaviours the two pursue at the beginning of the novel, prior to the fire, 
continue throughout: they engage in fraud, they conduct affairs, they fight and they 
                                                          
20 See for example David Gates, who calls The Corrections a ‘conventional realist saga of 
multigenerational family dynamics’; or Sam Tanenhaus, who writes of the novel, ‘like [Dickens and 
Tolstoy], Franzen attended to the quiet drama of the interior life and also recorded its fraught 
transactions with the public world.’  
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scheme. Finally, the novel climaxes with their youngest son, Sammy, being taken hostage in 
his school by his best friend Nate. In the ensuing struggle Sammy is shot in the head. The 
novel closes as Paul and Elaine pile into a helicopter, headed for the hospital, looking down 
on their lives from a new ‘peculiar perspective’ (357). 
 
In this climax, and in other strategies that Homes pursues throughout her text, I want to 
suggest that Music for Torching offers an alternative approach to the representation and 
critique of financialisation. Homes takes steps to repress the ‘inner lives’ of her characters 
through a stylised prose and authorial detachment that consciously shirks the ‘facile 
humanism’ derided by Carico and Orenstein. An early sex scene is typical of Homes’ artfully 
affectless narration: 
 He fucks her, his feet pressing against the armrest, using the sofa for leverage.  
 She begins to cry. “I’m bored,” she says. “I’m so bored, it’s not even funny.” She 
digs her fingers into his back; her nails sink into his flesh and stay there.  
 “I’m unhappy,” he says, still humping her. His few remaining strands of hair come 
unglued and fall forward, hanging in his face. He stops humping her for a moment, 
flips them back, then starts humping her again. “I’m unbelievably unhappy,” he 
says loudly and begins to cry. 
 They stop fucking. (15) 
The characteristically dry humour with which the mechanics of the couple’s sex is narrated, 
along with the flatly delivered lines—ostensibly emotive but drained of vitality—suppress 
the sense of the couple’s ‘inner lives.’ As the novel progresses, it becomes clear that 
instead of subjects, Homes critique of financialisation is mounted through structures: the 
structure of the suburban house, and the structure of the novel itself.21  
 
Where Franzen’s novel very explicitly evokes the concept of financialisation through the 
internal monologues of Gary, Homes’ novel takes a more roundabout route, raising 
                                                          
21 My account here of Homes aesthetic project goes against one of the few published readings of her 
work. In Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in Contemporary American 
Literature, Mary K Holland sets forth a vision of post-postmodernism as a resistance to the 
‘emotional sterility’ of postmodernism. Post-postmodernism ‘seeks to salvage much missed portions 
of humanism, such as affect, meaning, and investment in the real world and in relationships 
between people’, in a project Holland terms ‘anti-antihumanism’ (8). In the tradition of ‘anti-
antihumanism’, Holland reads Homes’ novel as entering into a ‘nostalgic abandonment of its own 
postmodernist principles in order to secure some kind of recuperative valuing of the family’ (10). For 
Holland, Homes’ novel is a morality play: it dramatises the consequences ‘when apathetic adults fail 
to define and protect their homes and families’ (96). My reading, in contrast, argues for the 
centrality of anti-humanism to Homes’ project.   
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financialisation indirectly through a variety of background details that illustrate how the 
logics of financialisation both economic and everyday structure the reality of Paul and 
Elaine’s suburban lives. Economically, finance is everywhere in the novel. When Elaine goes 
shopping, she does so on credit (121). When interviewed about their house insurance, Paul 
reveals they have ‘not much’ debt, just ‘the house, the car, and a little home-equity loan 
we took out a couple of years ago to fix up the bathroom’ (131). The downplaying of this 
debt indicates both the normalisation and essentialness of finance for everyday Americans, 
while the ‘home-equity loan’ flags Paul and Elaine as the typical neoliberal investors, 
borrowing against the value of their house in order to increase its future profitability in an 
act of double-displacement. Later in the novel, one of Paul and Elaine’s neighbours is 
revealed to be a housewife and day trader, a ‘financial whiz’ who, ‘when she was home 
with their first child […] started tinkering with their investments’ (193). Paul, meanwhile, is 
employed in a vague role that is never fully disclosed. He travels into ‘the city’ and covets a 
corner office, but his business conversations are conducted entirely as meaningless 
exchanges. In a meeting with his boss and colleagues he is asked about ‘the program’, to 
which he replies, ‘I think we have to look at return. We have to think about giving less and 
getting more’ (159). A colleague chimes in: ‘Return is fine, but what about the future?’ to 
which Paul replies, ‘we can go further if we go deeper’ (160). While this exchange is 
undoubtedly vacuous, it is also held loosely together by the thread of temporal 
displacement: the concern, for all involved, is the future, the return. Meanwhile, the 
function of the family unit is similarly cast in economic terms throughout, as when faced 
with the perfection of their neighbours, Paul and Elaine reflect on their household as ‘every 
man for himself, each hoarding what little he has, each wanting his own’ (54). Like Gary 
Lambert’s household in The Corrections, Paul and Elaine are depicted in constant, 
calculated competition. As both economics and ethics, financialisation is subtly but 
fundamentally present in Paul and Elaine’s lives.      
 
In Dead Pledges, Annie McClanahan devotes a chapter to the eponymous ‘dead pledge,’ 
the mortgage—or mort gage—as it is represented in contemporary horror films. Typically, 
in the decades preceding the 2008 crash, her argument goes, anxieties around home 
ownership found their fullest manifestation in haunted house horror texts like Amityville 
Horror (1977). These texts tended to manifest the effects of financialisation indirectly, as a 
subtext—just as Dawn of the Dead allegorises consumerism, so finance in these texts is 
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rendered metaphorically, in a move typical of the horror genre.22 And, as is often the case 
with this genre, the ultimate inclination of the narratives towards the restoration of stasis 
and calm belies an essentially conservative bent to these stories. Texts like Homes' novel 
borrows tropes from gothic horror23 but in this case it is the gothic that functions almost as 
a subtext to the more direct engagement with economic financialisation, its language and 
its everyday consequences. Likewise, while horror tends towards resolution, Homes' novel 
will radically subvert this narrative structure, concluding not with resolution but with 
terminal crisis, as it rebuts the sort of realist structure that Franzen's novel disinters. 
Central to this subversion is the motif of ‘payback,’ which is key to the home invasion-cum-
revenge thrillers McClanahan is interested in, but equally so to Homes’ novel. From the 
beginning, when Elaine and Paul try and fail to burn down their house deliberately, the 
couple evince an anxiety regarding what they may have earned—a poisoning of the 
traditional sense of earning a return as connoting the reward for a successful investment. 
This double meaning of ‘paying for’ as both economic transaction and punishment is 
evoked when Elaine worries that the couple deserve to go to jail, as she argues to Paul: ‘we 
have to pay for our mistakes’ (40). This double meaning returns again, towards the end of 
the novel, when Elaine contemplates the house: ‘she remembers the last time she was 
happy with the house. […] They hadn’t started to pay for it yet’ (245). Despite subscribing 
to the neoliberal ideal of home ownership and improvement as investment, Paul and 
Elaine’s assets have become poisoned, no longer signifying profit but instead unpaid debt.    
 
Both Homes’ and Franzen’s novels feature the repeated refrain of ‘warning signs’ that 
imbue each novel with an anxious foreboding. The Corrections begins with the metaphor of 
a ringing alarm bell, which in Gary’s section later translates into the subtle fluctuations in 
mental economy that foreshadow the character’s eventual crash. In Music for Torching a 
                                                          
22 Franco Moretti’s seminal work on genre, Signs Taken for Wonders: On the Sociology of Literary 
Forms, describes how horror ‘filters’ ideology through its generic conventions and tropes, both 
expressing but also masking a text’s politics.  
23 In this sense Homes’ novel is emblematic of the genre of the ‘suburban gothic.’ For more on this 
subgenre of suburban fiction see Dines and Vermeulen, The Suburban Gothic in American Popular 
Culture. Briefly, in Edgar Allen Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’ (1839), the physical house of 
Usher falls into disrepair in tandem with the decaying lineage of its inhabitants, the House of Usher, 
which collapses into a ferment of incest and interment. Like Walpole’s Castle of Otranto (1764) 
before it, Poe’s totalising vision yokes structural disrepair to subjective deterioration. As Dines and 
Vermeulen’s study demonstrates, in the late-twentieth century this literary conceit was transported 
to the suburbs, as a number of fictions sought to allegorise the spiritual decay of suburban living by 
detailing the structural disrepair of the suburban dwelling, leading to coining of the term ‘suburban 
gothic.’ 
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similar sense of anticipation pervades the novel. Alongside the anxiety each character 
displays regarding the moral debts of their behaviour—signified by the real debt of 
mortgaged property—the opening passage of the novel predicts how Elaine will ‘later […] 
regret’ hosting the dinner party that just precedes the beginning of the narrative. From this 
moment on, both Elaine and Paul consistently demonstrate a fluctuating and contradictory 
fear of both stasis and change: a fear, on the one hand, of being ‘stuck’, and a sense, on the 
other, of ‘impending disaster’ (173). Franzen’s narrative, as we have seen, ultimately 
‘corrects’ for this anxiety; for Homes, however, such resolutions are withheld. In the 
process, the structure of the novel (like the structure of the house) is marshalled by Homes 
in her critique of suburban financialisation in a way that it isn’t by Franzen, leading to a 
critique that ultimately draws attention not just to the subject of financialisation, but also 
to how financialisation operates at a systemic level.       
 
When Sammy is kidnapped and shot in the head by his friend Nate, this crisis comes 
seemingly at random at the end of the novel, as a kind of deus ex machina. On revisiting 
the novel, however, a reader may notice the warning signs that Homes liberally but subtly 
places throughout the text. Indeed, Sammy frequently tries to tell his parents of the vague 
and insidious situations that occur at his friend Nate’s: from him playing the rhino to Nate’s 
hunter in the school play, to his complaints of being forced to ‘do push-ups’ at a sleepover 
or calling his parents to request rescuing in the middle of the night. Yet Paul and Elaine are 
too narcissistically absorbed in their own lives to take notice of Sammy’s complaints. Even 
when the two adults are pushed to metaphysical observations, as when Paul makes his 
aforementioned remark whilst caught in a storm that ‘everything is happening at a strange 
pace. There is a sense of impending disaster’ (173), these implicit warning signs are 
ignored, the specific shape of the disaster remaining frustratingly undefined. When the 
disaster finally happens, Paul and Elaine find their perspectives properly reoriented. 
 
If Franzen’s novel structurally replicates a market correction, then, Homes’ by contrast 
embodies a cycle of crises. In her article ‘Investing in the Future’, McClanahan attempts to 
probe the gulf between the material and ideological realities of the 1990s. In doing so, she 
reveals the financial rhetoric of ‘investing in the future’ as an attempt to defer profit into 
an unspecified tomorrow, as a way also of deferring crisis. McClanahan asserts the critical 
urgency of ‘the observation that financialization not only forestall[s], but also foretells, a 
structural crisis’ (84). It is this foretelling which Homes’ novel seems to replicate: a first 
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crash (the fire) that warns of a greater crisis to come. In pursuing this structure Homes 
evokes a vision of finance’s function in the vein of Nikolai Kondratieff’s popular ‘wave-
theory’, which, as Paul Mason has recently demonstrated, began life not as a theory of 
‘waves’, but of ‘cycles’. For Kondratieff, the discourse of the cycle activates a valuable 
scientific sub-language: ‘of phases, states and their sudden alternation’ (Mason, 33). 
Kondratieff’s vision of cycles—of upswings and downswings, crises and recoveries—drew 
him to the attention of Stalin because it implied that capitalism would not, ultimately, fail. 
But as the financialisation of neoliberalism has flourished under the ideological blanket of 
capitalist realism, Kondratieff’s cycle theory comes to be more challenging to the system 
itself—which narrates a perpetual upswing—than to the possibilities of revolution it 
forecloses. Kondratieff’s theories have influenced the work of Giovanni Arrighi, who 
nevertheless rejects Kondratieff’s cycles in favour of the ‘systemic cycle,’ a broader model 
that ‘describe[s] and elucidate[s] the formation, consolidation, and disintegration of the 
successive regimes through which the capitalist world-economy has expanded’ (9-10). In 
Arrighi’s model, the end of an economic hegemon’s life cycle is marked by the primacy of 
financialisation. It is important to note, however, that unlike the first three powers to 
which Arrighi devotes attention in his account, the author observes that the current 
hegemonic reign of the US exhibits the hallmarks of decline but without the presence of a 
waiting successor. As such, the turn to financialisation—or more specifically, neoliberal 
financialisation—in the US economy, marked initially by the closing of the gold standard, 
heralds a terminal crisis in capitalism. 
 
The structure of Homes’ novel maps onto this long view of capitalism. While the repetitive 
behaviours of Homes’ subjects seems throughout the novel to foretell a cyclical pattern of 
collapsing and rebuilding, the shooting of Sammy and the novel’s abrupt closure suggests 
something terminal, the reaching of a figurative limit to the rhetoric of investing in the 
future heralded by the metaphor of the death of a child (a child, recalling Foucault, being a 
powerful image of investment both in the traditional financial sense and as a figure of 
human capital). As Paul and Elaine take off in a medical helicopter with the injured Sammy, 
Homes offers the following commentary:  
 they are up and away […] looking down on the familiar […] a crooked cartography 
[…] they are looking in on themselves from a peculiar perspective—everything in 
miniature, their lives made small. (357)  
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With this second crisis comes a sort of ‘telescoping’ of the couples’ life. Flying above the 
suburban geography, Paul and Elaine are made privy to the ‘crooked cartography’ of the 
planned community, the networks and patterns that form it but that are invisible from 
within. In this way, the narrative imitates diegetically the manoeuvre that is carried out at 
the formal level. The moment of terminal crisis, as I have already suggested, draws 
attention to the fragile temporality of the upswing cycle. This closure is dependent on the 
structure of the novel in line with Arrighi’s model of financialisation as a period of 
foretelling. Sammy’s injury represents the crisis moment to which financialisation is 
inevitably oriented and makes it visible, and like Paul and Elaine, it catapults the reader up 
a level, to a sudden awareness of the meta-structure, the ‘crooked cartography’, of the 
novel itself. Just as for the occupants of the helicopter, the lives of the novel’s characters 
are ‘made small’, superseded by the larger pattern the narrative enacts.24 In this way, 
Homes answers another of Carico and Orenstein’s questions, posed in the Radical History 
Review: ‘how do we narrate the repetitive cycles of capital?’ (9). 
 
As Sammy’s pressure begins to drop, Elaine addresses the final lines of the novel to Paul: 
‘Elaine looks at him. “It’s over,” she says.’ (358).  These final words are loaded with 
signification. ‘“It’s over”’ must first of all be understood to refer to the novel itself, a 
reading which further reinforces the sense that the cartography made visible in the final 
passages is not just that of suburbia, or of the financial system on which suburbia depends, 
but also of the text, too. The narrative of the couples’ ‘inner-lives’, always partially 
subsumed by the novel’s other preoccupations, is in its final moments indelibly effaced.  
Then, ‘“It’s over’” in a less figurative sense declares the death of Paul and Elaine’s marriage, 
the precariousness of which likely couldn’t survive the twin shocks of the death of a child 
and Elaine’s implied discovery, moments earlier, of Paul and Nate’s mother’s affair. These 
dual meanings—the line referring both to the personal dramas of the protagonists and to 
the formal qualities of the text—signal Homes’ awareness of the necessity to mediate: to 
write fiction that attends to the human, but that attends equally to the formal logics 
structuring the human lives; in this case, to the systemic qualities of financial capitalism. 
Key to Homes’ project is the idea of ‘making visible’ the illusions of financialisation by 
                                                          
24 Mary Holland concludes her reading of Music for Torching with what to me is a severe misreading 
of this ending. Holland first notes that she ‘can’t help but wish that Homes had stopped with [the] 
tenth neat and redemptive chapter’ (95), before then arguing that Sammy’s ‘death’ ‘bring[s] [Paul 
and Elaine] together over his dying body,’ ‘finally convert[ing] the parent’s indefinable lack into a 
specific and terrible loss they can grieve’ (93). Conversely, I contend that the closing chapter of 
Homes’ novel is essential to the cyclical narrative structure of the novel.  
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modelling the structure of her novel onto the systemic pattern of capitalism’s growth and 
decline in a way that reinforces, rather than undermines, the critical content of the text.  
 
 
Social Critique in John Keene’s Annotations 
 
 
McClanahan’s call for artworks capable of mediating between the systemic and the 
subjective demands a negotiation between a critique grounded in humanist subjectivity 
and a critique articulated via an anti-humanist formal play. The best examples of the 
attempt to narrate financialisation achieve a delicate balance between these two poles. In 
preface to the final text I will discuss, I want to return, momentarily, to Franzen’s Gary 
Lambert. If Gary’s suburban house and financialised life don’t qualify him sufficiently as a 
representative character of the 1990s, then his aforementioned status as a white patriarch 
surely does. The middle-class white male father, the ‘ideal’ suburban subject, underwent its 
own special crisis in the 1990s as the white male found themselves culturally (if not 
politically) decentered in favour of an increasingly popular identity politics that exalted 
queerness and difference. Emblematic of this shift was the Whitney Biennial, which in 1993 
played host to ‘a glorification of identity and difference, transgression, sex and sexuality, 
and the diminishing importance of the great white male’, encapsulated in the visitor 
badges, designed by Daniel Joseph Martinez, that displayed fragments of the sentence ‘I 
CAN’T / IMAGINE / EVER WANTING / TO BE / WHITE’ (Troy, 78). This crisis similarly 
percolated into the literature of the decade. In Do You Feel It Too? Nicoline Timmer reads 
Infinite Jest’s Hal Incandenza in the context of this ‘crisis of masculinity’—‘masculinity’, in 
this case, signifying a very specific white, patriarchal, heterosexual masculinity. Mark Storey 
reads the very different character of Patrick Bateman in Brett Easton Ellis’ 1991 novel 
American Psycho as reacting to a cultural crisis in which ‘the rise of the marginalized 
threatens his central position as hegemonic male’ (Storey, 64.). Citing several other 
examples of 1990s texts that deal with this crisis, texts like American Beauty and Magnolia 
(both 1999 and both, significantly, suburban narratives), Timmer notes that such texts 
tapped into a specific feeling ‘that a certain group lacked a constructive way to approach 
their identity’:  
 The white, heterosexual, middle or upper middle class, Western male was the 
 implicit ‘center identity’, if we could call it that, in contrast with which “marginal 
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 identities” were construed. In a  sense the identity of white western males had thus 
 for a long time been viewed mostly in negative terms.’ (137) 
Franzen’s Gary is another archetypal character in this vein, but as with the novel’s 
complicated negotiation with neoliberalism, it is unclear whether Gary’s complaint is 
shared with, or satirised by, Franzen—an ambiguity that many suburban narratives share.  
 
In White Diaspora, Catherine Jurca notes that the classic suburban narrative produced by 
the likes of Ford, Yates, and Cain, can fundamentally be understood as a narrative of 
‘complaint.’ That is, these novels lament the ‘affective dislocation’ suffered by their white, 
male, suburban-dwelling characters, who are commonly described as ‘spiritually and 
culturally impoverished by prosperity’ in what amounts to a literary ‘fantasy of 
victimisation’ (6). This observation is similarly recorded in Hoberek’s work, when he 
observes that the newly proletarianized middle class of the mid-century translates their 
loss of property ‘into narratives of individual dispossession that enforce its cultural 
dominance rather than seeking a potentially more useful affiliation with those already 
outside the magic circle of capital’ (32). The consistent focus on the woes of these 
patriarchal figures complements non-fiction narratives of suburbia. As Rachael Waldoff 
notes in her study of race and suburbia,  
 many anecdotal stories of white flight conclude when whites make their mass 
exodus from a neighbourhood. […] It is assumed that what will transpire is known: 
the inevitable, clear-cut, neighbourhood racial change “death spiral.” (213) 
In fact, Waldoff notes, ‘rapid white flight often creates conditions that lead to a later phase 
of black flight’ (ibid.). John Keene’s short novel Annotations (1995) narrates precisely this 
‘black flight,’ functioning as a corrective to the overwhelming dearth of accounts of 
suburban living that incorporate a consideration of race. While the eponymous 
‘annotations’ of which the novel consists may be understood to refer to Keene’s 
commentary on his own early life, the novel can also be read as an ‘annotation’ to the 
standard narrative of white flight, which tracks the exodus of the white fliers into suburbia 
without considering the impact on the territories from which they flee, or the stories of 
those who follow.  
 
Keene’s novel is a highly experimental narrative of the author’s own coming of age from 
birth to college, punctuated by aphoristic encounters with a variety of opinionated 
characters, and peppered with observations on the condition of growing up black and 
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working class in a central St Louis neighbourhood afflicted by white flight, and his family’s 
attempts to follow in the trail of the white emigres to suburbia. The eighty-something page 
novella is structured in three parts, each part divided into shorter sections with 
confounding titles like ‘A FATHOMING BENEATH A FLOURISH OF NOTES, AN EXEGESIS’ (37). 
Each of these sections tells an anecdote or anecdotes from Keene’s youth, and together 
they are assembled into a roughly chronological tale that traces Keene’s family’s passage 
from the inner city to the suburbs. The narrative begins with the birth of ‘another Negro 
child’ to working class parents. From there, we hear of Keene’s early childhood, his school 
life as a gifted but unpopular child, until the narrative closes as he attempts to gain entry to 
Harvard. Beyond this quite skeletal narrative, the novel is remarkable for the way in which 
Keene blends his account of the everyday with a keen eye for the theoretical stakes of 
transposing this material into narrative, and a lyrical style that foregrounds the 
transformation of life into literature. As Colson Whitehead observes in his 1995 review of 
the novel, Annotations is fundamentally a novel about ‘becoming,’ and about finding a 
voice somehow liberated from ‘parental admonitions, the codes of the black bourgeoisie, 
and societal double-talk.’ Such ‘becoming’ is evident throughout the text, as for example 
when Keene translates a parental invective to eat his greens into a burst of poetic lyricism: 
‘“Clear the peas off your plate, please,” achieved with the aim to appease’ (47). The novel is 
bursting with wordplay, unusual verbosity, theoretical digressions and philosophical 
musings, all of which serve to foreground the mediation of the autobiographical matter of 
Keene’s life into prose in such a way that it is this transformation, and the act of narrating, 
that becomes the central drama of the text.  
 
Keene’s airy wordplay and self-reflexive digressions are anchored, however, to a very 
concrete account of the material conditions of his upbringing. At the beginning of the 
novel, Keene’s family are based in the St. Louis neighbourhood of Walnut Park, where 
‘brick houses as uniform as Monopoly props lined the lacework of streets for miles’ (2), in a 
compelling image that yokes the urban house to the ruthless acquisitiveness of the 
capitalist ‘game.’ The narration flits between optimism and retrospection, as Keene 
juxtaposes the beliefs of the family on their arrival with his own recollections of the 
neighbourhood’s decline: 
 A home in which to watch the seasons pass, to grow old within a chosen 
“community.” Now names of most neighbours have shifted past his consciousness 
like afternoon shadows across the living room floor. Everyone, except the 
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neighbours, marvelled at the size of the basement. Then no one used heroin 
because they lacked for “family values.” (4-5)  
As the author of an autofictional novel, Keene occupies the unique roles of both subject 
and narrator, and as such is able to blur together temporally distinct viewpoints to create a 
patchwork voice of simultaneous boosterism and pessimism. Both of these rhetorics are 
couched in economic terms. Keene describes the ‘haemorrhage’ of whites from the 
neighbourhood and the attendant ‘unravelling’ of his family’s ‘internal social fabric,’ 
marked by the ‘creditors calling night and day’ (30). While narratives of white flight of the 
sort described by Jurca and Waldoff describe a rush into credit as an investment in one’s 
future, Keene’s account of those left behind tells a contrasting tale of debt’s true effect.  
 
The reality of creditors calling provides an abrupt rejoinder to the dominant discourse of 
financialisation. Unlike the Lamberts and Weiss’s of Franzen and Homes, for whom the 
promises of economic financialisation have at least been realised, Keene’s family buy into a 
rhetoric that, Keene implies, proves false. One of the competing discourses around which 
Keene must negotiate in his process of ‘becoming’ is the neoliberal rhetoric of financial 
betterment. A repeated refrain of the novel becomes the notion, first introduced on page 
four as the family choose their house in Walnut Park, that Keene’s black, working class 
family ‘quite naturally assumed that they, like others who worked for a living, would 
eventually own their own property’ (4). This refrain is repeated again in part two, when the 
source of the assumption is identified as ‘the TV families’ (26), and in part three, when the 
family eventually complete their ‘black flight’ to the suburb, it is repeated again:  
 No one, you understand, carped at the size of the downpayment, since it was 
assumed that they would eventually own their own property. Ignorance is 
incapable of concealing itself. (51) 
Beyond the accusation of ‘ignorance’ that Keene levels at this assumption, the beliefs of his 
family are never categorically proven wrong. Rather, Keene allows the reworked syntax of 
his refrain to implicitly undermine the logic of financialisation, which promotes a colour-
blind faith in home-ownership to potential suburbanites. As Jurca has observed, the reality 
for black families looking to move into the suburbs is that they faced (and still face) a series 
of racist and exclusionary laws and practices designed to put white residents at a 
permanent ‘economic and social advantage’ over non-whites (6).   
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Like Homes and Franzen, Keene tells a tale of urban and then suburban living that strongly 
implicates financialisation. What makes Keene’s novel particularly distinctive, however, is 
the way in which he tells this tale. When Franzen can be understood to provide a subjective 
critique of financialisation marshalled through his portrayal of Gary, and Homes develops 
an account of suburbia that draws away from the subject to lay emphasis on the structural 
qualities of financialisation, Keene’s novel does something quite different again. One of 
Keene’s most experimental techniques in the novel is his play with subjectivity. Another 
repeated refrain in the novel, commenting on the idea of ‘the subject,’ makes clear Keene’s 
ambitions in this area. When describing the way in which summer heatwaves gather ‘every 
living and inanimate thing in [their] folds,’ Keene remarks that this ‘entails no notion of the 
“subject”’ (7). When, later, he describes the epidemic of drug and alcohol addiction that 
grips the neighbourhood post-white flight, Keene modifies his observation, calling this time 
on a ‘decentered’ notion of the subject. Many more fluctuations abound in the novel, and 
these complement Keene’s problematisation of his own position as subject and narrator of 
the narrative. As many critics have noted, Keene’s novel is an example of autofiction—
Colson Whitehead, for example, calls it an ‘improv memoir’—but the autofictional element 
of Keene’s text is complicated by a constant flux of pronouns and narrative voices.25 
Consider the proliferation of pronouns in this short section in which Keene describes his 
victimisation at the hands of schoolyard bullies (italics added for emphasis): 
 He learned to create small diversions for himself […] as he crumpled near the 
swingset like a ravelling, forgotten husk-doll. One option proposed seriously was 
that of skipping a grade, though they feared that might warp her emotional 
development. In other words, neither parent had expected such a fragile character. 
[…] Neither Bolivia nor Paraguay has an ocean port, you learned from 
encyclopedias at the great-aunt’s house. (20-21) 
Yo-yoing between pronouns and persons, Keene builds up precisely the ‘decentered’ 
notion of subjecthood he observes as appropriate for his account, refusing to alight on a 
single organising consciousness around which the novel can cohere.   
 
This subjectlessness is described as both a condition of, and response to, the 
marginalisation of black lives in suburbia, just as white suburban fiction both critiques, but 
                                                          
25 For other references to Keene’s text as autofiction see Harold Augenbraum, who calls the novel a 
‘disguised autobiographical narrative’; Brian Evenson, who refers to Annotations as a ‘pseudo-
biography’; and Philip Gambone, who less ambiguously labels Keene’s effort a straightforward 
‘autobiographical novel.’  
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also risks contributing to, the complaint of cultural impoverishment by prosperity. As 
symptom, Keene frames the decentering as an impact of attempting to integrate into the 
white world of suburbia. He notes with vitriol the way his family try to associate with a 
‘bourgie crowd’ when they move to suburbia, despite still holding ‘menial jobs’ (65). Of his 
own attempt to gain entrance to Harvard in the ‘new climate of conservatism’ heralded by 
the election of Reagan, Keene observes that ‘the strain of our ruse quite rightly blinded us, 
until we lost sight of who we were’ (76). In this sense, Keene corrects for the ‘loss of sight’ 
with his own project of making visible, in this case illuminating the overwhelming whiteness 
of contemporary accounts of suburbia—the other fictions in this chapter included.  
 
Keene’s loss of sense of himself as individual is reframed, in the final, explanatory pages of 
the novel, as something to be harnessed creatively even as it is mourned personally. Earlier 
in the novel, Keene remarks that his pursuit of fashion—wearing the ‘coolest picks […] 
upright in our afros like coxcombs’—signified a ‘desire to be seen [and] an attempt to 
escape alterity, […] to shift from the margins to the centre’ (27). At the close of the novel, 
Keene scales up his ambitions from the personal to the political, to locate his ‘personal 
development within the broader historical record.’ He cites his ability to do this in the 
accounts he has recorded, ‘set down as carefully as tesseracts […] gradually melded, 
gathered shape, solidified.’ Keene finally recognises that he has ‘accomplished […] the 
construction of an actual voice’ (78). In this sense, dissolving the individual voices—the ‘he,’ 
‘she,’ ‘they,’ and ‘you’ of the narrative—into a collective group becomes another way of 
narrating his experience. Given the notion that the suburb, far from being a social space, is 
in fact an individualistic one, Annotations reads as a rebuttal to the dismantling of society 
by fracturing the author’s subjectivity into a collective as a means of writing a sort of 
‘choral’ critique. Rather than subtracting from the humanistic, as Homes does, Keene 
multiplies it, unifying his experience under the umbrella of an entire demographic’s 
experience—precisely what ‘white narratives’ of suburbia, desperate to resist rather than 
embrace their own subject’s decentering, are unable to do.  
 
Formally, Keene’s narrative experimentation also represents a wholesale rejection of the 
realist aesthetic which has dominated the genre of suburban fiction and which, as Hoberek, 
McClanahan and others have demonstrated, also reinforces the ideologies of 
financialisation. But Keene’s challenging, elliptic style does not therefore represent an 
unproblematic disavowal of the discourse of financialisation. In Hoberek’s account, the fact 
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that mid-century authors of suburban fiction revolt against modernist experimentation as 
the representation of an ossified bureaucratic system says less about modernism as a 
specific target as about the way in which any literary form can become the avatar of a 
social institution. Thus, the rejection of those institutions shifts importance from ‘the 
lineaments of style itself to the act of opposing the previous style (any style)’ (Hoberek, 24). 
What is problematic in this act of revolt is that,  
 While postwar authors’ engagement with stylistic innovation thus links their work 
to the transformation of the middle class, it does not necessarily constitute a 
politically desirable response to this transformation. On the contrary, the 
inherently individual and formal nature of such stylistic interventions necessarily 
forecloses the sorts of collective struggle and organization that a political response 
to the transformation of mental labor would call for. (24-25) 
Keene’s novel, interestingly, both succumbs to and avoids this pitfall. Stylistically, Keene’s 
adoption of a cluster of modernist hallmarks—Hemingway’s minimalism, Stein’s 
wordplay—doesn’t seem to signify anything politically. However, when one considers that 
Keene’s enigmatic, episodic style most closely resembles Jean Toomer’s Cane (1923), it 
becomes apparent that Keene is consciously drawing on a legacy of specifically African 
American modernism in his work. Furthermore, the manner of his rejection of realism and 
his commitment also to a choral form that deemphasises his role as the individualised 
author rejects the image of the petulant rebel, reopening the possibility for ‘collective 
struggle’ desired by Hoberek.  
 
To return finally to the notion of spatial and temporal ‘fixes’ central to the logic of 
financialisation, Keene rewrites the utopian rhetoric of ‘investing in the future’ by 
introducing racial experiences of debt and refused credit into the narrative. The dual 
temporality of the text, made possible by the autofictional status of the narrative, allows 
Keene at once to imitate and undermine a rhetoric of financialisation that promotes 
economic autonomy through home ownership, and to make visible the aftermath of the 
flourishing of suburbia on the inner-city neighbourhoods abandoned in the rush to escape 
to the periphery. Keene’s own focus on ‘shift[ing] from the margins to the centre’ reverses 
this trajectory, shifting the decaying and de-industrialised urban cores back into the 
foreground of his account of black flight, much as McClanahan argues for a 
reacknowledgement of the newly industrialised Global South in a larger account of 
globalised financialisation. And as is essential according to McClanahan and others, it is 
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Keene’s formal play in the form of his ‘choral’ critique that allows the novel to meaningfully 
resist the dominant discourses this chapter has discussed, reintroducing a sense of the 
social into a space infected by the Thatcherite ideology of the primacy of the individual and 
the family.   
 
Suburban narratives produced in the 1990s harness the suburbs’ imbrication in the 
phenomenon of financialisation as a means of making concrete a critique of an ordinarily 
abstract phenomenon. Each novelist responds to the challenge of representing 
financialisation in a different way: by narrating the impact of financialisation on the 
everyday life of the individual subject, by structurally transcribing the ‘true’ patterns 
financial rhetoric attempts to occlude, or by drawing attention to aporias in the utopian 
logic of investing in the future. That each fiction is suburban is no coincidence, as the 
suburban space both contains the financialised subject and itself embodies the rewards 
promised by the ideology of increased returns. In each case, these narratives kick over the 
barbecue in the backyard (in Homes’ terms) and set alight to the myth of financialisation, 
though none, of course, can raze this house to the ground.  
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Chapter 4: Abject Art 
 
 
‘A backwards reflection of itself’: The George Miles Cycle 
 
 
As Dennis Cooper himself tells it, the author produced and published the five novels that 
comprise the George Miles Cycle between 1989 and 2000. The novels, chronologically, are 
Closer, Frisk, Try, Guide, and Period. Together, they form a memorial to George Miles, a 
formative figure from the author’s past. Cooper conceived of the novels as a tribute to 
George, whom he first met when he was fifteen and George was twelve. They became 
friends and eventually lovers but fell out of contact when Cooper moved to Holland in 1985 
to begin work on Closer. Unbeknownst to him, Miles committed suicide in 1987, shortly 
before Cooper returned to the US. For ten years Cooper worked on the cycle, finding out 
only after the publication of Guide in 1997 that Miles had died before even the first novel 
had been published. Devastated, Cooper resolved to finish the cycle, and published the 
final novel, Period, in 2000. 
 
The George Miles Cycle revolves around a central, essential contradiction: in his own 
words, Cooper’s ‘unqualified love and support for George Miles’ and his ‘unqualified 
fascination with the sexual fantasy of possessing, exploring, and destroying young men like 
him’ (Cooper, ‘DC on…’). To elucidate this contradiction, Cooper developed a complex dual 
structural conceit for the cycle: on the one hand, the cycle would ‘take the form of a novel 
being gradually dismembered to nothing’, whilst parallel to this dismemberment would be 
‘a mirrored structure where the first novel would seem to gradually move through a mirror 
and eventually, over the course of the cycle, become a backwards reflection of itself.’ 
Within this premise, Cooper mapped out a structure in which Closer would make the 
opening gambit, constructing the themes, archetypes, subjects, style, and atmosphere of 
the cycle. Each of the middle three books would provide a concentrated surgical dissection 
of a single facet of Cooper’s response to his subject: first libidinal, then emotional, then 
cerebral. The final novel would present what remained, ‘creating Closer’s decimated, 
resolved twin’ (ibid.).  
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But perhaps all of the above ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, part of 
Cooper’s project is the shattering of the boundaries between the real and the fictional, to 
the extent that any commentary wrought by the author on his own works must be 
considered at best suspect, if not a deliberate extension of the cycle’s fictionality into the 
‘real world’. Such elisions of meaning abound throughout Cooper’s novels. In Guide, for 
example, when Mason meets the fictional bass player Alex Johns of the fictional band 
Smear outside his apartment, the amoral Mason capitalises on the chance encounter. He 
drugs Johns with rohypnol and fucks him ‘harder than he’d fucked anyone in his life’ (91). 
Cooper makes little effort to hide Alex Johns’ resemblance to Alex James, real bass player 
of the real band Blur. In real life, this elision earned Cooper a burst of infamy when Guide 
was first published. After reading the novel, Alex James famously expressed a desire to 
meet Cooper, only to fearfully back out of the arranged interview at the last minute. 
Meanwhile the fictional Dennis who narrates Guide shares his own remarkable similarities 
with the author. Both are novelists and occasional journalists, and Dennis’ fictional 
moments of autobiography echo Cooper’s various admissions in interviews and online. 
Even the synopsis on the book’s rear cover gestures towards a conflation of the two figures 
when it indicates that the narrator’s voice ‘may be construed as the author’s own.’ When 
Dennis successfully convinces his (unrequited) love Luke to move in with him, this blurring 
(or smearing) of identities is complicated further. When Luke tells his friends of his plans to 
move they warn him against Dennis, their fears grounded in Dennis’ novels. ‘“Have you 
read them?”’ Coffee asks Luke. ‘“They’re all about serial murderers. And all the victims are 
boys. And all the boys look like you”’ (155).  
 
Cooper displays a clear disinterest in upholding the strict ontological boundaries of his 
texts, mobilising, like Acker, Hustvedt, Kraus and Keene, the autofiction form throughout 
the cycle. This formal play renders the texts both inscrutable and compelling, his willingly 
offered paratextual information only enhancing this effect further. Like the itinerant youths 
of Cooper’s novels, readers of the cycle find themselves stranded in the hinterlands of 
Cooper’s world, adrift in the suburbs of meaning. This is the space in which Cooper’s fiction 
flourishes. The author’s purposeful elisions deliberately erode solid footholds in the text, 
frustrate interpretation, and block identification. They create a strange space, marginal, 
liquid, full of unstable identities and inconstant ontologies: a liminal space for a liminal 
decade. Anthropologist Victor Turner theorised liminality as a property of interim spaces 
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that function as sites of recuperation, as ‘escape valve[s]’ or ‘exhaust[s]’ for ‘pent-up, taboo 
and impermissible acts […] rituals, [things] that need to be addressed in the culture, but 
aren’t addressed in any other way’ (qtd. in McCarthy, 28). To read Cooper is to enter, 
through the escape valve of the body, into such a space.  
 
Critical work carried out on Cooper is, to date, admittedly limited, and often confines itself 
to familiar territory. Cooper’s strange space has been mapped in relation to its aesthetics, 
its philosophical implications, its subcultural and identitarian affiliations, and most 
frequently in regard to its lineage, wherein Cooper’s debts are traced back to everything 
from French avant-gardists like de Sade, Lautreamont, and Bataille, to the Southern Gothic, 
to Black Mountain College. Despite Cooper’s own insistence that his ‘politics were involved 
in the aesthetic of the cycle’, however, little critical work has been published on the politics 
of Cooper’s novels. James Annesley, for example, has attempted to ‘contextualise Cooper’, 
but he tantalisingly leaves the project of tying Cooper’s aesthetic of ‘placelessness [to the] 
conditions of globalisation’ (77) as work for another day.  
 
This chapter picks up where Annesley leaves off. Taking as my cue Cooper’s fascination 
with the abject, I read Cooper’s cycle in the light of Julia Kristeva’s classic study Powers of 
Horror. Complementing Kristeva’s politicised vision of abjection as an invocation of the Real 
in the face of a seamless Symbolic Order, I employ Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism to 
delineate the politics of Cooper’s aesthetics. Far from a unique case-study, this chapter also 
reads Cooper’s work alongside several of his contemporaries in the worlds of art and 
filmmaking. In an essay from which this chapter takes its inspiration, art critic Hal Foster 
observes in the American art scene of the 1990s ‘a general culture of abjection’ (24), and 
an accompanying politics of alterity ‘pushing towards nihility’ (27).1 This is the cultural 
climate into which Cooper’s words emerge, and they find many reflections in the art and 
film of his contemporaries, including filmmaker Gregg Araki and artists Paul McCarthy and 
Cindy Sherman. All of these figures use an abject aesthetic to articulate a political critique. 
                                                          
1 This culture of abjection, and its equally virulent opposition in the form of senator Jesse Helms’ 
jeremiad against the National Endowment for the Arts, spawned the first of many celebrations of 
the abject and the objectionable in the decade: artist-cum-curator Joseph Kusuth’s 1990 exhibition 
The Brooklyn Museum Collection: The Play of the Unmentionable. Two years later, the 1992 
Whitney Museum Biennale helped ‘set America’s cultural agenda’ for the 1990s with an ‘angry, edgy 
grotesque burlesque of eighty-two artists, with gays and minorities heavily represented, asserting 
difference, assailing sensibilities, flaunting their bodies and body parts, revelling in the emissions and 
secretions’ (Troy, 78). Following these early events, many more celebrations of the abject followed 
suit throughout the 1990s.  
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Their works play complex aesthetic games designed to invert hierarchies and subvert 
structures, to celebrate artistic creation and denigrate commodity production, and 
ultimately to sketch out a space autonomous to contemporary culture, in which 
philosophical inquiry and transgressive desire may be exercised free from repression or 
constraint. 
 
While each novel in Cooper’s cycle dismembers the last, as Wayne Kostenbaum has 
observed, ‘the second book [also] eats the first: the relation of text to text, is orgiastically 
cannibalistic’ (189). In this sense, each text consumes the previous and converts it into 
energy, fuelling the forward momentum of the cycle. A chronological analysis ought then to 
follow suit. The chapter thus begins with Cooper’s early novels Closer and Frisk, which set 
the stakes for abject art in the 1990s, both dramatising its potential and formalising its 
limitations. With these stakes established, I move on to a critical inquiry into the projects of 
Araki, McCarthy, and Sherman, respectively. Finally, I turn back to Cooper, to bookend the 
chapter. Cooper’s latter novels in the cycle both suture shut Cooper’s abject experiment, 
and at the same time celebrate the unique capabilities of the abject as demonstrated by his 
contemporaries.  
 
Ultimately, I intend to claim that abjection―like the other terms this thesis engages 
with―is, to borrow Hal Foster’s terminology, both a predicament and a strategy. Evolving 
in the wake of a postmodern scepticism towards authentic meaning, abject art attempts to 
move through postmodernism towards a post-postmodern position that incorporates the 
limitations of expression without succumbing to them. The various convergences of 
postmodernism and neoliberalism have been well documented in recent years and covered 
elsewhere in this thesis, and this chapter continues to concern itself with art attempting to 
negotiate the intersection of these aesthetic and political projects, respectively. The abject, 
as an aesthetic, stages many of the concerns I have argued are typical of the 1990s: an (at 
best) ambivalence towards affect, an enthusiasm for formal play, a self-reflexivity 
necessitated by preceding postmodern intervention, and a political antipathy to 
neoliberalism that manifests at both a thematic and formal level. Ultimately, the politics of 
abjection are derived from the reciprocal relationship that abject art stages with its reader. 
In the liminal space between a politics of anti-neoliberalism and an aesthetics of abjection, 
the texts discussed in this chapter find their home.  
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‘I think I was after perfection’: Closer 
 
 
The George Miles cycle begins with Closer (1989). Cooper’s novel introduces the tone, 
themes, and philosophical preoccupations of the cycle, as well as its eponymous central 
figure, George Miles. In Cooper’s schema, the novel presents the ‘body’ of the project prior 
to its dismemberment and pre-cannibalisation. The narrative of Closer focuses on the 
character of George and the milieu of disaffected, gay, suburban-dwelling teenagers to 
whom he is variously an object of infatuation, obsession, and abuse. Each chapter is 
dedicated to a different character in George’s orbit: John, a punk and an amateur artist 
obsessed with capturing George in sketch; David, a delusional teen who wavers between 
the reality of his school life and a fantasy world in which he is a famous popstar; Alex, an 
aspiring porn director; Cliff, another of George’s sexual partners; and Pierre. Two chapters 
on George punctuate this array. In the first, George meets Pierre, and the two engage in an 
abject sexual and scatological relationship. In the second, Pierre introduces George to the 
serial killer Tom. George confusedly submits to Tom, who mutilates but refuses to kill 
George when, during the act, George reveals his reluctance to die. The novel finally closes 
with Steve, who embarks on a tentative relationship with George despite his now scarred 
physical appearance.  
 
In Steve’s chapter, the eponymous character opens a club in his parents’ garage. On one of 
the club nights, David is killed when a car crashes through a wall into the club. Witnessing 
David’s death prompts in Steve a revelation of sorts. His awkward attempts to articulate 
this newfound self-knowledge—in the stumbling, slacker-teen-patois typical of Cooper’s 
novels—draw Closer to a close: 
It’s like this: I think I was after perfection, but wouldn’t admit it. […] I had this 
dualistic thing going on in my head, loving George―a mess―and wanting David―a 
perfect mess. I was a lot more confused than I let on. This sounds crazy, I know, but 
when I saw David there with his insides exposed, the perfection thing uglified. Is 
that a word? I mean, perfection’s like God. It only works if you want it to badly 
enough, or… Shit, I’m all tangled up.  
I’ll try again. (128) 
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With the ‘perfect mess’ uglified, Steve can accept the straightforward ‘mess’ of George, 
and George’s mutilated ass: ‘I can look at it now, like you can look at a horror film’ (128). 
This revelatory moment discloses the central preoccupation of Closer: the dialectic 
between surface and depth; or between a kind of formal, superficial beauty and a disguised 
grotesque. Appropriate to Cooper’s intentions for the novel-as-body, Closer exhibits a 
fascination with the visceral, sticky materiality of guts, and of the truth they conceal. Early 
on, John observes how George is really ‘just skin wrapped around some grotesque-looking 
stuff’ (7). Later, David describes himself—prophetically—as ‘a bunch of blue tubes inside a 
skin wrapper’ (22). In both cases these observations juxtapose an implicitly false reality 
situated at the skin-level—David’s belief that he is ‘famous for […] being gorgeous’ (22), 
John’s romanticising of ‘warm […] familiar’ (7) George—with the truth of ‘what everyone 
actually is,’ i.e. guts, gore. When Steve is faced with David’s insides ‘pushed through some 
holes in his shirt, blue and greasy and jumbled’ (127), the illusion is broken, the 
accompanying revelation given an air of transcendence by Steve’s conflation of perfection 
with God.    
 
Closer’s obsession with the body, and especially with the moments in which the smooth 
perfection of the skin is breached, is an integral feature of the abject aesthetic of Cooper’s 
cycle. In Julia Kristeva’s seminal Powers of Horror, Kristeva ruminates on the abject in all its 
incarnations: the skin on a glass of milk, the psychic shock of the holocaust, and the corpse, 
whose presence is ‘the utmost abjection’ (4). These things ‘disturb identity, system, order,’ 
and disrespect ‘borders, positions, [and] rules’ (4). Abjection marks the eruption of the Real 
into everyday life and the rupturing of Lacan’s Symbolic Order, the ‘social world of linguistic 
communication, intersubjective relations, knowledge of ideological conventions, and the 
acceptance of the law’ (Dino). When Steve sees David’s guts, no longer held in order by his 
skin but a ‘blue and greasy and jumbled’ mess, he experiences this eruption of the Real, 
and it profoundly alters his worldview. Faced with the abject, he is at once repelled and 
absorbed, newly looking—‘like you look at a horror movie’—at George’s abject ass.   
 
Steve’s response confirms Kristeva’s theory that what is abject is also perversely 
compelling―that abjection is limned with the sublime. Our relationship to the abject is one 
of constant struggle, in which ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ for Kristeva, ‘push each other away, 
confront each other, collapse, and start again―inseparable, contaminated, condemned, at 
the boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable’ (18). It is here at this boundary that ‘great 
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modern literature unfolds’ (18). The works of Lautreamont, Artaud, and Celine are 
celebrated by Kristeva for their function as wounds or temporary transgressions, portals 
that blurs the boundaries of subject and object. These works ‘keep open the wound’ rent in 
the Symbolic Order, a wound into which a reader may ‘enter […] into the analytic 
adventure’ (27). This adventure rewards the intrepid reader with a cathartic self-knowledge 
of the sort experienced by Steve: a sudden awareness of the Symbolic Order, of the 
constructedness of everyday life, of the ‘uglified’ Real latent behind perfection.  
 
‘[U]glified. Is that a word?’, Steve asks. The stumbling hesitancy with which Steve narrates 
his revelation is emblematic of Cooper’s prose, a stilted cocktail of teenage slang, ellipses, 
semi-vocal utterances, and half-finished sentences. Failed instances of communication 
punctuate the novel. John declares ‘“my portraits speak for themselves”’ rather than 
explain his work to an assembly (6); teenage infatuations go unrequited or are 
consummated with a lacklustre, awkward fumble; and at the novel’s climax, George 
misinterprets the murderous Tom’s intentions to devastating effect. All of which points to 
Cooper’s abiding preoccupation with the inadequacy of language as a communicative form. 
This anxiety spills over into the text of Closer itself, which Cooper positions as a flawed and 
limited container for his complex libidinal desires. To take Cooper at his word and read 
Closer as a tribute to the ‘real’ George Miles is to be faced with a monument perpetually 
crumbling at the foundations. 
 
Our first introduction to George comes as he offers to sit for John, the punk-turned-sketch-
artist with whom Closer opens: 
One afternoon a sophomore name George Miles took a seat in John’s bedroom and 
tried not to blink. He’d looked cute, maybe even a little too cute, across the school 
cafeteria but one-on-one he twitched and trembled so much he made John think of 
a badly tuned hologram. John tried to draw but George was already ruined without 
his help. (4) 
By the end of the novel, this ‘badly tuned hologram’ is already fading out. When Steve 
sleeps with George in the last few pages, George’s post-coitus form is described by Steve as 
‘facedown […] like he’s dead or has left his nude body idling in my room’ (123). Throughout 
the novel George flickers in and out of existence, eluding representation by John’s pencil 
and Cooper’s prose alike. For Kristeva, the ‘utmost abjection’ of the corpse is owed not to 
its appearance but to its signification. A fresh corpse and a rotten one are equally abject: 
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they are both ‘death infecting life.’ Their symbolic power derives not from their rotting 
flesh but from their status as both human and not-human, as ‘the in-between, the 
ambiguous, the composite’ (4). For Kristeva, ‘abjection is above all ambiguity’ (9), and if 
ambiguity is the key register of abjection, then it is George who of all Cooper’s subjects has 
the strongest claim to the abject.  
 
Cooper’s self-transposition into John―each trying and failing to adequately capture the 
essence of George―marks the first in a long and increasingly intricate series of meta-
textual manoeuvres performed by the cycle. With George’s elusiveness Cooper both 
performs and comments upon abjection as an aesthetic strategy. The breached body, in 
Kristeva’s text, is symbolic of a breached social order. David’s ruptured body, read through 
Kristeva, is a metaphor for a ruptured Symbolic Order of laws and ideological conventions. 
Steve’s exposure to the abject and the illusions it shatters models the eruption of the Real 
into the ideologically mediated reality of superficial high school sexual politics. When 
Kristeva expounds upon the abject, wound-opening literature of Lautreamont, Rimbaud, 
etc., she implies that abject art may have the same effect. But here Kristeva and Cooper 
diverge. For Cooper, abjection once removed—in the representations of the artist—is 
abjection compromised: a belief encapsulated in the text’s struggle to contain George.2  
 
Steve’s experience in the text fractures the smooth surface of the Symbolic Order like a car 
to a soft body, granting Steve an experience of catharsis as only abjection can provide. But 
the Real that Steve apprehends remains elusive to Cooper, ultimately collapsing the text. In 
the final lines of the novel, Steve decides to sleep with George again. Before he does, 
however, he has to ‘cross the room, [and] switch off the lights.’ The novel closes with his 
final observation: ‘it’s really black in here’ (131). This last line neatly unifies the diegetic and 
extra-diegetic manifestations of the dialectic of surface and depth, Symbolic Order and 
Real. As the novel fades to black, Steve censors the horror of George’s appearance. At the 
same time, the structural prerequisites of the novel form―the need for an ending―sutures 
                                                          
2 In a chapter contributed towards his co-edited collection Dennis Cooper: Writing at the Edge, 
Danny Kennedy notes how George ‘tests and degrades’ the novel, how Cooper’s text ‘buckles and is 
violated’ when it tries to represent him (79). For Kennedy, Cooper’s work embodies a ‘structurally 
compromised attempt […] to narrate experiences and manifestations of excess’, such as ‘sex or 
death’ (72). The auto-commentary implicit in Cooper’s faltering descriptions of George—and the 
character’s subsequent disappearance from the cycle, to be replaced by a series of substitute 
characters—as well Closer’s stumbling, ill-articulated prose, point to this structural compromise.  
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closed the wound momentarily opened by Cooper. The Symbolic Order reasserts itself over 
the Real. The ‘analytic adventure’ is brought prematurely to an end.  
 
 
‘Still, you can see the fingerprints’: Frisk 
 
 
Justifying Cooper’s significant presence in a thesis on political art in the 1990s is, at first 
glance, a hard sell. But Cooper’s cycle does important work in the decade through its use 
and complication of abjection. The abject’s challenge to the Symbolic Order suggests of the 
aesthetic an implicitly political dimension, a politics which fuelled a slew of abject work in 
the 1990s, from the art of Cindy Sherman and Paul McCarthy to the films of Gregg Araki 
and the ‘queercore’ movement. These artists pursue an implicitly political project, one that 
takes advantage of abjection’s political aesthetics in the face of the near-impenetrable 
ideology of neoliberalism. Capitalist realism’s colonisation of the ‘horizons of the 
thinkable’—encapsulated in Jameson’s famous claim that ‘it is easier to imagine the end of 
the world than the end of capitalism’—necessitates a turn in the decade towards ‘indirect’ 
political strategies: an art that manifests its politics aesthetically rather than polemically. 
Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism narrates neoliberalism’s project of the 1990s to naturalise 
a ‘business ontology’ such that it appears ‘simply obvious’ that everything in society 
conform to a business model of operation (17). His account of capitalist realism as a 
‘pervasive atmosphere’ that conditions not only the production of culture, but that acts ‘as 
a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action,’ is self-admittedly Lacanian, and 
makes clear the suitability of abjection as an artistic register for the decade. The 
‘ideological conventions’ that define Lacan’s Symbolic Order, kicked into overdrive by 
neoliberalism’s naturalising project, generate the ‘ideologically mediated’ reality of 
capitalism realism. In the face of this reality, Fisher offers a suitably Lacanian solution:  
For Lacan, the Real is what any ‘reality’ must suppress; indeed, reality constitutes 
itself through just this repression. The Real is the unrepresentable X, a traumatic 
void that can only be glimpsed in the fractures and inconsistencies in the field of 
apparent reality. So one strategy against capitalist realism could involve invoking 
the Real(s) underlying the reality that capitalism presents us. (18) 
The ‘traumatic void’ is precisely that which the abject accesses, the invocation of the Real 
the same end pursued in Cooper’s first novel. But as I have demonstrated above, whilst a 
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vision of a corpse provides access to this ‘traumatic void’ for Cooper’s characters, the 
limitations of language hamper Cooper’s attempt to invoke this same void for the reader of 
Closer. This ostensible failure is dramatised in Cooper’s second novel of the cycle, Frisk, in 
which the politics ‘involved in the aesthetics’ of the cycle are more explicitly articulated. 
 
A kind of depraved bildungsroman, Frisk (1992) follows the character Dennis as he tries to 
reconcile himself with his own psychosexual urges. Beginning with his formative encounter, 
at age thirteen, with a sequence of snuff photographs, the novel checks in with Dennis at 
crucial moments in his life: his sexual experiments with his friend and lover Julien and a 
series of transient gay youths, his near-murder of a punk hustler named Samson, and finally 
his retreat to a windmill in Holland, in which he carries out a series of increasingly sadistic 
and involved murders described in an epistle intended to reconnect him with Julien. In the 
final chapters, Julien and his younger brother do indeed travel to Holland to reconnect with 
Dennis, but in doing so discover that the murders described in Dennis’ letter have all been 
imagined; that Dennis has, in fact, not killed anyone. Instead, Dennis’ writing—first a failed 
‘artsy murder-mystery novel’ (40), then a journal, and then finally his letter to Julien—allow 
Dennis to imaginatively act out the fantasies that he is unable to carry out in real life. As a 
liminal space of the sort described by Victor Turner, Dennis’ writing functions as an 
‘exhaust’ for ‘pent-up, taboo and impermissible acts’ (Turner, qtd. in McCarthy, 28). 
 
In his short, posthumously published piece ‘Notes on Frisk’, William S. Burroughs writes of 
Cooper: ‘he sees the male body as symbol of—what? He wants to take it apart, like a boy 
dismantling a clock, looking for what makes it talk, eat, move, fuck’ (80). In Frisk, everything 
is information. Dennis describes sex with Samson, the punk hustler, as ‘all information’ 
(33). Joe, the subject of Dennis’ failed novel, experiences violence as ‘forms of information’ 
(50). Later, Dennis muses on his own desire for information through violence: ‘I’m pretty 
sure if I tore some guy open I’d know him as well as anyone could’ (53). When he pays for 
the company of a pornstar hustler in Paris, Dennis resists sex but instead massages Pierre 
from head-to-toe, ‘logging [his] tastes, smells, sounds, textures’, before requesting a 
sample of Pierre’s piss and shit, qualifying that it’s ‘information.’ Prohibited by his inability 
to kill Pierre, Dennis mournfully confesses his desires: ‘I want to know everything about 
you. But to really do that, I’d have to kill you’ (67). Finally, when his letter to Julien reaches 
its morbid crescendo at the mutilation and murder of a ten-year-old boy, Dennis explains 
how, at least in his fantasies, he could achieve what he could not with Pierre, describing 
134 
 
how he ‘cut [the body] apart for a few hours, and studied everything inside’ (106, my 
emphasis), and in doing so, discovered a form of ‘transcendence.’       
 
But, of course, this transcendence is imagined. Whatever absolute knowledge Dennis 
believes might be gleaned from the ‘big, off-white shell’ of a dead child is forever 
foreclosed to him. Frisk is ultimately a story of failure. Dennis’ ‘analytic adventure’ into the 
abject concludes with a last-ditch attempt at closure: Dennis has the idea to recreate the 
snuff photographs which he first saw as a teenager, and which—though he later discovers 
them to have been faked—indelibly marked his psyche. With the help of Julien and a local 
boy, Chretien, Dennis creates a poor replica of the original images. A description of the fifth 
and final picture, a close-up of a papier-mâché wound, brings the novel to a close: ‘It’s a bit 
out of focus. Still, you can see the fingerprints of the person or persons who made it’ (128).    
 
As Burroughs draws his analysis of Frisk to a close, he returns to the image of the body-as-
clock: 
You take a clock apart, knowing as much about a clock as the physicist knows about 
the universe or as much as anyone knows about the ultimate meaning of the 
human body, and you got a handful of parts that don’t fit, not quite―some 
essential piece missing in the Field Theory and the dismembered human body 
doesn’t walky, talky, fucky. Neither the dismembered universe nor the 
dismembered body function (82).  
The simulated photographs pale in comparison to the originals. Their subject matter—a 
boy, a mutilated ass—recall George Miles as we last saw him, in Closer. In which case the 
‘fingerprints’ visible in the copy might be both Dennis’ and Cooper’s: each engaged in a 
doomed project to recall to life a formative presence from their past, to make visible a Real 
that promises catharsis. Each are hampered by the limitations of their medium: papier-
mâché, a camera, words, the novel. Dennis’ writing fails to bring him into proximity with 
the information he believes the body contains. Meanwhile Cooper’s novel—as it confronts 
the arbitrariness of invented meaning through the revelation of Dennis’ fabrications—
collapses in on itself in a dramatic demonstration of the limitations of the novel form. The 
gap between language—bearing Cooper’s fingerprints—and what it invokes, is ultimately 
unbridgeable. This is also the gap between our experience of Closer, and Steve’s experience 
in the novel.  
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Abjection, in Kristeva’s terms, marks the eruption of the Real into the Symbolic Order, and 
as such, it promises to invoke the ‘traumatic void […] underlying the reality capitalism 
presents us.’ But abject art, one step removed from this visceral confrontation with the 
Real, must always be a poor imitation, constrained by form and marred by the fingerprints 
of the maker. Writing in the 1990s, Cooper belongs to a cohort of novelists living in the 
wake of postmodernism. As Lee Konstantinou observes at the beginning of his recent study 
of contemporary fiction, ‘[p]ostmodernism as a literary style, set of theoretical claims, or 
socioeconomic phenomenon cannot simply be evaded, sidestepped, or wished away’ (5). 
Cooper, like his contemporaries in the decade, must instead reconcile themselves with the 
deconstructive forces of postmodernism. A corpse and a description of a corpse are not the 
same, and by foregrounding his fingerprints, Cooper acknowledges this shortcoming. His 
confrontation with the Real is always, at best, imperfect and quickly foreclosed. This is the 
unresolvable dialectic of Cooper’s cycle and, in a decade strewn with the wreckage of 
postmodernism, a central tension of abject art of the 1990s. Faced with the endless, 
seamless horizon of capitalist realism, this dialectic becomes doubly charged: where the 
limitations of language constrain art and life, an abject political aesthetic promises to carve 
out a space for both. Cooper’s work then functions as a kind of meta-commentary on 
abjection. His aesthetics don’t articulate an explicit politics so much as they explore the 
political efficacy of aesthetics; that is, the ease or difficulty with which abjection might be 
harnessed to effect political change in the face of the ‘grey curtain’ of capitalist realism. 
 
In the next section of this chapter I want to consider some of those artists and filmmakers 
exploiting the politics latent in the abject. Making visible an abjected Real, these artists 
challenge the ideologically naturalised institutions simultaneously structuring American 
society and concealing the ‘aporias’ of capitalist realism. As with Cooper, though, these 
artists are unified by an awareness of the limitations of abjection as a political aesthetic 
strategy. As such, their aesthetic practices comprise both a challenge to the ‘reality’ of 
capitalist realism and a Cooperian commentary on the limits of this challenge. Together, 
their project begins to resemble something akin to a post-postmodernism: a politics of 
aesthetics that absorbs its own impossibilities, and by doing so effects a critical distance 
from the pincers of postmodernism and neoliberalism.  
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‘I fucking hate Bette Midler’: Gregg Araki’s Totally Fucked Up 
 
 
While Dennis Cooper was spending the 1990s writing the George Miles Cycle, another 
significant queer artist was working on his own decade-spanning sequence of works. Gregg 
Araki’s film Totally Fucked Up (1993) marks the first entry into the filmmaker’s Teen 
Apocalypse Trilogy, later to be followed by The Doom Generation (1995), and Nowhere 
(1997). Much like Cooper’s Closer, Totally Fucked Up follows a milieu of gay youths as they 
navigate the turbulent wasteland of an L.A. adolescence. The film—part mock-umentary, 
part proto-mumblecore avant-garde—follows Andy and friends as they wrestle with sex, 
sexuality, infidelity, depression, and the omnipresent threat of AIDS. Drugs are taken, 
parties attended, relationships form and collapse. The film ends as Andy fulfils the promise 
of the film’s opening shot—a reference to the prevalence of suicide in the gay teen 
community—by drinking a lethal cocktail of cleaning products.    
 
While the later films in Araki’s trilogy increasingly embrace an overtly stylised, hysterical-
pastiche aesthetic, Totally Fucked Up pursues a more subdued tone. The visual language of 
the film resembles a sort-of cinematic equivalent to the stumbling slacker-patois of 
Cooper’s Closer. Araki’s camera imitates Cooper’s awkward prose with a hesitant, 
amateurish cinematography: scenes are poorly framed, with characters turning their backs 
to the camera and blocking each other with their bodies. Performances are similarly flat, 
with the majority of the dialogue delivered in awkward hysterics or, as with James Duval’s 
lead Andy, mumbled in the tone of the terminally bored. Cooper’s L.A. is ill-defined and 
geographically ambiguous. Likewise, Araki’s L.A. is composed of flat surfaces and generic 
settings. Characters prop themselves against fences and billboards and 7-Eleven walls or 
loiter in motel parking lots and on cut-and-paste streets shot in closely-cropped frames, 
absent any landmarks or larger sense of geography. Travel scenes are non-existent. 
Ironically, for a low-budget film shot on location at least partly out of necessity, the 
impression Araki’s cinematography conjures is of the artificiality of a film set.  
 
This sensation is as deliberate on Araki’s part as it is on Cooper’s. The filmmaker 
foregrounds the unreality of his cinematic images, and by making visible this artifice he also 
makes visible the limitations of the medium in a way akin to Cooper’s demonstration of the 
limits and limitations of the novel form. To emphasise this, Araki capitalises on the 
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opportunities afforded by his medium to generate what Dustin Goltz, after Teresa de 
Lauretis, calls ‘space-off’: the ‘queer periphery existing beside represented space’, unique 
to the cinematic image (Goltz, 103). Scenes in Totally Fucked Up are frequently disturbed 
by passers-by: a dominatrix and her slave wander across the screen, a costumed woman 
drags an unconscious man down a stairwell, a chicken-suited figure strolls through a 
parking lot, a screaming woman stands shrieking under a billboard. These diversions—a 
kind of (paradoxically) artificially generated Barthesian punctum—3are deliberately 
included and deliberately ignored: the camera sticks with the same small cohort of 
characters. For Goltz, an impression ‘that there is more happening beyond the camera’s 
lens, in the margins of the shot, severed by the narrative progression’ (103), is the result. 
This ‘severing’ is necessitated by the limitations of film, in terms of both the borders of the 
frame and the linearity of narrative progression. In drawing attention to events beyond the 
scope of his lens, Araki points to the prohibitive constraints of his linear form.  
 
Unreality, for Glyn Davis, is a defining feature of Araki’s ‘queer camp’ aesthetic. Davis sites 
Araki’s ‘queer camp’ in the context of the New Queer Cinema movement, a loosely defined 
collective of independent queer filmmakers operating in the early 90s, who produced 
innovative and aesthetically experimental work that redefined gay cinema. Situated firmly 
within this movement, Araki refined the aesthetic developed in his earlier, landmark film 
The Living End (1992) into the ‘queer camp’ of the Teen Apocalypse Trilogy. Davis defines 
queer camp as a cocktail of metatextual play, pastiche appropriation, and a reverence for 
trashy cultural ephemera. Significantly, he also notes the ways in which queer camp breaks 
with a more conventional gay camp by pursuing a policy of ‘non-assimilationism’ through 
an emphasis on transgression and alterity: what Davis identifies as a ‘nostalgia for 
abjection’ (57). This nostalgia permeates New Queer Cinema, manifesting as a resistance to 
‘mainstream’ gay culture. New Queer filmmakers untether their work from both hetero- 
and homo-normativities with an aesthetic that at least partially suggests Davis’ ‘nostalgia 
[…] for a time when being gay/lesbian was still dangerous, furtive, criminal’ (ibid.). Araki’s 
portrayal of the subculture of queer teens—complete with non-binary sexualities, punk 
                                                          
3 Barthes’ punctum is defined in Camera Lucida as ‘that accident which pricks, bruises me’ (Barthes, 
26). Key here is the notion of the punctum as accident, ‘aberrant.’ In Barthes’ discussion of 
photography, the punctum is that element of the photograph which the photographer cannot 
control, which by its very accidental nature become perversely compelling. In Araki’s film, this 
element of uncontrollability is obviously artificially generated, yet the intended effect is the same. 
Our attention wanders past the characters in the foreground, to the chicken-suited figure strolling 
through the parking lot behind. ‘Who is that?’ we ask, ‘and what’s their story?’ 
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music and aesthetics, and an outright rejection of ‘everything homos are supposed to like’ 
(Tommy: ‘God, I fucking hate Bette Middler’)—reinvigorates the ‘danger’ of queerness by 
placing the queer subjects at another remove from the expanded mainstream of hetero-
/homonormativity.    
 
In an early essay on Dennis Cooper, Mark Storey finds in Cooper’s novels a similar desire for 
marginality. Storey observes the paradox that with ‘the celebration of difference that we 
find at the center of postmodernity […] those who wish to remain different find their place 
in the darkness being dragged into the light,’ thus ‘to deliberately exist outside the 
mainstream, one must cultivate new extremities of behavior’ (Storey). The extreme 
transgressivity of Closer, and especially of Frisk, clearly attempts this cultivation. 
Meanwhile Tommy’s disavowal, in Totally Fucked Up, of ‘everything homos are supposed 
to like’, is echoed in a 3:AM interview with Dennis Cooper in which the author wilfully 
rejects a gay community that he perceives to be about ‘conformity and narcissism’ (Cooper, 
3:AM).  
 
Refusing incorporation into the homogeneity of gay identity, Araki and Cooper thus step 
outside of the umbrella of identity politics, a move which resonates in complex ways with a 
resistance to neoliberalism. From David Harvey to Nancy Fraser to Walter Benn Michaels, 
many contemporary critics have posited the ways in which a liberal politics based on 
gender, sexuality, or race might in fact be complementary to a neoliberal political 
philosophy. Harvey finds in the social justice movements of the 1960s, which gave birth to 
contemporary identity politics, the kernel of the desire for freedom which neoliberalism 
wilfully exploits to undergird its emphasis on small government, privatisation, and self-care 
(Harvey 2005, 41). For both Michaels and Fraser, meanwhile, the continued pursuit of 
identity-based social justice at the expense of a focus on systemic economic inequality 
serves to at best distract from, and at worst reinforce, neoliberal philosophy. In her critique 
of liberal feminism, Fraser argues that, rather than fighting for equal access to existing 
social hierarchies, the feminist project ought to challenge ‘the structural sources of gender 
domination in capitalist society,’ namely the ‘institutionalised separation’ of productive and 
reproductive labour (Fraser 2015). Lastly, Michaels succinctly frames the debate with his 
assertion that ‘it is not discrimination that has produced the almost unprecedented levels 
of inequality Americans face today; it is capitalism’ (Michaels 2008, 36). 
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Araki’s brand of abjection is, then, much like Cooper’s: abjection once-removed, or an 
abjection that articulates its own failings as a ‘nostalgia for abjection.’ Araki incorporates 
the impossibility of being abject—in this case, the impossibility of a subculture to abject 
itself, to remain marginal, when defined against a mainstream culture that celebrates 
precisely the difference of marginality—into his aesthetics of abjection to make a complex, 
self-reflexive political point about the seamlessness of a neoliberal monoculture that 
paradoxically celebrates individual identity. Araki’s formal play, much like Cooper’s, both 
underscores and undermines his content. By highlighting the restrictiveness of the 
cinematic medium in the face of the multiplicity of human experience, he marries the 
formal traits of the film to its thematic preoccupation with the restrictiveness of identity 
politics. Both, the viewer is made acutely aware, are constructs, and by drawing attention 
to this constructedness, Araki points to an aporia in capitalist realism. One of Mark Fisher’s 
examples of an aporia, in Capitalist Realism, is bureaucracy, the presence of which—in the 
face of its ostensible eradication—highlights the difference between the way things are 
presented and the way they really are. Araki’s presentation of identity politics fulfils this 
same role: by pointing to the constructedness of ‘homonormativity’ Araki uncovers a gulf 
between the liberation promised by a celebration of difference and the real neoliberal 
project of subjection it conceals.  
 
Totally Fucked Up ends with Andy’s suicide. The event receives no build-up: Andy calls his 
friends, and when he can’t get through to them, he drinks a glass of bleach. It’s almost rote, 
and certainly not the typical narrative treatment of suicide, wherein the act marks the final 
capitulation to a whole text’s worth of applied pressure. Andy’s act seems almost destined 
or fated—and in fact it is. Araki’s film opens on a shot of a newspaper clipping describing an 
epidemic of suicides among gay teens. The article focuses on one Romeo and Juliet style 
double-suicide, a conventional, tragically romantic tale of two star-crossed gay teens. From 
the beginning, Andy, as a gay teen, is fated to this end. As Andy moves towards 
homonormativity (from bisexual confusion to homosexual convention) he moves closer to 
this fate, closer to assimilation, and closer to death. Like Cooper’s Closer, the film’s end 
twists together two strands of the same project. Andy’s death springs from a nostalgia for 
abjection that cannot be sustained in the face of the ‘seamless horizon’ of capitalist realist 
identity politics. Like the extra-marginal queer subculture which he represents, Andy’s 
assimilation or excision is ultimately irresistible. Meanwhile, as the credits role, the film’s 
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ending operates once again on a formal level too, to suture shut the wound momentarily—
but imperfectly—opened by Araki.  
 
 
Art of confusion: Paul McCarthy’s The Garden, Cultural Gothic 
 
 
From around 1970 to 1985, artist Paul McCarthy spent his days nauseating audiences with 
a series of uniquely masochistic performances. Live events like 1974’s Hot Dog and 1975’s 
Sailor’s Meat were stomach-churning exercises in abjection of the ‘milk-skin’ variety, 
featuring the artist nude, smeared in condiments, gagging on hot dogs and raw mince, 
masturbating and vomiting. It would seem, then, that the artist’s mid-1990s offerings, 
coinciding with his commercial discovery in line with a renewed attention to the bodily in 
the contemporary art scene, would mark something of a ‘taming’ of McCarthy’s 
customarily violent aesthetic. And yet pieces like Bear and Rabbit (1991), Tomato Heads 
(1994), and the subjects of this chapter, The Garden and Cultural Gothic (both 1992), are, in 
their own ways, just as abject. Furthermore, McCarthy’s turn from performance to visual 
art serves to highlight his value to this study. Both Cooper and Araki go to lengths to 
problematise their respective mediums: for the former, the insufficiency of language and 
the disconnect between words and their referents forms an impassable obstruction, while 
for the latter, the linearity of narrative and the restrictions of cinematographic framing 
constrict the filmmaker’s focus. The following two sections of this chapter will consider 
how abjection functions when these limitations are jettisoned: when neither language nor 
narrative exist to be exploited or subverted by the artist.  
 
Both Cultural Gothic (fig. 1) and The Garden (fig. 2) are motorised tableaux featuring life-
sized, Disneyland-inspired animatronic figures set in realistic artificial environments. The 
Garden places a pair of male figures into a forest setting originally used as a stage set for 
the television western Bonanza. Simultaneously realistic and obviously artificial—with the 
trees cut to the height of an imagined television screen frame—the forest encloses the two 
figures engaged in a perverse sex act. Trousers around his ankles, the older figure thrusts 
himself repeatedly into a tree, while the younger figure, lying stomach-down, humps a hole 
in the ground. Cultural Gothic renders a similarly transgressive scene of patriarchal 
pedagogy. A father reassuringly nods and rests his hands on the shoulders of his son, who 
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grasps the hindquarters of a goat and thrusts his hips in a simulated act of bestiality—
simulated, both in the sense of the artificiality of the robotic tableau, and because the boy 
is fully clothed.4  
 
 
fig. 1. McCarthy, Paul. Cultural Gothic. Sculpture. 1992.  
 
                                                          
4 It is, as Ralph Rugoff pointedly observes, ‘a dry run, an air fuck’ (65).   
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fig. 2. McCarthy, Paul. The Garden. Sculpture. 1992. 
 
Even twice removed, the act at the centre of Cultural Gothic is no less taboo. It is, however, 
more explicitly political than the artist’s anarchic earlier work. The Garden and Cultural 
Gothic, both featuring male figures in heavily implied paternal relationships, squarely take 
aim at the ‘fascist and oddball construction’—in Cooper’s terms—that is the American 
family unit (Cooper, Try, 182). In Pay for Your Pleasures, Cary Levine offers a succinct 
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reading of these two pieces in these terms. Levine suggests that the ‘deranged pedagogic 
ritual’ of Cultural Gothic taps into the idea that masculinity and male dominance is 
produced through ‘systematic and obligatory indoctrination,’ and that McCarthy’s works 
parody this indoctrination as it manifests in ‘rites of passage […] handed down from one 
demented generation of men to the next’ (139). As in Cooper’s Try,5 McCarthy identifies 
something toxic at the heart of ‘heterosexual-style bliss’. McCarthy’s younger figures are 
literally fucking nature, at once parodying destructive institutions like father-son hunting 
trips, and gesturing—through their obviously artificial, and endlessly replicated 
movements—to the way in which these institutions encode a pathology of masculine 
aggression and domination that is absorbed and repeated generation after generation. 
Ralph Rugoff argues that this work represents an extension of, rather than a break with, 
McCarthy’s earlier work. In his career retrospective of McCarthy, Rugoff observes how ‘all 
along McCarthy’s depraved patriarchal figures have simply insisted that the Father’s laws 
[…] are not the neutral mechanism of a transcendent authority, but are tainted and 
besmirched with irrational desires’ (84).   
 
As Lee Edelman has demonstrated, the figure of the child is rarely neutral. In political 
discourse, the child often features as a signifier shoring up the shaky ideological 
foundations of the ‘telos of the social order’ (11) with an appeal to the politics of 
‘reproductive futurism’ (2), which justifies the preservation of existing orders and 
hierarchies through an act of extended deferment. Levine appeals to this idea when he 
notes that the ‘puritan construct’ of the child is ‘central to American cultural politics’, and 
that McCarthy’s evocation of that child resists ‘justify[ing] a particular politics’ in order to 
‘challenge the inevitability of acculturation’ (143). McCarthy’s perverse tableaux, then, 
gesture to something rotten in patriarchal traditions, but also synecdochally to something 
equally rotten in the way great patriarchal institutions—the state, the media—condition 
their subjects. The media, particularly, is specifically invoked by McCarthy’s repurposing of 
the Bonanza television set to stage his unnatural carnal scene. Levine observes in 
McCarthy’s career trajectory an increasing preoccupation with ‘the politics of entrenched 
thought-systems—the ways in which norms, conventions, and ideals are socially 
conditioned’ (11), such that by the 1990s, ‘the trauma of cultural conditioning in the 
consumerist family is McCarthy’s great motif’ (171). Rugoff takes this notion and applies it 
                                                          
5 Which features at its heart the perverse relationship between Ziggy and his fathers, who each 
sexually exploit their adopted son. Regrettably, I do not have the space to discuss Cooper’s text in 
further detail here.  
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directly to the 1990s tableaux: for Rugoff, the figures in McCarthy’s later work are 
‘molesting […] the fundamental scaffolding of civilisation: the operations […] that make up 
the aesthetic foundation on which our conception of the law is founded’ (35).  
 
In a reading that could just as easily be of Cooper’s novels as of McCarthy’s tableaux, 
Rugoff notes that in McCarthy’s work, ‘the human body is pre-eminently a social body, a 
metaphor for systems and conventions that define our world […] the body’s defilement and 
hybridisation in McCarthy’s art thus comprises a discourse about structures of ideas, as 
well as ideal structures…’ (75). As I—and Kristeva—have demonstrated, the blue guts inside 
Cooper’s bodies invoke the Real, bursting in all its uglified glory through the artificial 
perfection of a teenage torso. The exposed genitals of McCarthy’s figures, plunged into 
trees or ground against goats, do the same thing, making visible the animal, the abhorrent, 
that systems of social construction sanitise and deny. And like Cooper or Araki, McCarthy 
uses an aesthetic of deliberate unreality to intensify or incorporate what would otherwise 
be diminished by art’s remove from the Real. Beyond the aforementioned clash of realism 
and artificiality bound up in the use of the Bonanza set, The Garden also features exposed, 
whirring motors that shatter any vestiges of realism. The forest itself, erected on a 
platform, simultaneously 3D and yet inaccessible, holds the viewer at arm’s length. One 
cannot enter the world of The Garden but must remain an outsider, feet planted firmly on 
polished gallery floor. Cultural Gothic, meanwhile, features a jarring blend of materials: a 
realistic taxidermied goat is fondled by an obviously artificial boy constructed from 
mannequin parts, while the father figure’s face and hands are latex life-casts with a fleshy, 
realistic texture. Both pieces are fundamentally incoherent.  
 
Pointing, at least in part, to the same formal limitations foregrounded by Cooper and Araki, 
McCarthy’s anti-mimetic techniques point to another unifying—and in fact integral—aspect 
of abject art: its reliance on reciprocity, on the viewer and artwork co-creating meaning. At 
its simplest, abjection generates a visceral and involuntary response in its beholder.6 Artists 
in the 1990s complicate this by adding a self-conscious quality to the abject aesthetic, but 
meaning remains located in the interaction between the text and its reader. With the aid of 
the linear narrative inherent to the novel form, Cooper’s Frisk suckers its reader into a 
visceral response only to belatedly reveal the text’s artifice. The transformation of meaning 
                                                          
6 At the beginning of Powers of Horror, Kristeva describes her involuntary reaction when confronted 
with the abject: ‘The spasms and vomiting that protect me. The repugnance, the retching that 
thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck’ (2). 
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that accompanies Dennis’ disclosed fabrication ripples outwards, forcing the reader to 
question their assumptions and taboos, retrospectively revising their earlier response. 
McCarthy, working in the medium of visual art, has a severely flattened temporal moment 
in which to generate the same effect. Thus, he uses incoherence to create a sense of 
unease that unfolds slowly as more attention is paid to the piece. As the viewer attempts 
to become more involved, to press forward into the work, they are held back with 
increasing force. His ‘art of confusion, ideological ambiguity, [and] contradiction,’ as Levine 
classifies it, suspends the viewer and entreats self-reflection, ‘shift[ing] attention to the 
viewer’s own culturally constructed values’ (11). The reader, in this participatory moment, 
thus ‘completes the work simply by bringing his or her conditioned responses to it […] but 
cannot easily be disentangled from its contradictions’ (Levine, 16).  
 
Here we begin to see a positive dimension to abjection: not just a back-footed response to 
a postmodern project that would hold language at arm’s length from the capitalist realist 
curtain it would aim to shred, but an aesthetic that, for all its incorporation, self-reflexivity, 
and difficulty, depends ultimately on an interpersonal connection with its viewer, a kind of 
complex affective response that activates its positive political potential. I use ‘positive’ here 
in the sense that it is used by Jeffrey Nealon in his recent book Post-Postmodernism: or, The 
Cultural Logic of Just-In-Time Capitalism. In Post-Postmodernism, Nealon offers a taxonomy 
of several post-postmodern political-aesthetic projects. For Nealon the ‘weak power’ of 
post-postmodern writing functions essentially as an ‘interruption’, a slowing down or 
disruption of ‘existing truths’: a ‘negative’ response (163). This is essentially a continuation 
of the postmodern project to problematise the notion of a whole, totalised meaning. In 
contrast, Nealon offers the notion of a ‘strong power’ of literature, or a ‘positive’ literature, 
which focuses not on the interruption of existing meaning but on the production of new 
meaning. Nealon gives the admittedly extreme example of the poetry of the Flarf and 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E movements as an example of the sort of literature that can, by 
generating ‘discourses, acts, and further appropriations’ that follow the texts themselves, 
‘model […] a mode of engagement, with that text and with the world’ (168).  
 
Nealon’s thesis is frustratingly vague, his final examples plagued with exceptions and 
undermined by the critic’s hesitancy (ironically) to commit to a truly positive reading of any 
text or author. I want here to put forward Cooper, Araki, McCarthy, and the abject art of 
the 1990s as one such ‘positive’ artistic project: an attempt to generate meaning that, 
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whilst inescapably at least a partial response to postmodernism, also goes beyond the 
interruptive project to gesture towards something more productive. I’ll return to this idea 
in the third part of this chapter, but for now I want to consider one more example of the 
abject in 1990s culture.  
 
 
‘It’s all a lot of crap’: Cindy Sherman’s The Horror and Surrealist Pictures 
 
 
Between 1994 and 1996 Cindy Sherman created a series of photographs dubbed The 
Horror and Surrealist Pictures. A grotesque mash-up of Sherman’s previous photography 
sequences Fairy Tales (1985) and Sex Pictures (1992), these works mark the apotheosis of 
the abject aesthetic Sherman had slowly been cultivating over the previous ten years. A 
morbid series of deformed mannequins, cut-up faces, fabricated corpses, amorphous 
visages, mutilations and mutations, Sherman’s chronological works from Untitled #302 to 
Unititled #326 are a veritable primer on abjection. Untitled #312 (fig. 3) resembles a hellish 
family portrait, the subjects crude assemblages of mismatched mannequin parts with 
genitals exposed and teeth and eyes rendered in nauseating detail. Untitled #314E (fig. 4) 
and #314F depict sexless, slashed-apart rubber faces strewn under a hyper-saturated light 
that simultaneously evokes the molten glow of flames and the garish palette of a massage 
parlour. Untitled #316 (fig. 5) captures a child-mannequin’s face, flayed of skin apart from 
the mouth and nose, a scarred and crusted plaster-like substance revealed beneath the 
smooth plastic skin. Finally, Untitled #324 (fig. 6), another close-up, uses what appears to 
be a melted or crushed plastic mask to translate the amorphous liquid landscapes of classic 
surrealist painting into a deformed visage more appropriate to Sherman’s oeuvre.  
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fig. 3. Sherman, Cindy. Untitled #312. Print. 1994. 
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fig. 4. Sherman, Cindy. Untitled #314E. Print. 1994. 
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fig. 5. Sherman, Cindy. Untitled #316. Print. 1995. 
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fig. 6. Sherman, Cindy. Untitled #324. Print. 1996.  
 
Like the work of McCarthy considered above, Sherman’s photographs from this series 
probe the structures and systems which construct and concretise meaning, simultaneously 
revealing and subverting them. Sherman’s work is unique, however, in that the institution 
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it takes aim at is the institution of criticism itself—making her work simultaneously 
compelling and yet extraordinarily difficult to critique. Nevertheless, her work has proven 
irresistible to commentators. Sherman critic Elizabeth Smith reads Sherman’s abject works 
as encapsulating a certain subtle but present political aesthetic: an ‘undermining of 
established genres [that] points to a satirical vein that underpins her work’s late twentieth-
century ironic sensibility’ (24). Referring to her career-spanning fascination with masks and 
disguises, Smith describes how Sherman parodies ‘the construction and presentation of 
myth and archetype’ (24), specifically those relating to self-construction, performance, and 
subjectivity, those things which, as Rachel Greenwald Smith has observed, are thrown into 
sharp relief by neoliberalism’s generation of a ‘new mode of subjection’. As with the 
previously discussed artists, Sherman’s work makes visible―and thus challenges―the 
processes of social construction that inform everyday life. In Sherman’s work, much as in 
Araki’s, it is those processes which contribute to the construction of identity which, at least 
ostensibly, form the artist’s target for subversion.   
 
This subversion, particularly in Sherman’s earlier work—Untitled Film Stills (1977-80) and 
Rear Screen Projections (1980-81)—captured the imagination of feminist critics and 
prompted an often-antagonistic dialogue between the artist and her audience.7 In one of a 
number of Sherman retrospectives, Rosalind Krauss provides a relatively de rigueur 
feminist-psychoanalytic reading of Sherman’s body of work, quoting liberally from Laura 
Mulvey’s earlier treatment. Reading Sherman’s abject images as a critique of the female 
body-as-fetish, Krauss notes that with 
the confrontation of the wound―“the disgust of sexual detritus, decaying food, 
vomit, slime, menstrual blood, hair”―the fetish fails and with it the very possibility 
of meaning: “Cindy Sherman traces the abyss or morass that overwhelms the 
defetishised body, deprived of the fetish’s semiotic, reduced to being ‘unspeakable’ 
and devoid of significance.” (193) 
But in the Horror and Surrealist Pictures, gender is almost entirely absent. We might posit 
that this mid-90s shift marks a deliberate move on Sherman’s part to undo or thwart the 
feminist-psychoanalytic mode of critique so enamoured by her work. By neutralising sexual 
identity in her work, Sherman’s shift towards representations of sexually ambiguous 
subjects represents a conscious rejection of the feminist theories that had previously 
                                                          
7 Smith notes how critics including Julia Kristeva, Laura Mulvey, and Mary Russo ‘specifically ground 
Sherman’s use of [the female grotesque] in relationship to a gendered female subject’ (25). 
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circled her work. Parsing the arguments around Sherman’s real or imagined feminism, 
Michelle Meagher notes that ‘the analyses of Sherman’s work are involved in a debate as 
to whether the images are useful or destructive for feminist politics and theories,’ and that 
a further elision occurs when the question ‘is the work feminist?’ shifts to ‘is the artist 
feminist?’ (19). Some critics, Meagher observes, contend that Sherman’s work ‘is about 
women, has always been about women, [is] invested in the construction of a feminist 
aesthetic’ (25). Others, like Smith, however, imply ‘that the change in Sherman’s protocol 
was a direct (and negative) response to […] feminist appropriation of her work’ (ibid.). 
Meanwhile Sherman herself has, in rare moments on record, attempted to disengage her 
work from the morass of theory surrounding it: ‘maybe it’s all a lot of crap […] they’re just 
finding whatever to attach their theories to’ (Sherman, qtd. in Meagher, 20). 
 
In Sherman’s notebook, the artist laments: ‘I can’t seem to keep from making everything 
have a sexual, “political”, or “heavy” edge, which I don’t exactly want here. If anything, I’d 
rather make the work seem politically incorrect…’ (Sherman, qtd. in Krauss, np.). These 
attempts manifest, in part, in Sherman’s idiosyncratic refusal to title her works, and in part 
in her refusal to give interviews: her refusal, in short, to exert ownership over her work. To 
eliminate herself entirely from her art is entirely the point. For Meagher, Sherman does not 
provide an interpretive framework because ‘the art’s strength, its power and its intrigue, 
are nested in its ambiguity. A tactic implicit in all of the work is the withholding or refusal of 
an authentic self’ (31). The Horror and Surrealist Pictures eschew gender for this reason. 
They swap the candid realism of Sherman’s early work for an impenetrable, alienating 
surreality. They sit uneasily alongside one another, sharing none of the thematic cohesion 
that binds Sherman’s earlier collections of Untitled’s together. If the characters that form 
their subjects had any shared features, it would be the proliferation of mouths and eyes 
sealed, painted, covered, or wounded. The images refuse to speak. As a body of work, they 
manifest the same incoherence as McCarthy’s individual sculptures, the same elisions as 
Cooper’s novels, the same off-shoring of meaning as Araki’s film. 
 
Refusing to attribute these photographs to an authentic artistic presence and refusing to 
provide indicative interpretative suggestions within or around the works allows Sherman’s 
pictures to aspire to that most emphatic sense of the abject: ambiguity. Like the previous 
artists discussed, Sherman’s challenge to one aspect of culture―this time gender 
politics―combines with a self-reflexive artistry that undermines the medium in which the 
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artist chooses to work and an abject aesthetic that invites and frustrates interpretative 
play. Sherman extends this notion further than the other artists, however, by consciously 
responding to and challenging interpretation in such a way that the work becomes less 
about gender politics than about the politics of gender politics. If this sounds tautological—
or just plain incoherent—it’s because when read alongside Sherman’s own antipathy to 
interpretation, her work pushes up against the very boundaries of meaning—something 
Cooper similarly strains towards in his later novels discussed below. Sherman, then, 
performs a complex aesthetic-political project: to simultaneously invoke an aporia in 
capitalist realism, and by extension to draw attention to the mechanisms by which these 
aporias are expressed and repressed in both art and life. The emphasis Sherman’s work 
puts on critical play and on a playful refusal of meaning ultimately, I contend, marks an 
attempt to forge an interpersonal connection between artwork and reader (albeit a 
fractious one). This project is a defining feature of abject art in the 1990s―indeed, is 
precisely that which grants abjection its political efficacy and thus its artistic appeal in this 
decade. So far, we have seen how Cooper mobilises abjection in such a way as to self-
reflexively theorise its mode of political engagement, and we have seen how artists like 
Araki, McCarthy and Sherman have taken up this aesthetic to make visible certain aporias 
in capitalist realism whilst warily negotiating a postmodern scepticism for any claim to a 
totalised meaning. In the following section, I want to return to Cooper, to consider how the 
author’s later works in his cycle―and in the decade―move beyond this scepticism, to take 
up the ‘positive’ project I have already hinted at in reference to McCarthy and Sherman.  
 
 
‘It’s the trip itself that’s important’: Guide 
 
 
In the chapter bluntly titled ‘Blur’, in which Alex Johns experiences his encounter with 
Mason, Dennis, narrator of Guide, checks in on the novel’s characters: ‘Luke’s asleep in my 
bedroom […] Mason’s home making art. So’s Scott. Robert and Tracy are filed away inside 
freezing cold, human sized drawers. You can basically forget them’ (67). Shortly after, he 
provides a succinct, elegant analysis of events at this, the mid-point of the novel. His 
observation returns us to the central conflict which, since Closer, has dogged Cooper’s 
work:  
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All the beauty in my world is either sleeping, unconscious, or dead. Luke, Goof, 
Chris, Alex. Life’s a scary place without them. All that’s left are the artists, the 
users, the interpreters. Us. Mason, Scott, Pam, Sue, and myself… The balance of 
power is totally off. (81-2) 
To restore this balance is Guide’s narrative impetus. The novel begins with Dennis ‘writing 
this novel’, an immediate metafictional disclosure that colours everything to come. The 
bulk of the novel follows another milieu of disaffected teens in L.A.: Cooper’s usual array of 
artists, junkies, pornographers, and predators, including another George Miles stand-in in 
the form of Dennis’ muse Luke. Seeking the clarity he once felt during an LSD binge, Dennis 
drops acid and tries to write his life, and the lives of his friends, into some sort of order. The 
layered structure of the novel precludes easy analysis. Dennis admits to modifying the story 
and to constructing ‘preposterous’ plots, and yet with no grounding reality as our referent, 
we are forced to follow his lead. Furthermore, his constant struggle to articulate himself 
clearly leaves the novel punctured by gaps, vagueness, and ever-present ellipses.  
 
The first three novels in Cooper’s cycle are sparsely populated with artists and writers: John 
in Closer, Dennis in Frisk, and Ziggy in Try. In the latter cases, especially, the works of these 
artists are therapeutic in nature: in Try, for example, Ziggy creates the zine No Apologies as 
an artistic response to the sexual abuse he suffers at the hands of his two fathers. These 
artistic avenues of authentic and meaningful expression are circumscribed as spaces: John’s 
drawings are ‘places to put his confusion’ (Closer, 13), Ziggy’s favourite band Husker Du 
‘knew a spot’ (Try, 175), and in Guide, Dennis describes his artistic pursuit as a project to 
‘write novels that are essentially long, involved wishes for offbeat utopian worlds’ (65). 
However, these spaces, as we have seen, do not go unproblematised. Guide picks up where 
Frisk leaves off: with Cooper’s fingerprints and the forced acknowledgement that Dennis 
cannot ‘realistically enter’ the utopian worlds of his novels.  
 
Guide playfully toys with the idea of artistic meaning. A young character offers his dad’s 
opinion: ‘my dad says art isn’t about anything until someone buys it, then it’s about the 
person who owns it’ (100). This notion of inherent meaninglessness—a hangover from the 
postmodern, poststructuralist days of the ‘death of the author’—combines with a general 
anxiety regarding the insufficiency of language, a pervasive theme of the novel. At the peak 
of his acid trip, Dennis’ friend Scott tries to articulate his feelings: ‘it was more like a pkhw… 
A filament? But weren’t words too complex to manipulate properly?’ (16). Later, the same 
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character is described as ‘star[ing] into something beyond the constraints of human 
language’ (21). These realisations, fuelled by acid, cause Dennis finally to swear off the 
drug. Scott finds that acid makes ‘art seem pathetic’, for Dennis, it’s ‘more about language’ 
(158). This inadequacy contributes to an unbridgeable divide between ‘all the beauty’ in 
Dennis’ world, and the ‘artists, the users, the interpreters’ that make that beauty their 
subject. As in Frisk, art is inherently flawed as a conduit to the Real. 
 
Returning momentarily to that earlier novel, in Frisk neither Cooper’s text nor Dennis’ 
desires can be entirely cancelled out, despite Burroughs’ assertion that ‘the dismembered 
body [can’t] function’. But Burroughs modifies this diagnosis with the observation that 
something—some ‘essential piece’—remains. With this essential piece, Cooper 
demonstrates that Frisk is not a total failure. This extant something is everywhere and 
nowhere in the novel. It’s in the description of the odours of a body as ‘profound’ (22). It’s 
in the ellipses that dog Dennis’ sentences, that hint at a world beyond language, renderable 
only in their absence: ‘it’s incommunicable, obviously…’ (78). Mark Storey calls it a ‘new 
world,’ one that is ‘outside of the capacity of language and […] requiring other ways of 
expressing its core truth’. This world is beyond information, inarticulable. At the very 
beginning of Frisk, while describing the snuff photographs, Cooper sites this mystery world 
in the blank, deformed pit of the victim’s ass: ‘a small tunnel entrance, too out-of-focus to 
actually explore with one’s eyes, but too mysterious not to want to try’ (4). 
 
Guide builds on the assertion that opens Frisk: that some things, never mind the 
impossibility of results, are ‘too mysterious not to try’ to explore. For all of its 
shortcomings, art is central to Guide’s philosophy. When Scott reveals that acid makes ‘art 
seem pathetic,’ he follows up by saying he ‘can’t think [that]’ (158). In an early passage, 
Cooper deftly captures what makes art vital, even in spite of its failings: 
Truth is dry. You’ll know the truth when everything in your world seems as if it’s 
been cooked until nothing is left but the exact information that separates it from 
other things in the world. On acid, you look at a thing, anything, with complete 
understanding. At the same time, everything’s more mind-boggling than ever. (22) 
This marks the clearest development in Cooper’s thought between Guide and earlier novels 
like Closer and Frisk. Where in Frisk information—truth—was valorised in the art of that 
novel’s Dennis, in Guide, the more contemporary Dennis fully embraces those moments of 
ellipses and unknowing that occasionally punctuate both texts. This comparison is clear in 
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the difference between Frisk and Guide’s treatments of killing. In Frisk, Dennis kills—or 
imagines killing—as a form of study, as a route to knowledge. Meanwhile in Guide, the 
dwarf that kills Chris similarly ‘studie[s]’ Chris’ body, but his search through Chris’ ‘purplish-
red, pasta-esque insides’ is a search not for knowledge but for ‘something, anything… some 
clue, some sign’ (93). Killing, like drugs, and crucially like art, takes on a mystical or spiritual 
significance that is barely present in Cooper’s earlier work. In a parallel of Nealon’s 
observation of literary powers, Cooper moves from the pure ‘weak’ power of interruption 
in Frisk—where meaning is teased at, frustrated and withheld—to, in Guide, a strong, 
productive power which relocates meaning in precisely these spaces of silence, hesitance, 
and frustration.   
 
The spiritual dimension of Guide informs both Dennis’ ultimate rationale behind drug-
taking and sex, and the development of Cooper’s political-aesthetic philosophy. As the 
novel draws to a close, Dennis reflects on his aborted relationship with Luke: 
Here’s what I’m thinking: Sex is sort of like being on acid. It’s the trip itself that’s 
important. Pills look magical in your hand, but as soon as they’re inside your 
mouth, they dissolve. Then it’s up to your mind to make something profound out of 
their well disguised chemical compounds. I’m thinking the same thing applies to 
the people you love. A beautiful, interesting boy can be hot, but his body’s the 
exact same body that’s slept with a lot of other people. It’s only yours in the 
process of being absorbed. (170) 
This might easily be read as a manifesto for Cooper’s cycle. Following the publication of 
Guide the author would go on to establish the first iteration of his troubled blog, The 
Weaklings, the object of which is, in Cooper’s own words, ‘to consciously break down the 
power structure’ between artist and fan (Cooper, ‘The Shift’, 203). Meanwhile in reference 
to the cycle, Cooper elaborates on his assertion that ‘my politics were involved in the 
aesthetic of the cycle,’ to clarify that ‘[the cycle] is about faith or something and that’s 
where the politics come in. It’s like trying to create a relationship between the work and 
the reader that’s really really democratic’ (ibid., 208). When Dennis, in Guide, laments the 
inadequacy of art whilst simultaneously lamenting the dryness of truth, he taps into this 
idea. It’s the same idea that motivates the dwarf to search for ‘some sign’ in Chris’ bloody 
remains, and the same idea that necessitates Scott believing in art, even if it is ‘pathetic.’ 
Finally, it’s the same idea that motivates Dennis to keep writing his ‘wishes for offbeat, 
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utopian worlds,’ even if he has no hope of entering them: ‘it’s the trip itself that’s 
important.’  
 
For Cooper, artistic creation is an end in itself. Cooper deliberately contradicts a late 
capitalist, neoliberal philosophy of art, wherein art is imbued with value derived from its 
marketability, or from its injunction to self-scrutiny and non-material rewards in line with a 
neoliberal project of subject formation.8 Instead, Cooper reimagines art as a space of 
communal philosophical inquiry: an autonomous space exterior to the neoliberal market. 
Autonomy, defined in Sarah Brouillette’s work on the subject as ‘the struggle to develop 
and secure the means for articulations of creativity that are separable from capital in some 
authentic measure’ (Brouillette 2013), is central to the cycle. Just as the boy’s body is ‘only 
yours in the process of being absorbed,’ so the participatory act of consuming—of 
absorbing—a text or a piece of art is what lends it significance beyond its materiality. It’s 
this same interplay that is exploited in McCarthy’s sculptural work, or in Sherman’s 
photographs. So when, in Guide, Drew mockingly tells Mason, ‘art isn’t about anything until 
someone buys it. Then it’s about the person who owns it,’ he’s half right. At the core of 
Dennis/Cooper’s work is a notion of art as therapeutic, but this is only half the story. Once 
that art is sent out into the world, it becomes transformative.  
 
By positioning his art in this way, Cooper makes an important shift from the personal to the 
impersonal a la Rachel Greenwald Smith: from the generation of affects that are privatised, 
self-regulated, invested-in, and networkable, to impersonal feelings that are not codifiable 
or even recognisable and thus resist marketisation. These feelings, furthermore, are not 
just impersonal but interpersonal: Cooper’s work constantly strives towards the state of 
conversation. Its obliqueness, its meta-fictionality, and its playful, partial refusal of meaning 
open Cooper’s texts up as spaces of shared meaning-making. The presence of music in Try 
and Guide speak directly to this. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva identifies ‘rhythm and music 
as the only way out [of abjection], the ultimate sublimation of the unsignifiable’ (23). She 
privileges music for the same reason she privileges poetry later in the text: because poetic 
language is most willing to toy with its own arbitrariness and obsolesence, because it is ‘not 
a language of the desiring exchange of messages or objects that are transmitted in a social 
contract of communication and desire beyond want, but a language of want, of the fear 
that edges up to it and runs along its edges’ (38). Kristeva finds the abject at its most 
                                                          
8 See my previous discussion of neoliberal art in chapter one.  
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sublime in the spaces beyond language. These are precisely the spaces Cooper’s texts 
ultimately come to celebrate, and to make available to the reader.   
 
 
‘A house painted black inside’: Period 
 
 
During the publication of Guide, Cooper finally heard of George Miles’ suicide a decade 
earlier. He resolved to finish the cycle, adhering to his original structural plan. Thus, at the 
beginning of a new millennium, the spare 109-page novel Period (2000) ended the George 
Miles Cycle. Period faithfully dons the mantle of the ‘backwards reflection’ of Closer. It’s a 
complex, self-reflexive, puzzling novel, set in a bleak, gothic world populated by disaffected 
Satanists, tortured artists, schizophrenic teenagers and anonymous web users. It’s both an 
oblique final memorial to George Miles and an act of literary auto-cannibalisation that is at 
once both confounding and profound, alienating and tender. It is, according to Cooper, a 
‘failed magic trick’, and an un-writing of what came before.   
 
The novel Period that sits within the novel Period (the former by the character Walker 
Crane, the latter by Dennis Cooper) refuses to accept its ontological boundaries. Any 
attempt to summarise the plot will, by necessity, fall woefully short. Nevertheless: Cooper’s 
Period begins with the novel Period, written by the poet Walker Crane about his lover 
George. The novel features an artist, Bob, who attempts to memorialise his lover, George, 
through an artwork: a house, painted black inside, housing a giant mirror. Local Satanists 
sacrifice a deaf-mute teen in the house and in doing so unleash a strange force that 
reverses everything in their world. The teen, Dagger, survives the attack and emerges as an 
imperfect copy of George, to be reunited with Bob. Meanwhile, in Crane’s world, the ‘real’ 
George was once a pornstar named Dagger whom Crane fell in love with. Crane lost touch 
with Dagger until many years later, when he recognised him in a news report about a boy 
who had been found raped and tortured in the woods. Crane reconnects with George only 
to find him bedridden and emotionally needy. He leaves George (again) and writes his 
novel, Period, to assuage his guilt. When George reads the novel he begins to imagine a 
deaf-mute boy named Dagger resides in a world through his mirror. George kills himself, 
believing he will be allowed access to Dagger’s world. When Crane finds out about George’s 
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suicide, he realises that his efforts have made him a mirror of Bob: vainly trying to resurrect 
a memory through art.  
 
The above synopsis is cribbed largely from ‘Period: The Official Strategy Guide,’ a short 
accompaniment to the novel written by Cooper and published in the magazine Dazed and 
Confused. At the end of the piece, Cooper issues this perplexing explanatory note:  
Like Walker Crane's Bob, I have hoped against hope that this work would somehow 
reconnect me with my late friend, but, on that level, the cycle has been a failure. In 
the end, all I can do in this final novel is try to make my work disappear, cancel 
itself out, commit suicide in George's honor [...] Since the novel was published last 
March in the United States, I've been overwhelmed with requests to explain 
Period's layered and interconnected mysteries. I can't do that, since this would 
defeat the purpose of the book. (Cooper, ‘Strategy Guide’) 
Earl Jackson, Jr.’s piece ‘Tough Platonic Love’ makes an ambitious attempt to make sense of 
the many layers of Period. Jackson, Jr. observes that the official guide describes the 
narrative without explaining it, that ‘to be “satisfied” by the “Official Guide” is not only to 
misread it, but to allow one’s conception of reading to be reduced to the scope of that 
satisfaction’ (90). This resonates with Smith’s work on impersonality. To read Period for the 
satisfaction of ‘solving’ it is to approach the text as a neoliberal reader seeking the 
fulfilment of a contract between text and consumer. By frustrating meaning, Cooper 
disrupts this interaction. Cooper’s ‘Official Guide’ is one more layer of narrative added to 
an already complex game played between the author and his readers. The ‘Official Guide’ is 
a text-commentary to a text-commentary, Period, which is already ‘a novel about the poet 
Walker Crane and the novel he wrote, also entitled Period, [which] also articulates itself as 
text and commentary’ (91). Thus Period mirrors the text’s (texts’) relation to its external 
commentaries. For Jackson, Jr., Cooper’s guide ultimately ‘offers a blueprint for the 
negotiations that go on between reality and representation, original and imitation, text and 
adaptation’ (84). The liberating potential of art gestured at in Guide is fully realised in 
Period through these meta-textual games. Mondo’s blurb of the novel as a ‘Chinese puzzle 
box’ is quite accurate in this sense: Period offers itself as a puzzle for the reader. But just as 
Cooper ‘can’t’ explain Period, so the reader can’t ultimately figure out the truth. As in 
Guide, it’s rather ‘the trip itself’—engaging in the novel’s games and the philosophical self-
reflection they encourage—that is important. 
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A return to the work of Brouillette offers a useful framework for thinking through Cooper’s 
project. ‘An insistence on autonomy,’ Brouillette writes, 
is not about continuing to valorize the self as a site of all meaning and value. The 
opposite is true. Autonomization is a fundamentally social process. It is a matter of 
vigorously and loudly arguing for the necessary existence of modes of inquiry, 
styles of life, and ways of organizing creative and scholarly activity that reveal the 
limitations of the neoliberal market as an arbiter of what is valuable to know and 
do. (Brouillette 2013) 
What’s key in Brouillette’s definition is the idea of alternative ‘modes of inquiry […] and 
ways of organising creative and scholarly activity.’ Meaning and value, in the artworks 
discussed, are not sited in an individual, complete self—not in an authentic author, a 
perfect text, or a satisfied reader—but at the site of interpersonal connection between 
reader and text. If postmodern poststructuralism insisted that ‘a text’s unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination’ (Barthes 1997, 148), then the post-postmodern work of 
abjection shifts meaning to somewhere between these poles, so that the text’s unity is 
suspended between the origin and the destination, claiming neither a totality of meaning 
nor its arbitrariness.  
 
I have tracked Cooper’s use of the body through his cycle, and following this trope to its 
conclusion elucidates this unique aesthetic. The idea of the body (and always, by extension, 
the novel) as a form of information, relied upon in Frisk and exceeded in Guide, is finally 
foreclosed in Period. The Satanic-rock band The Omen, deep into a hitchhiker killing spree, 
describe a recently deceased corpse to one of the novel’s principle characters: ‘it’s a crude 
piece of something that we can’t understand. It only strikes us as a guy because that’s our 
best point of reference’ (27). The body passes from understandable to incomprehensible, 
followed by the novel. This shift marks Cooper’s disillusionment with a cycle that set out to 
do the impossible: reconnect the author with an acquaintance who had died before the 
first novel was published. Nate, the character to whom The Omen explain the meaning of 
the hitchhiker’s corpse, picks up on the notion of form first sparked in Closer to further 
elucidate this failure. Momentarily dreaming of a world in which everything would 
understand everything else, Nate’s vision quickly collapses with the realisation that ‘there’s 
no way the world’s ever gonna be totally perfect, unless nothing and no one had minds,’ 
and ends with a longing for the day that ‘everyone [loses] sight of each other’s existence’ 
(17).  
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Despite this ostensible failure, the novel continues to pose questions. After reading Walker 
Crane’s Period, a character in Cooper’s novel wonders ‘whether the artist’s success is an 
example of love co-opting form, as some would have it, or the complete opposite’ (50). The 
question remains unanswered. Period offers no resolutions, only the endless oscillation of 
the dialectic of unruly, libidinal, ugly Real, and constructed, perfect, seamless Symbolic 
Order. Is the work of Bob ‘George’s house,’ or is it just ‘art… just a house painted black 
inside’? In the end, it doesn’t matter. The uncertainty is the point. The novel makes itself 
available as a space in which reader and text meet in a process of interpretive work, a ‘trip’ 
or an ‘analytic adventure.’ The primary register of abjection is ambiguity, and by harnessing 
this ambiguity Cooper and the other artists discussed invite entry into a reciprocal 
relationship with their reader. Abject art engages in what Nealon calls the ‘weak’ or 
interruptive attempt to disrupt the seamlessness of capitalist realism and to expose the 
aporias it conceals—for example the way patriarchal authority is disseminated through 
ritual or the way identity politics ironically push towards a homogeneity of culture-as-
marketplace. But abject art also self-reflexively acknowledges the limitations of its project, 
and by absorbing these limitations it generates a strong, productive effect, whereby a new 
mode of post-postmodern engagement with art is modelled and performed. 
 
 
‘The answer must be in the attempt’: Richard Linklater’s Before Sunrise  
 
 
It’s hard to imagine how Richard Linklater’s philosophical romance Before Sunrise (1995) 
could be further removed from the artworks discussed above. It is a slow, whimsical study 
of two people falling in love, a serendipitous meeting of minds and sensibilities that 
transpires into something profound. It exists in a world apart from the visceral and hellish 
scenes portrayed by the likes of Cooper and Araki, or the stomach-churning works of 
McCarthy and Sherman. And yet, a moment of Celine’s dialogue in the film unwittingly taps 
into the heart of a project like Cooper’s, and hints at the resonances between the project of 
abject aesthetics and broader aesthetic movements in the decade: 
I believe if there's any kind of God it wouldn't be in any of us, not you or me but 
just this little space in between. If there's any kind of magic in this world it must be 
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in the attempt of understanding someone, sharing something. I know, it's almost 
impossible to succeed but who cares really? The answer must be in the attempt.  
Just as, for Dennis, ‘it’s the trip itself that’s important’, so, for Celine, ‘the answer must be 
in the attempt.’ Here the counterculturally inflected project of the slacker, discussed in 
chapter one in relation to the ideas of the new sincerity, meets the traumatic nihilism of 
Cooper’s youths in a celebration of inquiry and liminality.  
 
Finally, then, we may say that abject art carves out a liminal space for philosophical 
meditation in spite of the aesthetic constraints of postmodernism and the political 
constraints of neoliberalism. The problems Cooper, Araki, McCarthy, and Sherman work 
through are deeply politicised, even when apparently confined to aesthetics. Each pursue 
their own agenda, using the abject to transgress a mainstream culture of suburban 
conformity, homo-normativity, liberal identity politics and patriarchal indoctrination. In this 
sense, abjection works to disrupt the seamlessness of capitalist realism by making visible 
the aporias it conceals. By marrying the constraints of language and form (postmodern 
concerns) to the constraints of social construction (symptomatic of neoliberalism), abject 
artists manage to absorb the legacy of postmodernism and re-energise, and re-politicise, 
aesthetics. But perhaps more importantly than this, abject artists working in the 1990s also 
gesture towards new, positive powers for art. By harnessing the inherent, pre-rational 
responses incurred by the abject, these artists embark upon an attempt to connect 
meaningfully in dialogue with their audience. Theirs is a never-ending attempt to express 
themselves in the face of the absolute impossibility of authentic expression post-
postmodernism. Nevertheless, they invite their audience to join them in this attempt 
through the staging of self-reflexive games and an obliqueness that necessitates 
interpersonal participation and a work of interpretation that ultimately engenders self-
reflection. Kristeva describes the abject as an ‘analytic adventure’. Cooper, Araki, McCarthy 
and Sherman offer to take their audience on that adventure. They promise no resolution, 
nor even a destination; only the reassurance that the answer must be in the attempt: that 
it’s the trip itself that’s important.
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Chapter 5: Dialectical Writing 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In a letter written to fellow author Jonathan Franzen, Don DeLillo addresses the former’s 
inquiry into the structure of his eleventh novel, Underworld. DeLillo writes,  
There's a term in mathematics, convergence to a limit, and I don't recall the precise 
meaning, or even the vague meaning, but maybe this is what I do when building 
the side-by-side structures you mention in your letter. Getting closer to an 
"answer" by listing the steps that lead to the answer. I think I tried to do less of 
this, one or two books ago, but with this book a number of things opened or 
reopened and possibly I began doing it again. (95.4)1 
The concept of convergence to a limit is an effective metaphor for the unmistakeable 
structure of Don DeLillo’s novels—helpfully summarised with one of Peter Boxall’s 
favourite terms for the author’s method: ‘bi-directional’ (Boxall, 94, 133, 184). For the 
purposes of this chapter, I wish to propose an alternative term for DeLillo’s distinctive style: 
dialectical. Understood in both the traditional, Hegelian sense as a mode of inquiry which 
arrays opposing theses against one another in search of a synthesis or resolution, and in 
Jameson’s sense as ‘thought to the second power’ (Jameson 1971, 45), reading DeLillo’s 
writing as dialectical recognises both the author’s intention to resolve problems with his 
texts and indexes the particular formal strategies DeLillo employs to this end. If each of 
DeLillo’s novels can be understood as an attempt to converge at a synthesis moment, or an 
‘answer,’ then the first step to successfully reading DeLillo’s work is to understand the 
question. For Boxall, DeLillo’s work is oriented around an attempt to maintain ‘the 
possibility of fiction’ in the face of the ‘exhaustion of possibility’ (8); or, in a reading that 
resonates with the dual preoccupations of this thesis, an attempt to develop a ‘form of 
                                                          
1 These letters belong to the Don DeLillo archive held at the Harry Ransom Center in Austin, Texas, 
along with all of DeLillo’s drafts, manuscripts, research materials and career-related ephemera. All of 
the unpublished work referred to in this chapter is drawn from research I carried out at the Ransom 
Center as an AHRC visiting fellow in Spring 2017. References to this material will list container and 
folder numbers in parentheses following quotes.   
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critical possibility that might take us past the theoretical impasse marked out by 
postmodernism, as it might take us beyond the end of history’ (16). Boxall observes that 
‘the millenium has formed DeLillo's far horizon, and his organising principle' (4). As the 
millennium-point bears down on the author in the 1990s, his attempts to argue for the 
‘possibility of fiction’ intensify, and DeLillo brings the theme of artistic production to the 
foreground of his work in this period. To this extent, one may read all three of DeLillo’s 
novels produced in the period of the long nineties—Mao II (1991), Underworld (1997), and 
The Body Artist (2001)—as one attempt to converge at the answer to the same problem 
that has preoccupied, in one guise or another, all of the works discussed in this thesis: 
what, at the moment the twentieth century becomes the twenty-first, is the purpose, 
power, and possibility of art? 
 
In DeLillo’s specific case, delineating the role of artistic production means drawing together 
two equally contested projects in 1990s America: postmodernism and Marxism. In the 
sphere of literary production, the waning of postmodern irony as the literary style du jour 
provided a space for a nascent and hotly contested post-postmodernism. Once comfortably 
classified as a postmodernist, the critical dissensus2 surrounding the categorisation of 
DeLillo’s 1990s writing testifies to his status as a paradigmatic writer of and for this 
unstable decade. Meanwhile, the Marxist project exhibited equal instability in 1990s 
America. The post-political, ‘end of history’ narrative promulgated by capitalist realism, or 
in Will Davies’ terminology, ‘normative neoliberalism,’ heralded a crisis of imagination for 
the left. Responses exacerbated the already splintered schools whose works of political, 
sociological, and cultural analysis could be said to owe elements of their methodology to 
classical Marxist theory. It is by engaging with these splintered factions of post-Marxism 
and relevant debates around autonomy, materialist critique, and the linguistic turn that 
DeLillo, in his 1990s texts, attempts to draw his own vision of the future of art.  
 
DeLillo’s first 1990s novel, Mao II, introduces these questions. The role of art and the 
relevance of the artist are quandaries that haunt the text and its protagonist, author Bill 
Gray. True to the metaphor of convergence, Mao II arrays concepts in dialectical pairs 
diametrically opposed to one another: art and terror, the individual and the crowd, 
autonomy and heteronomy. From this rigid schema, the novel pushes towards a sense of 
synthesis and an artistic ideal oriented around an idea of the social and the ameliorative 
                                                          
2 For examples of this critical dissensus, see my summary on page 169.  
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potential of art. Ultimately, though, the questions the text raises remain open. While 
DeLillo’s ideas converge, synthesis eludes him.  
 
1997’s Underworld picks up where Mao II leaves off. As well as a summation of the 
novelist’s achievements, this vast novel represents a widely acknowledged ‘pivot’ in the 
author’s oeuvre—a figurative break between the paranoid style and ‘relentless fixation on 
the political’ (Pakenham) that came before, and the oblique style and elliptical expression 
that comes after.3 This pivot, I want to suggest, is not as wholesale as some critics have 
argued. While Underworld certainly represents the end of a specific incarnation of DeLillo-
ian style, in terms of DeLillo’s intellectual concerns the novel represents less a pivot than a 
bridge. Facing the questions left unanswered by Mao II, Underworld may best be read as a 
grand playground of ideas—an experimental investigation into modern art’s potentialities 
and limitations, this time stressing greater ambitions in line with the novel’s expansive 
scope. It is in Underworld that DeLillo most explicitly draws his experiments with post-
postmodernism into conjunction with his interest in post-Marxism. Of particular interest in 
light of this reading are the archived early drafts of the novel, which hint at DeLillo’s unease 
and uncertainty in writing Underworld, and which reveal some of the possibilities the 
author failed to realise in his epic novel.  
 
If Underworld represents a grand debate played out over a half-century-sized stage, then 
The Body Artist embodies the outcomes of that debate distilled and manifested into 
DeLillo’s distinctive ‘late’ aesthetic project. Despite its oblique style, The Body Artist 
exhibits a certainty of purpose and a surety of agenda absent from the earlier work that is 
achieved partly by jettisoning the aforementioned ‘bi-directional’ rhythm in favour of a 
distinctly linear narrative trajectory. In its linearity it represents, I will argue, the limit point 
of DeLillo’s investigation into the role of the artist, and sets the stage for his following 
twenty-first century works. Ultimately, DeLillo’s output over the fin de siècle period 
encapsulates the narrative of this thesis, in which the long nineties is understood both as a 
space of instability and conflict, but also of radical experimentation and creativity.4 Tracing 
                                                          
3 In his article ‘The Genius of Don DeLillo’s post-Underworld work’, Christian Lorentzen presents a 
reading of the ‘four phases’ of DeLillo’s oeuvre, the last of which is constituted by 'the major minor 
works that followed [Underworld], five novels that constitute a beguiling late phase […] and each in 
its way a reckoning with encroaching silence.’ For further reference to a ‘late phase’ DeLillo, see also 
Anderson, ‘White Noise’; and Jordison, ‘Zero K and Making Sense of ‘Late Period’ Don DeLillo.’ 
4 In an excised passage from Underworld, DeLillo describes precisely this vision of the nineties. In an 
early draft of Marvin’s speech to Brian Glassic, the former observes:  
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DeLillo’s experiment, with all its conflict and creativity, from its origins as a disparate 
scattering of ideas to its convergence at an ‘answer’ to the question of the power and 
possibility of art will be this chapter’s task.  
 
 
Mao II 
 
 
The oft-quoted origins of Mao II point to the novel’s humble beginnings as a folder of 
research. In a rare interview with DeLillo, conducted by Vince Passaro in 1991, Passaro 
quotes Nan Graham, DeLillo's then editor at Viking: '"Long before he had written anything," 
says Nan Graham […] "Don told me he had two folders -- one marked 'art' and the other 
marked 'terror.'" Eventually the two folders became one.' Eventually this folder became a 
novel, but the folder itself still exists in DeLillo’s archive. Among the various newspaper 
clippings, magazine articles, and photographs that it contains, one article stands out as 
being subject to a particularly heavy spate of underlining and annotation. It is a piece from 
the New York Times entitled 'Writers and Dictators,' written by Mitchell Levitas and 
published in August 1988. The article explores the publishing world of Chile under the 
repressive regime of Augusto Pinochet. Beginning as a catalog of horrors visited upon 
prominent figures in Chile's publishing industry—the death of editor Jose Carasco, the 
jailing of editor Sergio Marris—the piece soon evolves into a debate over the role of 
literature.5 Referencing Jorge Luis Borges, Levitas writes that ‘Borges […] wrote an article in 
1948, during the Peron era, arguing that literature must avoid a confrontation with politics, 
a submissive idea to which he gave example.’ Following this example, Levitas suggests, has 
'led to a defense mechanism in which many writers took shelter in pure literature, a 
literature without historical reference that remains to this day.' Several of Levitas' subjects 
voice their displeasure at this state of events. One interviewee observes that “the only 
machine that functions well is the complicity machine, and until the writer’s responsibilities 
are openly debated, it will not be a healthy society”’ (Levitas).  
                                                          
People think the Cold War is history. It's actually the repression of history. It's the one thing 
that keeps the lid on society going nuts. It's the what-do-you-call-it, the stifling, the 
smothering of a thousand desires. What things will break loose when this period ends? Ask 
yourself. The knots are already loosening. Ask what it means to you personally. (63.4) 
5 DeLillo includes Marris’ story in Mao II. While photographing Bill, Brita remarks that she ‘was in 
Chile last year and […] met an editor who’d been sent to prison after his magazine did caricatures of 
General Pinochet. The charge was assassinating the image of the general’ (44).  
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It is the idea that the writer's responsibilities must be 'debated' that DeLillo addresses in 
Mao II. The novel follows the author Bill Gray and a loose cluster of figures that surround 
him: Scott, a drifter-cum-Bill’s housekeeper; Karen, an ex-Moonie and Scott and Bill’s 
sometime partner; and Brita, a photographer tasked with taking Bill’s picture. The first half 
of the novel documents these characters as they congregate at Bill’s house, drawn in by the 
gravitational pull of the reclusive author. Bill himself is a once-successful novelist who now 
maintains a near-hermetic existence and wrestles with a vast and unpublishable novel. In 
the second half of Mao II, Bill is invited to speak at an event on behalf of a kidnapped 
writer, believed to be held by a Maoist terrorist group in Beirut. Bill becomes embroiled in 
a plot to free the writer, and travels to Beirut by way of London, Athens, and Cyprus, in an 
attempt to sacrifice himself on behalf of the young Swiss poet. Bill dies on the ferry to 
Beirut from injuries sustained in a hit-and-run, and at the end of the novel DeLillo leaves 
the reader with an account of Brita’s successful meeting with the same Maoist group’s 
leader, whereupon she photographs him, having replaced her obsession with 
photographing writers with a desire to photograph terrorists.  
  
Anxiety over the roles of the terrorist and the novelist permeates Mao II, and leads to some 
of the novel’s most memorable passages. Early on, while Brita is photographing him, Bill 
volunteers his theory on the limitations of the novel:  
There’s a curious knot that binds novelists and terrorists. In the West we become 
famous effigies as our books lose the power to shape and influence. […] Years ago I 
used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of the culture. Now 
bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human 
consciousness. What writers used to do before we were all incorporated (41). 
For Bill, whatever perceived power the novel once had has been superseded by the more 
immediate psychic impact of the terrorist event. It is clear from a cursory exploration of the 
‘Art and Terror’ folder that the inspiration for these anxieties extends far beyond Chilean 
politics. DeLillo’s reading prior to writing the novel encompasses a global ferment of 
creative production and artistic repression. But drawing from this collection of research 
materials, a kind of paradox manifests itself in the novel: on the one hand, Bill Gray’s 
position argues for the impotence of art; yet, at the same time, compelling evidence 
refutes that notion: from Augustus Pinochet’s execution of uncompliant journalists to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa issued against an English author whose work of fiction sparked 
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a global hysteria, it is apparent that, for the Pinochet’s and Khomeini’s of the world, words 
have lost none of their power or potency.6  
 
George Haddad accurately identifies Bill’s problem when he observes—in a draft of their 
final conversation—that, ‘“in the world of glut and bloat, terror is the only meaningful act. 
The artist can be a hero only in repressive societies”’ (39.3). For Bill, the artist is defined by 
his other, the state against which he is perpetually opposed. The problem out of which the 
novelist’s impotence arises is the nature of the state against which Bill writes: the Western 
neoliberal state, the late-capitalist ouroboros of globalization and monoculture, 
consumerism and incorporation. The fluctuating nature of this state, its ideological 
malleability and infinite capacity to absorb and disarm that which threatens its hegemony, 
makes neoliberal capitalism the most dangerous opponent for the author attempting, as 
Bill attempts, to ‘raid […] human consciousness.’ 
 
DeLillo addresses this problem with dialectical inquiry. Mao II arrays a series of loosely 
interrelated terms in binary pairs such that the resonance of each individual term is 
developed through association. On the one hand, the character Bill, the solipsist par 
excellence, is associated with the individual artist and by extension, through his near-
hermetic existence, with the concept of absolute autonomy. Against Bill’s autonomous 
existence is arrayed the threat of absolute heteronomy, represented by DeLillo through the 
repeated images of crowds that punctuate the novel and that come, increasingly, to be 
synonymous with terror. From the ‘crushed and buckled’ (33) bodies of the Hillsborough 
disaster to the ‘living wave’ (189) of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s mourners, crowds in the 
novel are depicted in a perpetual ‘rush to death’ (34). Meanwhile, Bill’s own fate is similarly 
bleak. Death comes to the author in a small room, and with the symbolically on-the-nose 
theft of his identity papers, that death is freighted with the same significance as the deaths 
                                                          
6 A curious absence from Mao II, given the topic of the novel and the plethora of real-life references, 
is the figure of Salman Rushdie—but this was not always the case. In a scene from the novel that is 
cut from the final draft, Karen views a protest on TV. In later iterations, this scene would recount 
footage of the Hillsborough disaster, but in an early draft it describes a quite different vision:  
She sees a flag with a crescent moon, a man standing on a car; then a crowd, people cover 
the screen, chanting: then suddenly prayer, […] prayer rugs, running shoes, those knitted 
caps she doesn't know what they're called; then the canopy, Sunshine Deli, police in riot 
gear, then signs in English and she begins to understand this is not Tehran or the West 
Bank, signs saying Long Live Khomeini, Rushdie is a Friend of Satan; then the crowd 
standing and shouting. (39.2) 
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of hundreds at a football match or a funeral: both autonomy and heteronomy—the 
individual and the crowd—lead inevitably to the wholesale obliteration of one’s identity. 
 
DeLillo’s dialectic describes the same problem that Nicholas Brown, in his essay ‘The Work 
of Art in the Age of its Real Subsumption under Capital,’ considers in terms of the art 
object: ‘pure autonomy would have no relation to the world; pure heteronomy would be 
indistinguishable from it’ (Brown). This is essentially Bill’s bind: in Western society, the 
novelist can be absorbed by the culture or can withdraw from the culture, but Bill’s 
pessimism allows him no vision of how the novelist might be able to stand apart from, and 
yet meaningfully impact, that culture. But by arranging these concepts dialectically, DeLillo 
does what Bill cannot: he gestures towards the possibility of a synthesis of the poles of 
heteronomy and autonomy, and in doing so Mao II begins to posit an ideal form or role for 
art under the hegemony of neoliberalism: one that would neither be alienated from, nor 
absorbed by, the state against which it is opposed. In Brown’s schema, he associates 
autonomy—or at least an aesthetics of autonomy—with the modernist project, and 
heteronomy with the collapse of this project and the subsequent turn to postmodern 
pastiche. Here we approach familiar ground in the territories of DeLillo criticism: the 
debate regarding the degree to which DeLillo might be considered postmodern. This 
question arises in almost all significant work on DeLillo. David Cowart places DeLillo among 
‘the postmodern masters’ (2) but qualifies that his relationship to postmodernism is 
broadly antagonistic. Paul Giaimo builds on Cowart’s assertion and also rejects claims that 
DeLillo might more properly be considered a modernist or neo-modernist, to instead argue 
that the author’s emphasis on social engagement reflects a mimetic realist aesthetics (18). 
Meanwhile Tom LeClair places DeLillo in his own subcategory of postmodern or ‘re-
modern’ literature: the ‘systems novel’ (9). Peter Boxall, lastly, prefers to ‘move beyond the 
assumptions that are at work in the theorisation and the deployment of the terminology of 
postmodernism’ altogether (15).   
 
Boxall declares his position following a long excursus into the ‘fork’ in twentieth century 
theory, on one side of which sits postmodernism and whose chief proponents are Freud 
and Lacan, and then Derrida, Kristeva, and DeMan; while on the other side lies the 
Frankfurt School Marxism of Adorno and Horkheimer. Boxall convincingly argues that this is 
a false distinction, that ‘the story that pits French and German thought against one another 
has become somewhat less plausible’ (15). DeLillo grapples with the same complex knot 
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Boxall describes in Mao II, and as we shall see, even more directly in Underworld. By 
attempting to write a way between the poles of modernist autonomy and postmodern 
heteronomy, DeLillo’s work in Mao II and in the broader period of the long nineties 
attempts to move beyond the author’s own (debatably) postmodern aesthetics and 
politics, towards what we might call post-postmodernism. Just what this post-
postmodernism looks like, for DeLillo, becomes clearer as each novel progresses.   
 
* * *  
 
In preparation for his piece ‘Perchance to Dream,’ published in Harpers in 1996,7 Jonathan 
Franzen tapped DeLillo for a quote in an attempt to clear up a question he was grappling 
with: namely, what relevance and what purpose the novelist could enjoy in the coming 
century. In a letter to DeLillo, Franzen reveals one answer sourced from the novelist Donald 
Antrim:   
the question I still don't have an answer to is: how do I square the idea of the 
writer-alone-in-the-shadows with the imperative that so many of us feel 
nonetheless to address matters of central importance to the culture? Donald 
Antrim […] offered the idea that to write a novel is to create an (imagined) 
community that makes sense and feels home-like to the socially-isolate writer. 
(95.4). 
History—or at least the Ransom Center archives—does not record DeLillo’s response to 
Antrim’s idea. But in reading Mao II, one finds something akin to Antrim’s position 
developed in the novel. 
 
Before leaving Bill’s house to return to New York, Brita is invited to share a dinner with the 
house’s three residents. This dinner party forms something of an understated apex to the 
text, being the only time the four characters in the novel share a single scene. During the 
party, Bill observes that, ‘“it’s interesting how ‘guest’ and ‘host’ are words that intertwine 
[…] converging, mixing, reciprocating”’ (67). This notion of ‘converging, mixing, and 
reciprocating’ is key to DeLillo’s synthesizing act. Bill’s observation anticipates the concept 
Scott Lash has termed ‘sociality,’ as he describes it in his 1996 essay ‘Difference or 
Sociality.’ In this short text, Lash sets out his vision of ‘a radical politics of signification’ 
                                                          
7 Originally Franzen composed the piece for the New York Times, but, as he reports with horror to 
DeLillo, the Times ended up requesting half the text be cut and the rest be turned ‘into bullet-points’ 
(95.4). 
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(115) in opposition to an early-nineties intellectual climate that, in its privileging of identity 
and the ‘signifying lifestyle,’ Lash perceives to dangerously valorize the attributes of the 
‘self-enclosed’ and ‘monologic.’ Lash’s work provides an ideal critical companion to 
DeLillo’s fiction. Operating at the interstices of what Boxall identified as the ‘false binary’ of 
postmodernism and Frankfurt School Marxism, Lash—like Boxall—braids together the 
writings of Marshall McLuhan, Baudrillard, Eco and Derrida with a Benjamin-inspired 
critique of late-industrial society. Lash finds in the aforementioned postmodernists a 
disregard for intersubjectivity in favor of what he calls inter-objectivity, or the 
foregrounding of the interaction between the subject and the object. Lash terms this 
approach a ‘semiotics of difference,’ against which he posits his idea for ‘a semiotics of 
sociality’—a semiotics that would stress the qualities of ‘receptionism and presentation’ 
(122). For Lash, the ideal subject is  
not self-enclosed, but open, open and […] vulnerable; not involved in monologic 
“representation” but dialogical “presentation”, and whose aesthetic sensibility is 
not primarily productionist but receptionist.’ (114)  
This semiotics of sociality can be distilled into an aesthetic agenda that emphasizes 
dialogism, presentation, and reception, which is to say: it engages in a dialogue that 
functions at both an intertextual and interpersonal level; it rejects the easily consumable, 
marketable ‘fixity of the signifier’ in favor of an emphasis on irreducible aesthetic 
experience; and it eschews staid, alienating meta-referentiality for new forms of 
communication and connectivity.  
 
In Lash’s model art facilitates interpersonal connection by generating an aesthetic 
experience of ephemerality, impersonal feeling, and participatory production—all ideas I 
have discussed elsewhere in this thesis.8 Lash himself gives the example of free-form jazz, 
with its real-time responsiveness and improvisational quality, as an art form that might 
embody these features and thus demonstrate a semiotics of sociality. In a response to 
Lash’s essay, Harold Lemke provides an array of further examples. For Lemke, the key to 
the idea of sociality is ‘the drawing together of life and art through cultural activities which 
have only a marginal function under capitalism’ (Lemke, 134), for which he gives the 
example of ‘the art of cooking and feasting… [and] the related arts of friendship and 
socializing’ (ibid.). With Lemke’s response to Lash we come full circle to arrive back at Bill’s 
                                                          
8 For a discussion of ephemeral production as means of resistance in the film Slacker, see chapter 1; 
for an explanation of ‘impersonal feelings,’ see chapter 3; and for further development of the idea of 
democratic production in the literature, art, and film of the 1990s, see chapter 4.   
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dinner party, and the ‘converging, mixing, reciprocating’ relationship that it facilitates 
between the guests.  
 
Not content with the ephemeral pleasures of a good party, however, DeLillo extends the 
idea of sociality to more conventional art in Mao II, namely the photograph and the novel. 
In relation to Bill’s novels, the idea of the work of a fiction as a mediator for interpersonal 
connection is explicitly developed in a passage cut from the final manuscript, in which 
DeLillo reveals Bill’s profound effect on Karen’s relationship with Scott: 
She didn't sleep with Scott for three months. First because she was married. Not 
only that but a willing celibate.  
She didn't sleep with Scott until she'd read Bill's novels. 
Bill’s novels allow Karen to connect intimately with Scott. Meanwhile, talking to Brita, Scott 
describes his first experience reading Bill: ‘I saw myself. It was my book. Something about 
the way I think and feel. He caught the back-and-forthness. The way things fit almost 
anywhere and nothing gets completely forgotten’ (51). Scott clarifies his ambiguous 
description by referring to a ‘great Winogrand photo,’ which for him conjures an ‘incidental 
menace’, a sensation which Brita affirms (51).9 Later, again talking to Brita, Scott recalls his 
first meeting with Karen, in White Cloud, Kansas. In response, Brita tells Scott she has ‘an 
Eve Arnold photograph of White Cloud,’ in which ‘everything so lonely and eloquent and 
commonplace at the same time […] all flows into the strange word on that [shop] sign’. ‘Ha-
Hush-Kah’, Scott recalls, ‘a Bill Gray touch. It’s a Bill Gray place, it really is’ (83). These 
conversations manifest a sense of intertextuality derived from Scott and Brita’s shared 
cultural experiences, despite the two characters being relative strangers. Brita and Scott 
use the references to Garry Winogrand, Eve Arnold, and Bill Gray as a form of extra-
linguistic communication, as a way of communicating complex sensations—‘the back-and-
forthness,’ ‘incidental menace,’ ‘everything […] lonely and eloquent and commonplace’—
through an aesthetic experience that can be shared interpersonally between the two 
characters, rather than confined to self-reflection and what Scott Lash might term ‘the self-
enclosed monad’.  
                                                          
9 In a letter to Frank Lentricchia, DeLillo calls Winogrand’s New Mexico, 1957 ‘the great American 
novel without words’ (97.8). He doesn’t elaborate, but I would speculate that DeLillo found the 
photograph’s marriage of the quotidian suburban dwelling with the vastness of the New Mexico 
desert particularly evocative. The encroaching storm clouds cast a pall over the innocent domestic 
scene Winogrand captures, and one can’t help but read in the photograph an anxiety in the child’s 
uncertain pose that echoes a generational anxiety regarding expansion, technology, and the looming 
threat of the nuclear. 
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The medium of photography is particularly significant here. In a commentary on Mao II’s 
closing chapter, Mark Osteen—drawing on the works of John Berger and Walter Benn 
Michaels—observes the ‘weak intentionality’ of the photograph, a condition of the 
instantaneousness of the photograph’s taking, and the disconnect between the 
photographer and the developed photo. This weak intentionality dilutes the authority of 
the photographer and leads to the photograph expressing ‘the subjectivity of the 
photographer,’ while simultaneously ‘demand[ing] the superimposition of the viewer's.’ 
Osteen summarises: ‘[the photograph] is both social and personal, at once a document and 
an interpretation’ (Osteen 1999, 667)—in other words, it is, perhaps more than any other 
medium, a liminal space in which collaborative meaning-making is foregrounded. As an 
artist, Brita expresses an awareness of her contingent manipulation of her photographs 
when she explains to Scott, ‘secretly I know I’m doing certain things to get certain effects. 
But we ignore this, you and I’ (26). Osteen notes how Mao II ‘embodies this paradox of 
photography: its mimetic quality is always accompanied by a realization of its artificiality’ 
(645).10 But, like in Brita's conception of her work, the overriding sense in Mao II is of a 
move beyond the meta-referential displays of self-awareness typical of postmodernism. 
The fact that Brita chooses to ‘ignore’ her role as mediator, however weak or strong her 
intentionality might be, speaks to what Nicoline Timmer has observed obliquely in post-
postmodern literature as the practice of ‘suspending’ the ‘suspicion of the suspension of 
disbelief’ (256), the latter of which guides reading in postmodern cultural and literary 
practices. Elsewhere Timmer refers to this move as ‘bracketing […] lack of faith’ (239). This 
‘bracketing’—or attempting to maintain faith—in turn recalls the openness of Lash’s ideal 
social subject, and circumscribes the aesthetic agenda of DeLillo’s novel.11  
 
The artworks in Mao II, then, demonstrate how the semiotics of sociality might be 
mobilized in aesthetic experiences to generate something like Donald Antrim’s idea of the 
                                                          
10 Most obviously, this sense of materiality is evoked in the inclusion of reproductions of 
photographs in the novel, with which DeLillo draws attention to the text as a material object and a 
work of printed fiction. This sense of materiality recalls the techniques of several other artists 
discussed in this thesis, from the retained pilcrows of Coupland’s Generation X to the attention 
Gregg Araki draws to the constraints of the frame in Totally Fucked Up (see chapters 1 and 4 
respectively). 
11 This idea of ‘bracketing […] lack of faith’ also of course recalls the ‘blind faith’ which Adam Kelly 
argues is instrumental to the aesthetics of new sincerity, which Kelly draws from the Derridean idea 
of the gift. Just as one must bracket the fear of manipulation when one accepts a gift, so the reader 
of new sincerity fiction is invited to bracket their postmodern ‘suspicion’ in order to engage with the 
work (see chapter 1). 
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‘(imaginary) community.’ The photographs discussed by Scott and Brita and the novels 
written by Bill function to facilitate interpersonal exchanges, both as shared cultural objects 
capable of expressing common but hard-to-articulate feelings, and as invitations from artist 
to viewer to share in a faithful interpretation of the object itself. In this way, DeLillo posits a 
vision of art that aspires neither to heteronomy nor autonomy, but to sociality, and to the 
affective sensation of communality that this semiotic register can develop when deployed 
in an artwork.  
 
* * *  
 
But if Mao II argues for art’s capability to facilitate and forge affective bonds between 
artists and audiences, these bonds remain at the scale of Bill’s four-person dinner party. 
Consulting DeLillo’s notes and drafts reveals the author’s belief in the mechanics and scale 
of art consumption. At the end of the novel’s prologue, DeLillo observes how people ‘bind 
themselves into numbered seats and fly across time-zones and high cirrus and deep night, 
knowing there is something they have forgotten to do’ (16). In an earlier draft, this image 
forms the opening scene of the novel: 
A journey by air is a story with a beginning, a middle and an end. It has a narrative 
pull, the arching trajectory of classic plot design. But it's a story you forget as soon 
as it's over. […] The aircraft encloses you all in a time sense unconnected to the 
burdened pace set by earth-clocks and sunsets and seasons. You are part of a 
complex trick, sealed from the world, enclosed in private time, a drift barely felt, 
like time passing in a book, years passing in a page. (39.1) 
DeLillo’s conflation of the separate images of a plane journey and a literary narrative are 
telling. They suggest, in their shared sense of ‘enclosed […] private time,’ the way in which, 
during the act of reading a novel, the novel exerts its own reciprocal effect back onto the 
reader, withdrawing them from the ordinary, ‘burdened’ flow of time.12  
 
This spatialized idea of reading evokes Salman Rushdie’s sense of the ‘little room of 
literature,’ which DeLillo refers to in a pamphlet written a few years after the release of 
Mao II in support of the then-exiled author. In the pamphlet, DeLillo observes that,  
                                                          
12 This passage also echoes the moment in DeLillo’s earlier work, The Names, when protagonist 
Axton observes how flight is a form of ‘dead time’ (The Names, 7). 
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[the] spirit of Rushdie lives […] in the narrow passage between the writer who 
works in solitude and the reader whose own living space or park bench or plane 
seat is "the little room of literature"—in Rushdie's own phrase—the place that will 
not be completely open until all marked writers are free people again. (91.6). 
This ‘narrow passage’ suggests a restricted relationship between reader and novel. In these 
instances, DeLillo’s vision for the novel resonates more with his own recorded thoughts on 
his ideal readership, as shared with Alan Begley in his Paris Review interview: 
I like to imagine [my novel] being read by some stranger somewhere who doesn't 
have anyone around him to talk to about books and writing--maybe a would-be 
writer, maybe a little lonely, who depends on a certain kind of writing to make him 
feel more comfortable in the world. 
 
For Jeffrey T. Nealon, DeLillo’s primary aesthetic goal with Mao II is to achieve a sense of 
‘interruption’ to the ‘too fast world of capital’, thus proving the novel ‘semi-autonomous 
from the world of getting and spending’ (155). DeLillo’s celebration of the plane seats and 
‘little rooms’ of literature is certainly indicative of DeLillo’s interruptive aspirations, but, 
contrary to Nealon, I want to stress that Mao II—and the photographs and novels that 
circulate within the text—also embraces a sense of sociality and a sense of the possibility—
to return to Boxall’s term—of art’s generative power. DeLillo cedes the power to ‘influence 
mass consciousness’ to the terrorist, but he nevertheless claims for the novel an alternate 
form of power no less important, but also not yet fully realised. The ideas of the novel as 
interruption and the novel as a means of instigating a form of sociality co-exist and 
commingle uneasily within the pages of Mao II. Ultimately, while the points DeLillo plots 
undoubtedly converge on a sense of something capable of mediating between the absolute 
poles of autonomy and heteronomy, the novel does not reach a ‘limit’ point of 
convergence: the dialectic does not result in a synthesis. What the novel does do, is raise 
and keep open the question of art’s place and power in the new millennium, opening a 
space for DeLillo’s subsequent work.  
 
 
Underworld 
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In his review of Mao II for The Irish Times, John Banville writes, 'Mao II, with its rages and 
disgusts, strikes me as a transitional work, a sort of pivot between sure-footed novels such 
as The Names and Libra, and something wholly new, the birth of which we must await.' No 
doubt Banville felt his anticipation justified when DeLillo followed Mao II with 1997’s vast 
epic Underworld. But I would argue that it is Underworld, not Mao II, that can most 
comfortably be read as a ‘pivot’ between the DeLillo of old—the DeLillo of postmodernism, 
of paranoia, and of an abiding interest in the grand sweep of American history—and a 
DeLillo that is ‘wholly new’; and that perhaps even then the novel is not so much a pivot as 
it is a bridge between the questions raised in Mao II and the answers potentially arrived at 
in The Body Artist. Indeed, regarding the question of the role of the artist, Underworld’s 
primary mode is of experimentation, in which a dizzying array of ideas are played out—
some successfully, others not—as DeLillo attempts once again to converge on an ‘answer.’ 
If Mao II, in Nealon’s terms, represents a ‘nostalgia’ for interruption, and as I have 
suggested balances ideas of art as an articulation of sociality formative of new communities 
and art as an amelioration of the existential loneliness of the alienated reader, then 
Underworld may be read as DeLillo’s rejoinder to the small-scale and the interruptive: an 
attempt to write a novel capable of generating tangible social change and the ‘widespread 
cognitive dissonance’ that Nealon argues should be the ultimate goal of any literature with 
aspirations beyond interruption. But, as I shall eventually demonstrate, DeLillo’s attempt 
culminates in exhaustion. 
 
Underworld begins similarly to Mao II: in an American baseball stadium. The set-piece this 
time, though, is not a Moonie mass wedding but the historical event of the ‘shot heard 
‘round the world’—Bobby Thompson’s 1951, pennant-winning home run against the 
Dodgers—and its curious historical concurrence with the test-explosion of a Soviet nuclear 
missile. These twin shots reverberate through the novel, sending out shockwaves that 
disturb fifty years of American history. DeLillo’s whistle-stop tour of the late-twentieth 
century takes in his home territory of the Bronx in the 1950s, the New York art scene in the 
1970s, the nascent cyberspace of the 1990s, and many more destinations besides. 
Structuring—or rather de-structuring—the novel is the omnipresent threat of the Cold 
War. Everything in the text is irradiated by the perennial threat of the nuclear, from Lenny 
Bruce’s Cuban Missile Crisis-inflected stand-up routine in the 1960s to Nick Shay’s business 
trip to a Kazakhstan desert that closes out the story. Throughout this, Underworld further 
picks at the threads teased at in Mao II. A plethora of artists and artworks circulate in the 
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novel, and DeLillo uses these figures as a means to further develop his response to the 
question of art’s possibility in the coming millennium.   
 
In this respect also, Underworld initially picks up where Mao II leaves off—with the idea of 
sociality and of Donald Antrim’s ‘imagined communities’. One of the over-arching conceits 
of Underworld is the novel’s excavation and exposure of the literal ‘underworld’ that 
DeLillo demonstrates to be subsumed under or repressed by contemporary society. The 
novel demonstrates by example the way in which a work of art can reverse this repression 
and bring to light secret or buried histories and communities. Boxall suggests that the 
novel, in a sort-of ironic resistance to its own opening half-line, is fundamentally about ‘all 
those forms of cultural experience and memory that cannot be articulated by an American 
voice' (187).  
 
The idea of art as an articulation of a repressed underworld is raised almost immediately 
and in literal terms in the novel’s prologue, when J. Edgar Hoover, while attending the 
Giants’ game, encounters Pieter Bruegel’s painting The Triumph of Death on a torn-out 
page from Life magazine.13 The painting’s subject, an untamed underworld rising up to 
shatter the respectable veneer of bourgeois society, becomes a recurring motif in 
Underworld and guides DeLillo’s clinical, unblinking vision of American society. During the 
course of the novel DeLillo describes horrors as varied as the man ‘who’d cut his eyeball 
out of its socket because it contained a satanic symbol’ (247) in Brooklyn, to the woman 
‘with features intact but only half a face, somehow’ (800) in Tchaika, which leads Woody 
Lewis to remark that the novel views its subject through a ‘Bruegel filter’ (Lewis).  More 
than just an aesthetic coda, though, Triumph’s depiction of the denizens of the underworld 
puncturing a surface of decorum and sensibility sets the ideological agenda of the novel, 
and leads Sister Edgar to reminisce, only a page after the story of the satanic eyeball, of her 
days in Rome and her own vision of ‘death, yes, triumphant’ (249). Art, for DeLillo, is the 
ideal medium through which to breathe life into those skeleton denizens of society who lay 
hidden. 
 
This motif is clearly present in the various art projects featured in Underworld, from the 
guerrilla-style throw-ups of graffiti artist Moonman 157 to the vast, participatory projects 
                                                          
13 Over five hundred pages later, this moment will find its parallel when the Factoids infiltrate and 
intimidate Hoover at his own bacchanalia, the Black and White Ball. 
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of visual artist Klara Sax, to the avant-garde filmmaking of real-life Soviet auteur Sergei 
Eisenstein. Repeatedly, these projects are framed as expressions of uprising thematically 
akin to the skeletal bacchanalia of the Bruegel painting. While riding one of his painted 
subway cars, graffiti artist Moonman 157 addresses himself to the public of New York:  
you can't not see us anymore […] you have to see our tags and cartoon figures and 
bright and rhyming poems, this is the art that can't stand still, it climbs across your 
eyeballs night and day, the flickery jumping art of the slums and dumpsters, 
flashing those colors in your face--like I'm your movie, motherfucker (440-441) 
Moonman’s graffiti is cast in the novel as an expression of the underclass with which he 
identifies, the class that occupy the literal underworld of the subway tunnels and ‘slums 
and dumpsters’ and ‘the people who lived in the cable rooms and up on the catwalks […] 
and in the unused freight tunnel under the West Side’ (435). ‘The whole point of 
Moonman’s tag,’ DeLillo writes, ‘was how the letters and numbers told a story of 
backstreet life’ (434), while the form and violence of the tag lends it its forceful impression. 
As Jean Baudrillard writes in America: ‘[Graffiti] simply say: I’m so-and-so and I exist! They 
are free publicity for existence.' 
  
Long Tall Sally, the work of visual artist Klara Sax and an army of volunteers working in the 
New Mexico desert, is a similar project of making visible. The vast installation consists of 
over two hundred decommissioned and abandoned B-52 bombers, systematically painted 
by Klara and her volunteers living in the makeshift camp she has organised for this purpose. 
When asked to explain the rationale behind the piece in an interview with a French 
television crew, Klara haltingly explains that, in the face of the spectacle of mass 
production the Boneyard represents, ‘we’re trying to unrepeat, to find an element of felt 
life, and maybe there’s a sort of survival instinct here, a graffiti instinct—to trespass and 
declare ourselves, show who we are’ (77). As with Moonman’s tags, Klara’s brightly daubed 
canopies declare ‘I’m so-and-so and I exist!’ 
  
Finally, and arguably the most iconic of Underworld’s many artworks, is the fictional ‘lost’ 
Sergei Eisenstein film Unterwelt. In a pivotal scene in the novel, the film is watched by Klara 
Sax and a carefully curated audience of New York artists and intellectuals at the same 
moment that Moonman is riding his subway train below—the passing vibrations of which 
are felt by the Eisenstein crowd in the basement theatre of the Radio City Music Hall. 
Eisenstein's film is a long, ill-defined narrative documenting an oppressed and deformed 
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peoples’ overthrowing of their captors and their subsequent ascent to the surface of their 
world. The film is reportedly shot in the director’s distinctive style but inflected with a 
schlocky science-fiction edge, and with a tempered and distilled ‘politics of montage’ that is 
a subtle yet pointed departure from the rest of Eisenstein’s (real) oeuvre. Klara notes the 
way Eisenstein shifts in this film from ‘typage’ to ‘typology’—from a focus on characters 
defined by their class and persecuted accordingly, to characters defined only by the fact 
that they are persecuted: ‘this was their typology,’ she remarks. ‘They were an 
inconvenient secret of the society around them’ (443). Based on this egalitarian 
representation, she concludes:  
This is a film about Us and Them, isn’t it?  
They can say who they are, you have to lie. They control the language, you have to 
improvise and dissemble. They establish the limits of your existence. (444) 
Like Klara and Moonman’s artworks, Eisenstein’s film symbolizes art’s potential to express 
that which has been repressed and driven—literally—to the underworld.14 
 
These projects—variously, an avant-garde film from the 1930s, graffiti produced in the 
1970s, and a kind of social or participatory art project typical of the 1990s15— all seek to 
express the existence of an ‘underworld’ to an American society ignorant of its presence. 
And yet, of course, they vary immensely in both their process and execution. As this 
chapter develops, I will argue that Underworld is, above everything else, a novel of 
experimentation. The novel’s five-year gestation period is reflected in a finished project full 
of internal dichotomies and contradictions, not least relating to the role of art as a mode of 
societal critique. Spanning a fifty-year period, DeLillo’s exploration necessarily considers 
                                                          
14 In an interview conducted in the wake of Underworld’s publication, DeLillo confirms both this 
reading and the film’s centrality to the novel:  
the film supplies a Russian presence right in the middle of the book, almost the literal 
middle of the book, and it also explores a kind of gradation from the political repression of 
the Stalin era to something that in a way is deeper and more personal. (Howard) 
15 Here, it may be worth very briefly considering the issue of medium specificity, which is raised 
when considering these examples and which surfaces regularly when dealing with DeLillo’s novels, 
which typically feature a myriad of art forms including film, photography, painting, theatre, and 
performance. Despite this plethora of forms, I am inclined to agree with David Cowart’s response to 
the widely held notion that DeLillo privileges the visual image in his novels. Cowart, discussing 
DeLillo’s use and belief in the power of language, suggests that in DeLillo's fiction the visual image is 
not privileged, rather, 'language subsumes image,’ and that 'images themselves constitute a 
semiotic’ (4). In other words, DeLillo uses different mediums as different semiotic codes that 
nevertheless express essentially the same thing. Attending to medium specificity may nuance our 
understanding of DeLillo’s project, and his use of various mediums may allow him access to different 
techniques and strategies, but these mediums are at a very fundamental level interchangeable with 
regard to the author’s key ideas.   
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several shifts in contemporary art, covering periods of both modernism and 
postmodernism, and both 'high' and 'low' cultural forms.  
 
Were we to attempt to place Moonman 157’s graffiti into an existing taxonomy of art 
movements, we might take its playfully disruptive nature, its occupation of public space, 
and its dubious legality, and conclude that it belongs alongside its contemporaries in the 
neo-avant-garde, as another stunt or ‘happening’ akin to those staged by groups like the 
Situationist International and Fluxus.16 Certainly, Moonman’s artistic ethos, the transient 
nature of his work, and the joy he takes in witnessing its reception, mirrors the Situationist 
emphasis on ‘complete communication’ of ‘the lived moment.’ (‘Situationist Manifesto’). 
Meanwhile, as Moonman rides his bombed car below, the coterie of intellectuals 
assembling for the display of Eisenstein’s film Unterwelt represents a starkly contrasting 
model of artistic circulation. Whether in keeping with the auteur’s wishes or not, the 
limited showing of Unterwelt manifests as a sort of Bourdieusian field of restricted 
production, a hallmark of a typically modernist circulation of art.17 At the moment 
Moonman’s train passes beneath the Radio City Music Hall, then, DeLillo juxtaposes an 
avant-garde vision of art-in-life with a modernist model of restricted artistic circulation.18    
  
In his 1985 study After the Great Divide, Andreas Huyssen contrives a similar juxtaposition 
in his attempt to ‘map the postmodern’. Huyssen tells a narrative of the development of 
postmodernism that begins with the challenge mounted by the historical avant-garde 
against the bourgeois high art of the nineteenth century. These attempts by expressionists 
and Dadaists to bring 'art into life,' Huyssen argues, ultimately result in failure, and 
modernism’s emergence represents a redressing of the balance in favour of ‘high’ culture: 
a move away from art and life, to l’art pour l’art, or art for art's sake (192). In telling this 
story, one of Huyssen’s most interesting interventions is to recast poststructuralism as a 
theory of modernism and an ‘archaeology of modernity,’ which he situates against a 
                                                          
16 Graffiti’s status as avant-garde has been argued by, for example, Connell Vaughan in ‘Institutional 
Change: The Concept of the Avant-Garde and the Example of Graffiti’, as well as in many popular 
publications such as the special issue of IdN: Street Art: from Vandalism to Avant-Garde. 
17 Bourdieu compares the ‘field of restricted production’ to the ‘field of large scale cultural 
production.’ For Bourdieu, the former is defined as ‘a system objectively producing for producers,’ 
which is to say, a collective of artists creating art for a highly specialised coterie of fellow artists and 
intellectuals actively distinguishing themselves from a broader public of consumers, of which 
modernism is the archetypal example (Bourdieu, 4). 
18 See also Peter Bürger, who argues in his classic work Theory of the Avant-Garde for the way in 
which the avant-garde seeks to 'reintegrate art into the praxis of life' (22). 
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prevailing reading that parallels poststructuralism and postmodernism. Huyssen finds a 
congruence between modernist art’s restriction to the aesthetic realm and 
poststructuralism’s abandonment of ‘the pretense to a critique that would go beyond 
language games, beyond epistemology and the aesthetic,’ leading him to conclude that 
French theory is a theory of ‘modernism at the stage of exhaustion’ (209). This is a 
complicated account of postmodernism, and these complications might be accounted for 
by Huyssen’s position as a frontrunner in the rush to attempt to ‘map the postmodern.’19 
To an extent, we might read DeLillo’s work in the 1990s as a similar attempt to map the 
postmodern. The interplay of modes and styles of art he describes betray an interest in 
working out where contemporary art—including his own—sits in relation to their 
modernist and avant-garde antecedents. In this sense, the web of influence Huyssen traces 
back from the postmodern moment, while provisional and imperfect, is nevertheless 
invaluable for interpreting how artists like DeLillo were attempting to draw their own 
‘maps of the postmodern’ at the end of the twentieth century.  
 
Without wishing to suggest too schematic a reading of DeLillo’s configuration of artists, we 
might read Klara Sax as DeLillo’s avatar for the postmodern tradition. Having explicitly 
acknowledged the significance of the formal placement of the Unterwelt episode at the 
center of Underworld, it is reasonable to read Klara Sax’s placement at the centre of this 
event as another formal tip-off to the artist’s situation at the centre of the 
modernism/avant-garde divide with which the novel is at least partially preoccupied. 
Placed somewhere between Eisenstein’s film and Moonman’s graffiti, Klara’s art—
particularly Long Tall Sally—occupies a liminal no-man’s land between modernist 
autonomy and avant-garde art-in-life, and DeLillo’s depiction of Klara’s art is representative 
of his dialectical style. Klara’s work marries a desire to ‘find an element of felt life’ with the 
semblance of autonomy she implicitly indicates when she quotes Matisse in her French 
television interview: ‘painters must begin by cutting out their tongues’ (77); or when she 
insists on the necessity of the desert which renders her installation all but unreachable. In 
this sense quintessentially postmodern, her work is simultaneously withdrawn and open, 
                                                          
19 Huyssen’s Great Divide is contemporaneous with Fredric Jameson’s account of postmodernism 
but precedes the later and widely accepted narratives posited by, among others, Linda Hutcheons or 
Brian McHale. Whether postmodernism is primarily a return to avant-garde practice, a pastiche of 
consumer culture, historiographic metafiction, or an experiment in ontological instability, the 
debates surrounding the definition of postmodernism speak to its slipperiness as a category and 
thus a frame of understanding. Huyssen contributes to the attempt to define the term, but his 
conclusions are far from final. 
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restricted and egalitarian. This balance is significant for DeLillo’s broader project because it 
suggests that far from a coherently linear interpretation of the last half-century, 
Underworld is bound up in the contradictions and oppositions of this period.  
 
* * *  
 
By raising the question of language—by observing that ‘they control the language’—Klara 
gestures towards a broader issue raised by Eisenstein’s film and the other artworks in the 
text: the idea of history as a narrative or discourse. When Klara or Moonman or Eisenstein 
narrate the existence of their own suppressed community, they not only make visible that 
community but also the ideologies which enacted that suppression in the first place. In 
other words, they make visible the dominant narratives that organize and describe their 
society. Underworld returns frequently to this idea of narrative as an organizing principle 
and to these narratives’ effects on the culture. Likewise, critics of DeLillo have frequently 
noted the way in which his work aspires to the condition of counternarrative or disruption-
of-narrative.20 To return to the earlier question of DeLillo’s postmodernity, we might 
initially recognize this idea of narrative and counternarrative as an essentially postmodern 
one. Here, DeLillo begins to grapple more explicitly with some of the defining theoretical 
debates of the 1990s. Earlier, drawing on Lash and Boxall, I referred to the tensions 
between postmodernism and Marxism. While a commonly accepted narrative tells of the 
publication of Hardt and Negri’s influential text Empire in 2000 as instrumental to the 
‘resurrection’ of Marxist debates following their decline in the 1990s,21 in fact such debates 
continued throughout the decade, albeit partially occluded by the critical dissensus 
concerning the nature and legacy of postmodernism. Indeed, these two debates are 
inextricably intertwined, as postmodernism often found itself situated—as Lash and Boxall 
demonstrated—as the bogeyman of classical Marxist analysis. As I wish to demonstrate, 
Underworld represents DeLillo’s attempt to engage with, and work through, precisely this 
complex knot of political and aesthetic theory.   
 
                                                          
20 See Boxall (5) as well as John Leonard, who in his review of Underworld notes wryly that 
‘cyberpunk professors are entitled to conclude that DeLillo has problematised the very idea of a 
master narrative.’ 
21 Michael Hardt, in ‘Postface: Deciphering the Meaning of the Attacks on Empire’, notes that in the 
wake of Empire, ‘traditional anti-imperialist authors’ have tended to ‘resurrect the “Marxism versus 
postmodernism” debates that raged among Left academics.’ 
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In his 1991 article ‘Remaking American Marxism’, Manning Marable laments that in the 
‘post-modern period’ it is no longer accepted as given that capitalism is class struggle.22  
This shift away from the tenets of classical Marxism gave rise in this period to a number of 
debates over the applicability of key Marxist concepts—concepts like the labor theory of 
value and the configuration of base and superstructure—to late capitalism’s fin de siècle 
form. A paradigmatic example of such a debate can be found in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality (2000), a three-way exchange between Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and 
Slavoj Žižek which culminates with the latter two theorists disavowing one another’s 
positions entirely.23 Over the successive essays laid out in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality, Slavoj Žižek puts forth an argument for, among other things, a re-essentialising 
of class struggle in the face of its ‘ideological displacement’ and sublimation under the 
‘discourse of postmodern identity politics’ (Žižek, 97). Žižek situates himself against what 
he perceives as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s renunciation of ‘the objective 
grounding of the “superstructural” hegemonic struggle in the economic “infrastructure,”’ 
which he regards as an attempt to repoliticise the economic realm and democratise 
struggle (98). Against this shift, Žižek argues for a structural, materialist analysis that 
reinstates a classical appreciation of the hegemonic relationship between base and 
superstructure and the privileged position of class struggle as the terrain of revolutionary 
politics based on the worker’s proximity to the heart—or base—of the system. In return, 
Laclau argues that a renewed emphasis on the privileging of class struggle ignores the fact 
that capitalism is a complex world system structured as an ‘imperialist chain,’ not a 
hierarchy, and thus ‘crises at one point in the system create dislocations at many other 
points’ (Laclau, 203). Reading the capitalist system as an unstable system of constantly 
displacing component elements, rather than as the classical arrangement of base and 
superstructure, allows Laclau to reframe class struggle as ‘just one species of identity 
politics, and one which is becoming less and less important in the world in which we live' 
(ibid.). Furthermore, Laclau probes the metaphor of base/superstructure itself, positing 
that the systemacity it implies is itself a hegemonic construction, and that this brand of 
Marxist discourse might be considered complicit with the neoliberal metanarrative of 
economic fundamentalism.  
                                                          
22 Marable’s own position is that ‘it always has been, and so long as corporate capitalism dominates 
our economic and social system, it always must be’ (45). 
23 Alongside Derrida’s 1993 text Specters of Marx and the responses captured in the 1999 volume 
Ghostly Demarcations, the dialogue between Žižek and Laclau indicate the heatedness with which 
theories of post-Marxism were debated in the 1990s. Certainly, these debates were in no need of 
‘resurrection’ come the publication of Hardt and Negri’s Empire. 
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This back-and-forth exchange is paradigmatic of the antagonism that Goran Therborn, in 
his 2007 article ‘After Dialectics,’ observes between post-Marxist and neo-Marxist thought. 
For Therborn, the most compelling and prolific strains of late-Marxist thought at the turn of 
the century are those of the post- and neo- schools. While Therborn admits that the 
boundaries between the two ‘have become blurred in recent times,’ he still distinguishes 
between a post-Marxism that, in Laclau and Mouffe’s words, represents ‘the 
reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as well as the process of going beyond it,’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, qtd. In Therborn, 104) and a neo-Marxism that is contrarily composed 
of projects that ‘signal a significant departure from classical Marxism and retain an explicit 
commitment to it,’ of which Therborn considers Žižek’s Lacanian-inflected politics 
emblematic (Therborn, 106). Following Therborn’s taxonomy, we might place Žižek’s 
passionate confirmation of the enduring relevance of the base/superstructure 
configuration and of class struggle as the primary force motivating anti-capitalist reform as 
a neo-Marxist position. In turn, Laclau’s dismissal of Žižek’s defence as an outdated reading 
of a complex and multivalent system mired in an archaic terminology represents what 
Therborn would classify as a post-Marxist stance. A key distinction between the two 
positions is the neo-Marxist insistence on the continued relevance of materialist claims 
arrayed against the post-Marxist turn to linguistics and a focus on discourse and the 
insufficiencies and elisions present in the language of classical Marxism. This difference is 
emblematised by Laclau’s claim in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, that the main task 
of political theory in the 1990s is ‘to develop […] language games and thus to promote the 
expansion of political imagination’ (213). Here, it is clear to see how post-Marxism can be 
yoked to postmodernism through a chain of false equivalences. Huyssen’s branding of post-
structuralist ‘language games’ as a clear indication of the discipline’s retreat from the 
political shares Laclau’s terminology, but Laclau’s ‘language games’ represent an expansion 
of, not a retreat from, the realm of politics.   
 
To return to Underworld, essential to understanding DeLillo’s politics is understanding 
whether the language games the novel employs represent post-Marxist expansion or 
postmodern retreat. Swathes of the novel take place in the post-Cold War 1990s, and in 
these scenes DeLillo’s diagnosis of modernity—delivered primarily through the character of 
baseball memorabilia collector Marvin Lundy—playfully invokes a Lyotardian account of 
the structuring force of metanarratives. In a key scene in the novel, Brian Glassic visits 
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Marvin on a whim after seeing an article on him in an in-flight magazine. Unprompted by 
Brian, Marvin pontificates at length on the meaning behind the obsessive pursuits of 
collectors like himself.  He eventually locates this meaning in the end of the Cold War—an 
event that he describes as one of the twentieth century’s most powerful narratives and 
most enduring organizing principles. The Cold War, Marvin observes, is 
the one constant thing. It's honest, it's dependable. Because when the tension and 
rivalry come to an end, that's when your worst nightmares begin. All the power and 
intimidation of the state will seep out of your personal bloodstream. You will no 
longer be the main […] point of reference. (170) 
In his suggestion that ‘the power and intimidation of the state will seep out of your 
personal bloodstream,’ Marvin appears to predict the hegemony of Cold War realism giving 
way to something emergent and as yet undefined. This position is clarified further in a 
passage DeLillo eventually cuts from the novel, in which Marvin remarks that ‘people think 
the Cold War is history. It's actually the repression of history. […] It's the what-do-you-call-
it, the stifling, the smothering of a thousand desires’ (63.4). For Marvin, the Cold War 
represents a systemic narrative capable of inhibiting or suppressing ‘history,’ and perhaps 
also politics, understood as the flux of everyday life.  
 
For DeLillo, when the Cold War comes to an end, capitalism assumes its position as 
organising metanarrative. The epilogue to Underworld, titled ‘Das Kapital’, begins with a 
typically DeLillo-esque provocation: ‘capital burns off the nuance of the culture’ (785). The 
passage goes on to lament the development of the nuance-less monoculture of 
globalisation, referring as it does to the same suppression of desires for which Marvin 
blames the Cold War:  
The system pretends to go along, to become more supple and resourceful, less 
dependent on rigid categories. But even as desire tends to specialize, going silky 
and intimate, the force of converging markets produces an instantaneous capital 
that shoots across horizons at the speed of light, making for a certain furtive 
sameness, a planing away of particulars that affects everything from architecture 
to leisure time to the way people eat and sleep and dream. (786) 
DeLillo’s vision of instantaneous, speed-of-light capital complements Laclau’s nuanced 
appreciation of the complexity of the late capitalist world system. In each of DeLillo’s 
accounts of the Cold War and capitalism, global conflict and globalisation are framed as the 
dominant narratives of a system capable of assimilating the nuances of individual 
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expression and desire. Drawing equivalence between capitalism and the Cold War in this 
respect, DeLillo presents both as ideological fronts, picking at the same loose thread Laclau 
draws from Žižek’s reliance on the base/superstructure configuration: the idea that 
systemic narratives are self-confirming. This reading has interesting repercussions for the 
art projects the novel features, and by extension, the novel itself: if the capitalist system 
relies on a ‘planing away of particulars,’ then to emphasise the difference and the radical 
non-conformity simmering beneath the monocultural veneer positions Underworld, as well 
as the artworks it contains, as a direct antagonist to globalized capitalism. Here, DeLillo’s 
commitment to everyday life is imbued with a newfound political valence that freights the 
art projects of Klara and Moonman with an urgency tied directly to their attempts to make 
visible the ‘felt life’ of their suppressed subjects as discrete counternarratives. 
 
Against these forces which control the discourse, DeLillo arrays art as resistance. Beginning 
with Klara Sax, DeLillo tells us: 'she tried to scale her work to the human figure even though 
it wasn't figural. She was wary of ego, hero, heights and size' (375). Meanwhile, in 
reference to her piece Long Tall Sally, Klara remarks: ‘what I really want to get at is the 
ordinary life behind the thing. […] That’s the heart and soul of what we’re doing here […] to 
find an element of felt life’ (77).24 In the context of a novel hyperaware of modernity’s 
tendency towards monoculture—the aforementioned ‘stifling’ of the Cold War, the ‘furtive 
sameness [and] planing away of particulars’ engendered by globalized capitalism— the 
impulse towards egalitarianism and suspicion of ego, combined with the celebration of the 
everyday and the quotidian, positions Klara as a champion of those desires suppressed by 
the structuring dominant narratives. Her ‘looking […] carefully’ allows her to expose 
counter-narratives and micro-narratives of the ordinary arrayed against the grand 
narratives of global conflict and global expansion that threaten to flatten out the 
particularities of human existence. Klara’s explanations weaponize her art in this war of 
discourse. Frequently, the novel renders this conflict in terms of a struggle to control vision: 
whether through advertiser Charlie Wainright’s observation that ‘whoever controls your 
eyeballs runs the world. […] Once we get the consumer by the eyeballs, we have complete 
mastery of the marketing process’ (530-31), or Moonman 157’s declaration that ‘you hit a 
                                                          
24 Once again, early drafts cast this project in slightly different, expanded terms: 
We salvaged junk and reclaimed it, I guess, gave it a refuge in art. Which sounds nobler 
than it was. It was mainly a democratic thing. We were all-consuming on the one hand, 
junk-merchants ready to steal and beg, but also sort of populist, I think. […] eager to see 
what's worthwhile in the ordinary object, to see it again. (65.5) 
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train and it’s yours […] seen everywhere in the system, and you get inside people’s heads 
and vandalize their eyeballs’ (435), DeLillo’s novel equates visibility with agency and power. 
From Nick’s interpretation of Long Tall Sally as an expression of ‘who we are’ to 
Moonman’s eyeball-vandalizing graffiti to Eisenstein’s ‘secret rebellion,’ the artworks in 
Underworld function as a creative-critical challenge to the narrative forces of consumer 
culture and global conflict for control of the discourse of history. 
 
 Laclau concludes his first contribution to Contingency, Hegemony, Universality with the 
proposition that democratic politics needs to balance the universal and the particular in the 
way that, for example, a general strike encompasses both the concrete specificity of actual 
demands and the symbolic desire for a fully ethical society. As the link Underworld makes 
between art as an expression of felt life and art as counternarrative suggests, for DeLillo 
the novel is capable of performing precisely this marriage of the particular and the 
universal. DeLillo’s position, however, is far from stable. Just as debate raged between the 
factions of post- and neo-Marxism in the 1990s in the pages of volumes like Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality, so, to an extent, do these debates manifest in literary works from 
the period, including Underworld. While DeLillo’s work has always been characterized by 
the dialectical approach he employs in Underworld, one of the most compelling revelations 
DeLillo’s archive discloses is the extent to which such attempts to stage and resolve 
complex problems are enacted during the drafting phase of the author’s writing process. 
Consulting the early drafts of Underworld, for example, one is met with DeLillo’s wavering 
attempts to solidify his position within the Marxist debates I have glossed above. 
Emblematic of his uncertainty in these debates is a fascinating speech DeLillo eventually 
cuts from the epilogue of Underworld. In this speech, Viktor Maltsev delivers a strikingly 
traditional Marxist sermon in which he argues that Marx’s vision of capitalist collapse may 
have been somehow suspended by the Cold War, much as Marvin reads the suspension of 
history as a product of this same conflict. As we move into the twenty-first century, 
Maltsev speculates, capitalist collapse may again become possible:  
Marx believed capitalism would crumble because the vast standardised system, the 
interdependent and uniform means of production, would fall into conflict with 
independent thinking, private property, free enterprise, free expression. […] The 
bomb makes us all docile. Malleable. Faithless. Conformist. Ready to be massed 
and processed. Not just the danger of the bomb but the knowledge, the 
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technology, the vastness of nature completely falsified, you know. Now that the 
immediate threat is gone, what will happen? I don't know. Chaos, maybe. (68.6). 
 
This passage returns to Marvin’s belief that the threat of nuclear conflict somehow stifled 
or repressed the possibility of ‘chaos.’ But Maltsev’s account is more stridently neo-Marxist 
than Marvin’s, in its insistence on a superstructure of legal and ideological values 
constructed on a base system of production, and on its prediction that the contradictions 
internal to this configuration will inevitably result in revolutionary change. It is perhaps 
Maltsev’s conviction of this inevitability that leads DeLillo to excise this passage. While 
postmodern metanarratives and post-Marxist unstable systems grant superstructural 
actants—including artists—agency to effect political change, Maltsev’s position appears to 
leave little room for the possibility of critique to play a meaningful role in the challenging of 
capitalist realism or the neoliberal hegemony it represents. The speech, coming in an 
epilogue already explicitly signaling Marx through its title, is imbued with a conclusiveness 
that disturbs DeLillo’s carefully balanced oppositions. Structurally paralleling Marvin’s 
argument in the novel, the position of Maltsev’s speech as well as its content appears to 
close the loop of the text, trapping the tensions it explores within, rather than leaving the 
question of the possibility of critique open. Removing Maltsev’s speech preserves this 
question, and it is to this notion of possibility that I will turn in the following, concluding 
section.   
 
* * * 
 
 Laclau and Butler represent, to perhaps a greater extent than Žižek, the legacy of the 
‘linguistic turn’ of the twentieth century. Butler effectively summarises both the openness 
and the instability of language in her final contribution to Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality, when she concludes that ‘language will not only build the truth that it 
conveys, but it will also convey a different truth from the one that was intended, and this 
will be a truth about language, its unsurpassability in politics’ (Butler, 279). For Butler 
especially, but Laclau also, there persists a gulf between the symbolic order in which the 
political must be conducted and the Real to which it gestures. This isn’t to say that politics 
is therefore futile, rather both Butler’s multiple truths and Laclau’s ‘language games’ 
represent an ‘expansion of the political imagination’ and the ‘going beyond’ of traditional 
Marxism that post-Marxism represents. The antagonist to this view is, again, Žižek, who 
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commits himself to the distinction Laclau had previously critiqued—that of the difference 
between effecting change within the system, at the superstructural level, or against the 
system, by reconfiguring the base—and argues that in fact it is possible for a subject to 
achieve the latter by means of the Lacanian ‘act,’ a gesture which, ‘by definition, touches 
the dimension of some impossible Real’ (122). In a further demonstration of the 
malleability of the superstructure/base metaphor, Žižek here equates superstructure and 
base with the dichotomy of symbolic and Real, respectively.   
 
In successive drafts of the final pages of Underworld, DeLillo wrestles with this same 
question regarding whether an ‘act’ might approach the Real, or whether it will always be 
blocked by the ‘unsurpassability’ of language. In the published text of the novel, the very 
final lines of Underworld read:  
'[…] But it's only a sequence of pulses on a dullish screen and all it can do is make 
you pensive—a word that spreads a longing through the raw sprawl of the city and 
out across the dreaming bourns and orchards to the solitary hills. Peace.' (827)  
However, in the earliest draft of the novel, the lines are quite different. The first iteration of 
these lines reads: 'Listen and smell, live in the world, follow the word off the screen and 
into the street and across the landscape that rolls to the solitary mountains. Peace' (68.6). 
In this draft, ‘peace,’ as a word and a concept, is transported off the computer screen and 
out into the street. The linguistic expression penetrates the barrier of the screen and 
appears to inhabit the Žižekian dimension of the ‘impossible Real,’ transcending mere 
expression to operate as an ‘act.’ But as DeLillo redrafts this conclusion, the 
‘unsurpassibility’ of language increasingly drives a wedge between ‘peace’ as a word and 
‘peace’ as a real-world manifestation. In their second iteration, the lines read: 'and you try 
a little unreachably to imagine the word on the screen taking its serenities and 
contentments out into the street,' and in their third, ‘and you try to understand the limits 
of the word on your screen, how it can never become a thing in the world.’ This slow 
gradation from the word in ‘the street’ to the word as ‘a sequence of pulses’ appears to 
suggest the same poststructuralist abandonment of ‘the pretense to a critique that would 
go beyond language games, beyond epistemology and the aesthetic’ that Huyssen locates 
in the exhaustion of the modernist project. 
  
Returning to the question of art, this reading can be bolstered by DeLillo’s own ‘language 
games’ relating to the varying modes of address in the novel. In the passage I quoted in the 
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first part of this paper, Moonman directs his graffiti at a ‘you’ that refuses to acknowledge 
him. Meanwhile, in his analysis of Long Tall Sally, Nick Shay perceives ‘you’ as a malign 
force when he remarks in another excised draft that Klara’s piece is ‘[about] who we are 
when you are not directing your menace into our lives’ (62.6). Finally, Klara associates ‘you’ 
with ‘us’ against ‘them’ in her response to Eisenstein’s film (444). So, for Nick ‘you’ are a 
malign presence; for Moonman, ‘you’ are an apathetic public; and for Klara, ‘you’ are a 
sympathetic community. ‘You,’ of course, are also the owner of the voice in which Cotter 
Martin speaks at the very beginning of the novel: ‘He speaks in your voice, American.’ The 
‘underworld’ of Underworld—the slums of Manhattan, Klara’s boneyard, Cotter Martin’s 
Bronx, Moonman’s subways—are evoked by the novel and the artists within firstly as a 
means of asserting their existence a la Baudrillard’s graffiti. But the shifting signifiers—
‘you,’ ‘us,’ ‘them’—point also to the way in which these artworks are multivalent in 
meaning and open to interpretation. The shifting signifiers of Underworld’s art projects and 
the fact that ‘you’ can be menace to one character and ally to another suggests a 
continually fluctuating and malleable system of repression and subversion that exceeds and 
transgresses traditional, fixed class divides. This system operates on an individual, 
subjective level, much like the complex ‘imperialist chain’ which Laclau posits as the ideal 
means of understanding global capitalism, full of pressure points and thus full of 
opportunity for specific struggles to be translated into a universal challenge to hegemony. 
 
What is at question in both the exchanges in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality and in 
DeLillo’s 1990s fiction concerns the extent to which classic Marxist tenets still hold, and 
consequently, to what extent the concrete changes these tenets predict can still be 
anticipated; or, whether post-Marxist discourse has shifted the work of progressive politics 
entirely into the realm of the symbolic. In the iterations Underworld goes through, one can 
clearly see DeLillo vacillate between these conflicting positions. A temptation to articulate a 
more traditionally Marxist, or neo-Marxist, position jars with DeLillo’s postmodern 
skepticism of metanarratives and linguistic instability. This first results in the jettisoning of 
the Maltsev speech, which appears to deny the possibility of art’s role in effecting social 
change. At the end of the novel, DeLillo finds himself tending too far in the opposite 
direction, endorsing a Žižekian view of art as an ‘act’ capable of effecting exactly this 
concrete change. Characteristically of his ‘bi-directional’ or dialectical approach, DeLillo 
ultimately also excises these moments in which the text endorses the possibility of a 
reconfiguration of the economic base through critique.  
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Despite these insecurities, DeLillo doesn’t give up entirely on the Marxist critique the text 
contains. Rather, he draws towards a post-Marxist position in which the hegemony of a 
complex world system rests on its articulation through symbolic discourse and the interplay 
between metanarratives and subversive counternarratives—counternarratives which, as an 
expression of felt life, relinquish the goal of autonomy in favour of universality. In this 
sense, the novel appears to argue for the possibility of critique and for its own value as a 
critical tool. But the language games DeLillo deploys remain frozen between 
poststructuralist retreat and post-Marxist expansion. The structure of Underworld is 
cyclical, its chapters arrayed in a mirror-like arrangement. Like the narrative itself, DeLillo’s 
position in relation to the question of art as a mode of Marxist critique collapses and folds 
back on itself, and at the end of the novel, while the shadow of a decision is visible, this 
question is ultimately left unresolved.   
 
 
The Body Artist 
 
 
DeLillo’s drafts of his 2001 novel The Body Artist are haunted by a phrase the author 
couldn’t seem to escape. DeLillo scribbles it in notepads and in the margins of manuscript 
pages, and writes it into—and back out of—almost a dozen different scenes in the novel. A 
hangover, perhaps, from the final failure of language that marks the end of Underworld, 
the repeated phrase reads: ‘otherwise it’s just words’ (6.5, 6.6, 7.1, 7.2). This fragment 
expresses a frustration on the author’s part to successfully manifest something beyond the 
written page—to, for example, drag ‘peace’ out into the streets. With The Body Artist 
DeLillo resets his ambitions to a more minor key. The compressed, almost claustrophobic 
narrative he produces, however, succeeds in doing that which it seems Underworld 
ultimately could not: to create something ‘more than words.’ 
 
The Body Artist begins where Underworld ends: with a T. S. Eliot reference and a collapse of 
linguistic meaning. In the first scene of the novel an unnamed couple, ‘still a little puddled 
in dream melt’ (3), enjoy a lazy, somewhat disjointed breakfast. The pair communicate 
ineffectually to one another and at one point, watching the feeder outside the window, 
DeLillo tells us, ‘the birds broke off the feeder in a wing-whir that was all b's and r's, the 
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letter b followed by a series of vibrato r's. But that wasn't it at all. That wasn't anything like 
it’ (14). Recalling Eliot’s Prufrock—‘turning toward the window, should say: / “That is not it 
at all, / That is not what I meant, at all.”’—the scene hesitates and stumbles over 
sensations that struggle to be rendered linguistically: ‘the sense somewhere of the color 
blue, runny and wan’ (5); the smell of soya, the way ‘nothing described it. It was pure smell’ 
(13); and ‘a hundred other things, nameable or not’ (17). Out of this insufficiency of 
language and DeLillo’s desire to write something that is more than ‘just words’ arises the 
novel proper. Following their breakfast, Rey Robles shoots himself and leaves his third wife 
Lauren Hartke, the eponymous body artist, to grieve his absence. She discovers a strange 
man, whom she names Mr. Tuttle, living in her house. Tuttle, an apparent manifestation of 
her grief, offers Lauren temporary, imperfect access to a trace of Rey, but disappears 
towards the end of the novel as abruptly as he had arrived. Alone again, Lauren develops 
the experiences the novel has described into a piece of ‘body art’, a performance work that 
enacts her process of grieving and ultimately enables Lauren to re-enter the society from 
which she had temporarily withdrawn.     
 
Thematically, The Body Artist represents the convergence point for the question first raised 
in Mao II: what are the possibilities for art in contemporary Western society? Throughout 
Mao II and Underworld, DeLillo flirts with a number of responses to this question: art as an 
expression of repressed communities and ideas; art as an articulation of a sociality 
formative of new communities; art as an amelioration of the existential loneliness of the 
alienated reader; art as an enunciation of impersonal feelings facilitating an interpersonal 
connection; art as a force of social change. Returning to Jeffrey Nealon, we might group 
these functions into two groups: the ‘strong power’ of the artwork as operating on a large 
scale to express, develop, and generate social formations and social change; and the ‘weak 
power’ whereby the artwork operates on a muted level, at the ‘retail consciousness’ of the 
individual consumer to provide a sealed space extant to neoliberal flow and to soothe that 
consumer’s sense of alienation. The Body Artist converges at a synthesis of several of these 
ideas, marrying a possibility of temporal interruption to a nuanced version of the notions of 
interpersonal exchange and post-Marxist language play expressed in the earlier novels. 
 
* * * 
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Following Rey’s death, Lauren enters a state of ‘still time,’ or timelessness, embodied by 
the atemporal figure of Mr. Tuttle. This strange, childlike man exists somehow outside of 
conventional human experience of time. From Lauren’s perspective, DeLillo attempts to 
describe Mr. Tuttle’s existence: 
Time is the only narrative that matters. It stretches events and makes it possible for 
us to suffer and come out of it and see death happen and come out of it. But not 
for him. He is in another structure, another culture, where time is something like 
itself, sheer and bare, empty of shelter. (98)  
With Mr. Tuttle alongside her, Lauren enters this ‘other structure’ that exists outside of 
time. Her plan, we are told, ‘was to organise time until she could live again’ (36). Removed 
from the ordinary flow of time, Lauren can exert a degree of influence over her experience 
or perception of everyday life as a means of separating out a parcel of timelessness in 
which she can grieve for her lost husband. While Lauren’s escape from time is motivated by 
this grieving, the novel’s expression of her escape—especially though its own formal 
qualities—implies a broader sense by which art can be understood to function as an 
antidote to time. This notion is described explicitly in DeLillo’s notes for the novel when he 
writes, in a spiral notebook containing early ideas for the piece, ‘Art is the cure for time. Art 
stops time’ (6.5). This is the clearest expression of the interruptive potential of art that 
Nealon finds expressed in DeLillo’s work, and that I identified previously in the moments in 
Mao II in which the novel is evoked as a figurative manifestation of a little room or plane 
seat.  
 
The idea of consciously manipulating or temporarily halting time as a form of resistance or 
an attempt to exert a sense of personal autonomy has gained increasing prominence in the 
twenty-first century as a response to the temporal intensification of daily life under late 
capitalism.25 David Harvey identifies the basic importance of fast time to capitalism when 
he observes that ‘capital must circulate continuously or die. The speed of its circulation is 
also important. If I can circulate my capital faster than you, then I have a certain 
competitive advantage’ (Harvey 2014, 73). Following this idea, Jonathan Martineau, in his 
2016 book Time, Capitalism and Alienation: A Socio-Historical Inquiry into the Making of 
Modern Time, distinguishes between the concrete time of lived experience—of seasons, 
day and night—and clock time, a ‘worldwide time regime’ (111) of social relations that 
                                                          
25 These ideas are treated explicitly by DeLillo in the novel following The Body Artist, 2003’s 
Cosmopolis. 
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demarcates and arbitrarily constrains the ‘natural rhythms’ of life, broadly for the benefit 
of early systems of commerce, and later, for industrial capitalism. In the twenty-first 
century, this system has evolved in the ways in which it structures daily life, mutating from 
a system of rigidly defined boundaries to a more fluid temporality in line with capitalism’s 
colonization of leisure time and even sleep. In 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, 
Jonathan Crary critiques the ‘normative trajectories and conditions’ of twenty-first century 
capitalism, one of which is ‘the generalised inscription of human life into duration without 
breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning. […] A time that no longer passes, 
beyond clock time’ (8).26 A trajectory from lived time, to clock time, to a kind of post-clock 
temporality parallels the trajectory from pre- to post-industrial life. 
 
With increased attention being paid to the intensification and indeterminacy of late-
capitalist temporality, there has also come, since around the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, a renewed interest in how the flow of time might be reclaimed for the individual 
as a subversive response to the hegemony of capitalist fast time. Michelle Boulous Walker’s 
Slow Philosophy: Reading Against the Institution champions ‘slowness’ as a response to 
temporal intensification. The ‘slow movement’ that she describes in the book is  
not a counter-cultural retreat from everyday life, not a return to the past, the good 
old days […] neither is it a form of laziness, nor a slow-motion version of life […] 
Rather it is […] a process whereby everyday life—in all its pace and complexity, 
frisson and routine—is approached with care and attention (Boulous Walker, qtd. 
In Lloyd).  
Primarily focusing on the practice of philosophy, Walker’s idea nevertheless taps into a 
broader cultural zeitgeist oriented around the idea of ‘slowness’.27  
 
In a review of Boulous Walker’s book for The Los Angeles Review of Books, Henry Martyn 
Lloyd notes that ‘slow reading is often characterized by its intensity: it involves a fine-tuned 
attention to detail and nuance,’ and that this reading practice can be generative of a sense 
of openness: ‘Boulous Walker,’ Lloyd suggests, ‘is advocating reading as an act of 
                                                          
26 As we saw in chapter 1, this ‘duration without breaks’ is a hallmark of the neoliberal work 
environment, and a catalyst for the slacker’s impulse to withdraw. 
27 In recent years, the epithet ‘slow’ has been appended to a vast array of cultural practices, 
beginning with the ‘slow food’ movement in 1986, and spreading to everything from fashion to 
travel. Many of these movements are discussed in Carl Honore’s 2004 book In Praise of Slowness: 
Challenging the Cult of Speed, which the Financial Times famously described as being ‘to the Slow 
movement what Das Kapital is to communism’ (van der Post). 
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meditative contemplation that has transformative potential, which opens the self to the 
possibility of a reorientation vis-à-vis knowledge and the other’ (Lloyd). This sense by which 
the reader, engaged in a process of slow reading, may become ‘open’ to reorientation 
recalls the ‘openness’ of Scott Lash’s ideal social subject and of the intimate relationship 
DeLillo posits between author and reader in his discussion of Salman Rushdie: ‘[the] spirit 
of Rushdie lives […] in the narrow passage between the writer who works in solitude and 
the reader whose own living space or park bench or plane seat is "the little room of 
literature."’ In this instance, Rushdie’s ‘spirit’ is the embodiment of his work’s 
transformative potential, contingent on the reader occupying the ‘little room of literature,’ 
itself a spatial expression of slow reading.  
 
With The Body Artist DeLillo makes a distinct stylistic choice that seems calculated to 
encourage slow reading. Time is a thematic focus of the novel from the very first 
sentences—‘Time seems to pass. The world happens, unrolling into moments’ (7)—but 
DeLillo also generates a sense of time from his sentences themselves, which are often 
paragraph-long and punctuated with commas, mimicking the same sense of ‘unrolling’ that 
DeLillo evokes on the opening page. Vague referents, a focus on the quotidian minutiae of 
daily life—one page-long scene describes a paperclip falling, its echoes rippling through 
‘teeming space’ and ‘an immense web of distances’—and Lauren’s halting struggle with 
language all further contribute to the novel’s achingly slow pace. Several reviewers pick up 
on this sensation when reporting on their experiences reading the novel. Alan Begley notes 
how DeLillo ‘slows the reader down’ (Begley, ‘Ghostbuster’) for example, while Donna 
Seaman observes that 'there is a curious physics at work in this intense narrative, which 
takes much longer to read than its size would suggest.' And in a letter to DeLillo, David 
Foster Wallace notes that the novel ‘took a long time to read. I read it very slowly’ (101.10). 
These remarks affirm the way the novel operates to generate its own ideal reader: the 
‘slow reader’ championed in Boulous Walker’s book. With its reader suitably removed from 
the capitalist flow of fast time, the novel exhibits its own potential to interrupt, a la Nealon, 
and draws us also back to the ideas of everyday life and to the reinvigoration of leisure 
time I discussed in relation to the slacker fiction of the early-1990s (see chapter 1).   
 
* * * 
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In an article on Lauren’s eventual performance piece, Body Time, the artist tries to explain 
the rationale behind her work. The idea, she muses, is to 
"Stop time, or stretch it out, or open it up. Make a still life that's living, not painted. 
When time stops, so do we. We don't stop, we become stripped down, less self-
assured. I don't know. In dreams or high fevers or doped up or depressed. Doesn't 
time slow down or seem to stop? What's left? Who's left?" (113). 
Doubling-back and self-cancelling, Lauren’s stilted explanation posits, and then rejects, the 
idea of ‘stopped time’ in favour of ‘stretched’ or ‘opened’ time; ‘living’ time. What is 
advocated, in Lauren’s work, is not a rejection of—or interruption of—time but a 
reorientation of temporal experience towards a slowness that nevertheless still flows. 
Simultaneously, her open, inquiring manner—her repeated entreaties for reviewer Mariella 
to share her sensations of the piece: ‘doesn’t time slow down or seem to stop?’—suggests 
that Lauren’s real goal for Body Time is to generate a feeling, a ‘seeming’ that is at once 
tangible and yet vague, ephemeral—what, referring to Rachel Greenwald Smith, we might 
call an ‘impersonal feeling.’  
 
In both Crary and Boulous-Walker, and in the broader slow life movement, time is similarly 
celebrated rather than denigrated. For Crary, the problem with late-capitalism is its 
effacement of clock time in favour of a time ‘that no longer passes.’ Meanwhile for 
Boulous-Walker, the point of the slow movement is to pay renewed attention to the ‘pace 
and complexity’ of everyday life. In each of these examples, a different flow of time is 
advocated for, rather than a time that is simply halted. As Lauren develops her art and her 
grief simultaneously, she likewise moves from advocating a sense of being outside of time 
to a recognition of the necessity of re-entering time. Occupying a ‘still life’ allows Lauren to 
work through the repercussions of Rey’s death, but as she develops her art performance 
she recognizes the necessity of transforming that still life into something ‘living.’ This ‘still 
life that’s living’ becomes Body Time.28 Like DeLillo’s novel, Lauren’s art succeeds in 
disrupting the flow of time, slowing it down until it becomes almost unbearable. But also 
like DeLillo’s novel, this temporal experience is not bound to the individual artist. Rather, 
both Hartke and DeLillo use their artworks to disseminate slowness, to—in the words of 
                                                          
28 Mariella describes this piece in terms curiously similar to those eventually used by the reviewers 
of The Body Artist. ‘Hartke clearly wanted her audience to feel time go by,’ Mariella writes, 
‘viscerally, even painfully. This is what happened, causing walkouts among the less committed’ 
(110). 
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Mariella—make the observer or reader ‘feel time go by.’ As Mariella observes, Lauren’s art 
is  
obscure, slow, difficult, and sometimes agonizing. But it is never the grand agony of 
stately images and sets. It is about you and me. What begins in solitary otherness 
becomes familiar and even personal. It is about who we are when we are not 
rehearsing who we are. (116).   
With this passage, DeLillo could be describing his own novel. Lauren’s journey in the piece 
likewise represents a movement from ‘solitary otherness’ to something ‘familiar and […] 
personal.’ As her grieving progresses, Lauren re-enters time through art, and as she does 
the novel begins to integrate outside characters—Mariella, the landlord—to demonstrate 
the way in which Lauren’s performance grants her readmission into society. At the same 
time, the participatory experience of viewing her work places her artwork at the center of 
this process of community-formation. As Mark Osteen observes, 
Body Time embodies second chances not only for Lauren, who revives and 
undertakes Mr. Tuttle and Rey, but also for audience members, who cannot watch 
passively but must engage in a spirited give-and-take with Lauren’s impersonations 
and subversions. Lauren’s echoes thus reverberate against the audience’s 
experiences to enable the formation–even if briefly–of a genuine community 
(Osteen 2008). 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I suggested that Underworld could be read as a pre-
emptive rejoinder to the criticism Nealon would level at Mao II by aspiring to exactly the 
effect of ‘widespread cognitive dissonance’ he criticises the former novel for abandoning. 
Ultimately, though, I observed that Underworld concluded on a note of exhaustion and the 
expression of its own limitations. With this pattern, DeLillo follows many artists so far 
discussed in this thesis: upon arriving at the sense that their art cannot effect real change, 
the artist begins to create art that posits the possibility for this change in a form separate 
from that in which they are working—they make imperfect art about ideal art. In the case 
of Linklater, for example, the filmmaker creates a film that, by its nature, is inescapably 
bound to the mechanics of capitalism, but which features examples of artworks extant to 
these mechanics. DeLillo, however, pursues a different approach. Markedly separate from 
the ‘bi-directional’ structures of his previous novels, Lauren’s linear trajectory in The Body 
Artist suggests a commitment to a compromised but nevertheless generative, rather than 
self-referential, possibility for art. Likewise, the shift DeLillo signals in his use of language—
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from language as description or narration, which is undermined by the moments of failure 
present in the opening scene, to language as a means of generating a ‘slowness’ that 
registers on an affective, rather than intellectual, plane—suggests that the author’s belief 
in the possibility of fiction is not exhausted contiguously with his belief in the possibility of 
language. To return, again, to David Cowart’s analysis, DeLillo’s fiction compellingly argues 
that 'if there is a site of resistance, it is language.' 
 
In the novel’s final scene, Lauren evocatively throws open a window in her house. DeLillo 
writes, ‘she wanted to feel the sea tang on her face and the flow of time in her body, to tell 
her who she was’ (132). The flow of time is recognized as key to personal knowledge, and 
expression of this knowledge—say, in the form of performance art—helps generate a sense 
of affective connection between the artist and her audience. Mariella reads Lauren’s piece 
as ‘about who we are when we aren’t pretending who we are,’ recalling Bill’s novels, 
Klara’s art, and Eisenstein’s film, each of which contains the idea that art can express 
something essential about ourselves that even we cannot put into words. Lauren’s art 
imposes her feeling onto others as a means of sharing and ameliorating those feelings,29 
and allows the artist to re-enter ‘felt life’. And, as critics like Rachel Greenwald Smith have 
rightly observed, encountering this art makes possible the opportunity to share those 
feelings, thus facilitating a form of social exchange based on the openness, dialogism, and 
reception that Scott Lash celebrates as the integral facets of sociality. 
 
In another note taken in preparation for writing The Body Artist, DeLillo finally, directly, 
answers the question around which this chapter has been circling: 
Role of artist in 21st century--directly influence people's lives; to infiltrate people's 
lives; to make art seamless with living. 
[…] 
To change the way people think, eat, sleep, shit. 
The ambition to ‘make art seamless with living’ surfaces in all of DeLillo’s work in this 
decade. From the sociality expressed in Mao II, which draws ‘together […] life and art 
through cultural activities which have only a marginal function under capitalism’; to Klara’s 
stated belief in Underworld that art and life are ‘all the same thing’; to Lauren’s literal ‘body 
art’, wherein her art and herself are physically indistinguishable: each novel demonstrates 
                                                          
29 In response to Franzen’s request for a quote for his Harper’s article, DeLillo told Franzen, ‘writers 
write to survive.’ 
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the way in which art can enter and reorganize the inner life not of the culture on a large 
scale but of the individual and their interpersonal relationships and affective sensations on 
a small scale. Matching the trajectory of so many artists in the 1990s, DeLillo’s ambitions 
ultimately—necessarily—diminish, but the author does not abandon his art entirely to self-
reflexivity. Rather, DeLillo pushes forward, for a way out of the bind that Mao II first 
introduces: embracing neither the autonomy of modernism nor the heteronomy of 
postmodernism, neither pure hermetic interruption nor grand social disruption, and 
neither the power of language nor the failure of fiction; DeLillo instead converges on an 
idea of post-postmodernism that emphasises partial autonomy, small-scale sociality, and 
complex feeling. In doing so his work operates subtly but effectively, ceding the territory of 
grand spectacle to terror but claiming as it does the spaces of everyday life as its own to 
reorganize and rejuvenate.    
200 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Rupturing Events 
 
 
The long nineties ended in 2001, with the fall of the Twin Towers on September 11. In the 
decades following 9/11, the event has come to represent a major rupturing force with 
significant repercussions not just for American politics, but for American society and 
culture, too. This viewpoint is echoed repeatedly in literary criticism focused on the twenty-
first century.1 However, the tendency to describe 9/11 as a ‘break’ or ‘rupture’ in these 
texts does not extend to the field of literary production itself, unlike, for example, the way 
in which the rupturing events of the First World War are often considered to mark the 
transition from realism to modernism at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
despite a series of further ‘ruptures’ in early twenty-first century American history, most 
notably the financial crisis of 2008 and the election of Donald Trump as President of the 
United States in November 2016, there has been little critical consensus as to the impact of 
these events on American art. Arguably, it is simply too soon to periodise in the way that I 
have throughout this thesis.  
 
The events of 2001, of 2008, and of 2016 no doubt represent violent, polarising forces. 
Americans’ sense of both liberty and security has been pressurised by terrorist threats and 
the surveillance-based response of western governments, economic precarity has 
intensified following the global crash, and the rise of populism has heralded the increasing 
vocalisation of new extremes of political opinion. Indeed, so radically has the political 
landscape altered since the 1990s that critics are increasingly questioning whether the 
neoliberal project—which seemed so hegemonically entrenched only a decade earlier—has 
come to its end. Will Davies’ taxonomy of neoliberalisms, referred to earlier in this thesis, 
                                                          
1 For more on ‘post-9/11’ fiction, see: Life Between Two Deaths, 1989-2001, in which Philip E. 
Wegner argues that 9/11 heralded ‘a true new world order’ (24); 9/11 and the Literature of Terror, 
in which Martin Randall suggests that 9/11 ‘fundamentally and irrevocably ruptured reality’ (35); 
and Arin Keeble’s The 9/11 Novel: Trauma, Politics, and Identity, in which 9/11 is repeatedly referred 
to as an event of ‘trauma and rupture’ (90).   
201 
 
concludes with the post-2008 formation of ‘punitive neoliberalism,’ characterised by its 
propagation of cruel austerity politics ostensibly to safeguard economic stability. Davies’ 
description of punitive neoliberalism evokes an ‘undead’ state. Today, Davies writes,  
sovereignty is found in technical and technocratic spheres: policies, punishments, 
cuts, calculations are simply being repeated, as that is the sole condition of their 
reality. The coercions of post-2008 policymaking are those of a system in retreat 
from both the ideology and the reality of rational public dialogue, and the 
epistemological constraints which that involves. (134) 
In the years after the 2008 crash, neoliberalism could be observed in a state of living death. 
By the mid-2010s its fragility had only increased. In 2016, the IMF took the unprecedented 
step of not only directly recognising the label ‘neoliberalism,’ but also of recognising that 
aspects of the neoliberal project had failed. Writing for the Finance & Development branch 
of the IMF, Ostry, Loungani and Furceri suggested that ‘instead of delivering growth, some 
neoliberal policies have increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion.’ For 
the IMF itself to address the failures of neoliberalism marks a significant moment in the late 
history of this economic project. And by November 2016, Donald Trump had been elected 
to the highest office of the United States on a campaign waged on the populist rejection of 
wealthy elites and globalised trade. Days after this result, The Guardian gleefully declared 
‘Goodbye, American Neoliberalism,’ observing that a 'lethal fusion of economic insecurity 
and cultural scapegoating [had] brought neoliberalism to its knees.' Closer to home, I have 
been involved in the running of the research project ‘Freedom After Neoliberalism’ at the 
University of York. In the 2018 edited collection of Open Library of Humanities on this topic, 
editors Adam Kelly and Alex Beaumont, the founders of the project, offer a reading of the 
contemporary situation that draws short of declaring the death of neoliberalism, but that 
nevertheless recognises the moment of crisis in which this ideology finds itself: 
Quite suddenly, ground has opened up on either side of the 'centrist' neoliberal 
doxa that previously dominated the political arena. On the right, new forms of 
cultural revanchism are propelling political parties into power whose presence in 
national assemblies would have been unthinkable during the 1990s. And […] it is 
also the case that opportunities have opened up for the reinvigoration of leftist 
politics. 
Neoliberalism, then, is perhaps not dead yet. But after the dual blows of an economic crisis 
and a political crisis, the once seemingly impenetrable ideology finds itself only just clinging 
to life. These events, however, are too contemporary to confidently periodise. Perhaps 
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future scholars will be able to say with confidence that the long nineties was followed by a 
‘short noughties,’ ending with the crash of 2008. Or perhaps the relative stability of ‘the 
Obama years’ will be followed by the apocalyptic epoch of the ‘Trump years.’ However, it is 
my contention that at the moment of writing the long nineties represents the most recent 
period that we can, with some certainty, identify as having both a beginning, an ending, 
and a characteristic set of aesthetic forms, as I have set out in the preceding chapters. 
 
 
Taipei Ennui 
 
 
What, then, can we say about the cultural products of the twenty-first century from the 
vantage point of this thesis’ findings? Rather than attempting to make broader, definitive 
claims about this period, I want in these final pages to look closely at a single contemporary 
text, to consider how the readings I have conducted in this thesis might help readers 
understand the texts that have followed. Writers, filmmakers and artists who are in their 
mid-thirties now lived their formative years in the 1990s, and it follows that to an extent 
they have inherited both the neoliberal economy of that decade, and the aesthetic forms 
developed as a response. One such writer is Tao Lin, whose most recent novel, Taipei 
(2013), explicitly draws upon some of the literary techniques I have discussed in this thesis, 
even as it presents its own distinct picture of American life under late capitalism.   
 
Lin initially rose to fame as a central figure among the loosely affiliated group of artists 
comprising the Alt Lit movement.2 Taipei, his third novel and the first from a major 
publisher, follows Paul, an American author of Taiwanese descent, on a book tour and trip 
to Taipei to visit his parents. Much of the narrative action is spent with Paul either taking 
drugs or ‘doing things’ on his Macbook, or frequently both together. The narrative is 
listless, Paul’s interior monologue oscillating between apathy and anxiety and delivered in 
long, run-on sentences: 
                                                          
2 Writing in The New Yorker, Kenneth Goldsmith describes Alt Lit as 
an online writing community that emerged in 2011 and harnesses the casual affect and 
jagged stylistics of social media as the basis of their works—poems, stories, novels, tweets, 
and status updates. Its members have produced a body of distinctive literature marked by 
direct speech, expressions of aching desire, and wide-eyed sincerity. 
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He vaguely traced back the night and concluded he should’ve left when, on his way 
to the venue, he had been “completely lost.” He allowed himself to consider earlier 
opportunities, mostly for something to do, and discerned after a brief sensation of 
helplessness—like if he’d divided 900 by itself and wanted the calculator to answer 
494/494 or 63/63—that, in terms of leaving this social situation, he shouldn’t have 
been born. (21) 
As a Brooklyn-based, Florida-born author with Taiwanese parents, Paul is a clear analogue 
for Lin himself. Much like the third-person fiction of Kathy Acker, then, Lin’s novel is a work 
of autofiction. Furthermore, Paul’s unconventional work ethic—towards the beginning of 
the novel he refers to several months of his life as ‘an interim period’ between stretches of 
creative work—and his penchant for introspective philosophising and periods of prolonged 
doing nothing mark him as an inheritor of the slacker mindset. Indeed, Lin’s work is 
representative of a trend in twenty-first century fiction, particularly noticeable in the Alt Lit 
genre, towards producing autofictional narratives of slacker lifestyles.  
 
In an interview with Vol.1 Brooklyn, Noah Cicero, one of Alt Lit’s most prominent authors 
alongside Lin, offered the following when asked to define Alt Lit: 
Currently I am sitting in Seongnam, South Korea […] I wouldn’t be here unless I met 
Brittany Wallace through the alt lit connection. To reduce alt lit, online literature or 
whatever, to merely literature is not the truth. It is a way of life, a new type of view 
that doesn’t correspond with the views of societies that want us to be good little 
college kids that get jobs and pay off our student loans, then buy televisions and 
cable, and spend our lives watching “Two and Half Men”, Fox News, CNN and Shia 
Lebeouf movies in some dumbass suburb going deeper and deeper into debt. 
Unpacking Cicero’s comments raises a number of notable points: not only that Alt Lit 
represents a new mode of withdrawal modelled after the slacker archetype and intensified 
by the addition of student debt, but also that Cicero and fellow Alt Lit authors mobilise the 
internet to generate real-life networks of connections, in much the same way that slacker 
narratives attempted to instantiate communities through formal techniques decades 
earlier. The same impulse is notable in Taipei. Lin’s novel ends with Paul in his characteristic 
state, ‘lying on his back, on his mattress.’ In these final passages, Paul muses on the 
purpose of his writing: ‘he uncertainly thought he’d written books to tell people how to 
reach him, to describe the particular geography of the area of otherworld in which he’d 
been secluded’ (247). Echoing, with its spatial metaphor, the moment in Coupland’s 
204 
 
Generation X in which Andy allegorises his fiction writing as akin to the distribution of 
maps, Lin’s vision of his work evokes the techniques of the new sincerity: the notion that 
fiction can be mobilised as a conduit for connection between reader and writer.  
 
Lin’s use of the autofiction form further compounds this notion, but the stilted language, 
narcotic haze and frequently uncomfortable moments of misinterpretation are most 
reminiscent not of the texts I focused on in Chapter Two, so much as of the autofictional 
experiments of Dennis Cooper. Paul’s candid descriptions of his mental and physical states 
recall the obsession with the bodily as it is represented in Cooper and McCarthy when, for 
example, in a train station in Taipei Paul reports that he ‘tried masturbating and couldn’t 
and […] was worried he vomited some of his MDMA earlier, because he didn’t feel much’ 
(188). Less grotesque, but no less discomforting, is Pau’s apathetic, almost nihilistic 
attitude. Paul describes himself as feeling ‘like a digression that had forgotten from what it 
digressed and was continuing ahead in a confused, choiceless searching’ (67), and the 
reader’s experience mirrors this confusion: like Cooper’s flagrantly manipulative or 
delusional narrators, Paul’s candour is marred by moments of contradiction and a carefully 
maintained position of detachment. Moments of affective vulnerability, as in the novel’s 
final line: ‘[he] was surprised when he heard himself, looking at his feet stepping into black 
sandals, say that he felt ‘“grateful to be alive”’ (250), are framed by Paul’s habit of ironic 
quotation,3 as well as by qualifying statements drawing attention to the moment’s 
remarkability. This draws into greater prominence the dialectic of sincerity and irony that 
for critics like Adam Kelly resides at the heart of new sincerity: the notion that a reader can 
never be sure of the intention of the author, and that to take the author at face value thus 
always constitutes a leap of faith and a shared willingness to circumvent what Coupland 
calls ‘the carapace of coolness.’ 
 
Paul is at his most ironic when in Taipei, in the later chapters of the novel, and also at his 
most political. But, as Audrea Lim has observed, Paul is ‘embarrassingly inarticulate’ when 
it comes to observing something as complex as the intersection of class and race in Taipei. 
A conversation shared with Erin reveals this: 
                                                          
3 This is a frequent hallmark of Lin’s style, see for example this representative passage:  
Paul began, at some point, during the ninety-minute discussion, to feel a mocking, sitcom-
like conviction that, for him, “too many years had passed” since college—that without 
education’s season-backed, elaborately subdivided, continuous structure, traceable 
numerically backward almost to birth, connecting a life in that direction, he was becoming 
isolated and unexplainable. (19)  
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 “I don’t like places… where everyone working is a minority… because I feel like 
 there’s, um, too many different… I don’t know,” said Paul with a feeling like he 
 unequivocally did not want to be talking about what he was talking about, but had 
 accidentally focused on it, like a telescope a child had turned […] toward a wall. 
 […] 
 “Minorities,” said Erin at a normal volume. “What were you saying?” 
 “Just that… here, when you see someone, you don’t know… that… they live like 
 two hours away and are um… poor, or whatever,” said Paul very slowly, like he 
 was improvising an erasure poem from a mental image of a page of text. 
Indeed, for a novel set mostly in the financial heart of the Western world, New York, and 
named after the capital city of one of the four ‘Asian tigers’4—countries that have 
experienced rapid economic growth in the last half-century—overt references to 
financialisation are largely absent from Lin’s writing. Instead, like Franzen’s The Corrections, 
the effects of late capitalism are filtered largely through Paul’s subjective experience, and, 
also comparably to Franzen’s work, this experience is overwhelmingly characterised by 
depression. Sophie Atkinson has labelled Paul as a contemporary example of what she 
terms the ‘Sad Flâneur,’ a character archetype that ‘appears in literature in times in which 
capitalism is at its most ruthless: [and] lays bare the relationship between capitalism and 
depression.’ Like Franzen’s Gary, Paul’s mental state reflects the neoliberal economy, and 
as, post-crash, neoliberalism limps on in a state of undeath, so too does Paul continue to 
digress without purpose or pleasure. What is particularly significant, in light of the 
proliferation of suburban financial fictions in the 1990s, is that the ‘Sad Flâneur’ is an urban 
phenomenon. As Atkinson observes, Paul takes no pleasure in wandering New York or 
Taiwan because ‘these same cities are effectively the visual form of the same system that’s 
crushing them.’ Where, in the 1990s, suburbia could be effectively mobilised to critique a 
financial system based on deferral, in the 2010s the precarity experienced by Lin’s 
generation appears to preclude any faith in future returns—most characters in the novel 
work temporary, shift-based or freelance work—such that the suburban environment no 
longer becomes a viable or relevant setting. Instead, Paul’s restless, digressive journey 
through an urban city centre of shared apartments and hot desks emblematises an 
uncertain future, both for Paul and for the economy to which he belongs.  
 
                                                          
4 South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. For more see Gulati, ‘The Foundations of Rapid 
Economic Growth: The Case of the Four Tigers.’ 
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Ultimately, perhaps, in its affectless tone and meandering plot, Lin’s novel best represents 
the continuation and extension of Don DeLillo’s dialectical tradition. Where, as I 
demonstrated in my final chapter, DeLillo’s work in the mid-90s mobilises a dialectical 
structure in order to stage conflicts between grand ideas, in the 2000s he turns towards 
linearity in order to generate an aesthetic of slowness that allows for a confrontation with 
the personal: with grief, mourning, and existential uncertainty. Lin’s novel similarly 
‘stretches’ time, moving hesitatingly from passages that gloss over months (Paul’s first five-
week visit to Taipei is covered in a matter of pages) to achingly slow passages cataloguing a 
minutiae of movement and thought: 
Fran said to put on Rilo Kiley. Paul said it was Rilo Kiley and, after a few motionless 
seconds, Fran slowly turned her head away to rotate her face, like a moon orbiting 
behind its planet, interestingly out of view. (62) 
This pared back style, twinned with Paul’s restless forward momentum, echoes DeLillo’s 
late phase work like The Body Artist, and even more so Cosmopolis (2003), which also sites 
a narrative exploration of late capitalism in the centre of a major urban city. Paul’s 
aforementioned apoliticism precludes the staging of grand, dialectical debates—a 
symptom, perhaps, of the novel’s historical emergence during a period of prolonged 
centrism and relative stability in the US. 
 
In his Vulture article ‘Considering the Novel in the Age of Obama,’ Christian Lorentzen 
identifies four genres representative of American literature 2009-2017, all of which are 
arranged around what Lorentzen identifies as the crucial problem of this era: ‘problems of 
authenticity.’ It is my contention that it is sincerity, not authenticity, which is the defining 
problem of the twenty-first century, emerging out of the aesthetic experiments of the 
1990s. Lorentzen includes autofiction as one of his representative genres, and observes in 
conclusion that the inward-focused nature of narratives such as Lin’s may lead ‘literary 
historians [to] look back at the Obama years as a time of tranquility—when American 
writers had the luxury of looking inward, investigating the systems that formed them…’ 
(Lorentzen). Lin’s Taipei is but one of a number of texts that take this interiority to its 
glacially-paced, anxiety-ridden conclusion. Perhaps the ending of the Obama years will see 
also the end of such narratives. Looking forwards, the age of Trump heralds anything but 
tranquillity. New, radical extremes of discourse suggest a re-emergence of dialectical 
thought after a long period of centrism that has seemingly turned the gaze of authors like 
DeLillo and Lin inwards, while the imminent threats of environmental disaster and global 
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turmoil may well inject new urgency into political fiction, and a new, outwards-looking 
perspective. Writing in early 2019, it is difficult to periodise and difficult to predict what 
new genres and aesthetic forms the twenty-first century will see. What I consider certain, 
however, is that the legacy of the long nineties—of innovative formal experimentation, of 
art mobilised to generate new affective relationships between artist and audience, of 
compromise and contradiction and movement beyond failure, and of the importance of the 
attempt—will be apparent for many years to come. 
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